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 ABSTRACT 
This dissertation looks at how African countries can mitigate the effects of external debt burden.  
African countries are enmeshed in unsustainable external debts that have led to debt overhang 
problems, declining output, escalating current account deficits and worsening human welfare 
indicators.  These external debt burdens are further worsened by the structural weaknesses of these 
economies.  The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have initiated strategies aimed 
at trying to arrest the escalating debt burden such as rescheduling, structural adjustment programs 
and the highly indebted poor countries initiative.  However, African countries continue to 
experience difficulties in servicing external debts.  The objective of this study is to find ways by 
which African countries can effectively manage their debt burden and possibly come up with self 
pre-qualification schemes that would forestall future external debt problems.  The questions the 
study seeks to answer are: how can African countries effectively manage their current debt 
burden? What can African countries do to forestall the pervasive external debt accumulation in the 
future?  
To address these questions, I develop a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of external 
debt burden for Africa.  The model is estimated using the maximum likelihood method by 
applying the Kalman filter to the state space representation of the model.  Empirical results of the 
model suggest that African countries need to refine their basket of imports and mainly import 
inputs that can be used in the production sector as opposed to importing consumption goods.  Most 
importantly, these countries must re-think their export products and markets, and perhaps endeavor 
to export final goods as opposed to exporting primary commodities. 
 
Furthermore, simulations of the model show that an expansionary monetary shock and a 
favourable world commodity price shock leads to an increase in external debt.  On the other hand, 
the world interest rate shock leads to a fall in external debt.  An interesting result worth 
highlighting is that a favourable commodity price shock leads to an increase in imported 
investments but the increase in imported investments does not translate into increased output.  On 
the other hand, an unfavourable world interest rate shock leads to a fall in imported investments.  
Generally, these findings suggest that African countries are vulnerable to external shocks.  
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In pursuit of the second objective – possible ways of sourcing external debt and managing it 
sustainably – I find that the appropriate threshold level for debt sustainability is a ratio of external 
debt to gross domestic product of between 40%-60% for Africa compared to 120%-150% for Latin 
America.  Surprisingly, East Asia has the lowest significant debt sustainability threshold of the 
three emerging market regions.  On liquidity, which is captured by the short-term debt to reserves 
ratio, the threshold is 60%-80% for all the three regions.  On governance, a stable political 
environment plays a crucial role in determining the external debt burden of African countries.  An 
improvement in the legal system and a stable political environment leads to an increase in exports 
and a fall in consumption imports.  These in turn reduce foreign debt.  These findings suggest that 
African countries must pursue proper governance practices if they are to appropriately and 
effectively manage their external debt in ways that enhance economic progress instead of 
economic retardation.  
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 CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
"If a despotic power incurs a debt not for the needs or in the interest of the State, but to strengthen its 
despotic regime, to repress the population that fights against it, etc., this debt is odious for the population 
of all the State. This debt is not an obligation for the nation; it is a regime's debt, a personal debt of the 
power that has incurred it, consequently it falls with the fall of this power".      
             Alexander Sack, 1927. 
1.1 Background of the Study 
For over 25 years since the early 1980s, Africa‟s1 external debt burden has been unmanageable.  
The inability of the region‟s countries to service their debts is not only reflected by the massive 
build-up of arrears, but also by the number and frequency of debt rescheduling.  The attendant 
burden of the debt and the debt service payments are compounded by the serious structural 
weaknesses of African economies, such as lack of diversified export base, which makes it more 
difficult for the countries to adjust to changing world demand for tradable goods and changing 
production patterns.  Further, much of Africa‟s accumulated debt is as a result of ill-conceived 
creditor supported development projects, flawed policies and strategies that originated from 
development co-operation agencies in exchange for cold war support, and short sighted policy 
decisions by African leaders. These weaknesses constrain these countries from achieving the kind 
of high and sustainable growth that is necessary for mitigating, if not forestalling, needless 
external debts and their attendant problems.   
The severity of this problem can be seen from the large size of the current debt relative to income, 
and the attendant high debt service payments.  From an estimated total of $6 billion at the end of 
1970, the external debt of African countries rose to US$84.9 billion in 1981 and then rose further 
by 318 percent to US$270.3 billion in 2004.  During the same period, the nominal value of exports 
declined from US$49.3 billion in 1980 to US$25.9 billion in 1986 and stagnated at an average of 
US$27 billion due to falling commodity prices.  Stagnant exports increased the pressure to borrow 
abroad and that weakened the economic base for servicing the debt.  Debt as a percentage of GDP 
rose by 525 percent from 14.5 percent in 1971 to 76.2 percent in 1994 and declined marginally to 
51.1 percent in 2004.  In fact, Africa‟s external debt as a proportion of GDP is the highest in the 
world.  Debt to export ratio rose from 82.6 percent in 1980 to 279.2 percent in 1994 but declined 
                                                 
1
 In this study, Africa represents the southern region of the African Continent, which the Washington institutions call 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). 
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to 176 percent in 2003.  In the early 1990s, Africa‟s debt to export ratio was higher than that of 
any region except Latin America and the Caribbean.  However, between 1993 and 2002, Africa‟s 
debt to export ratio became the highest among developing regions of the World.  These ratios 
point to a worrying Africa‟s absolute inability to service its external debt. 
The debt service payment of the African region rose from under US$1 billion in 1970 to over 
US$10 billion in 1980, representing about 25 percent of export earnings; and it moderately 
increased to 28.7 billion in 2006.  The high debt service payment meant that a significant 
proportion of earned hard currencies are consumed by debt, thereby limiting the countries‟ ability 
to import necessary intermediate products.  The debt service also gobbles up a considerable share 
of the budget in many countries and consequently imposes significant constraints on domestic 
investment (Osei, 1995).   
The average net transfers for 1997 and 1998, for example, was US$10 billion, an amount spent by 
African governments entirely on servicing debt which was equivalent to more than 5 percent of the 
region‟s GDP (World Bank, 1999).  This amount represented more than the sub-continent‟s 
combined expenditure on primary health care and basic education for those two years.  These 
relatively huge transfers from the world‟s poorest region to the richest region are slowly but 
inexorably consigning most of these countries to a future of deepening poverty and helplessness.  
In fact, the African continent is the only developing region of the world where human welfare 
indicators are worsening, with the proportion of people living below the poverty line increasing. 
Excessive stock of external debt has retarded economic growth, and hampered the socioeconomic 
development of African countries.  In many African countries, debt servicing in the face of 
inadequate foreign exchange earnings lead to severe import strangulation, which holds back export 
growth, thus perpetuating vital inputs import shortages (Iyoha, 1999).  Falling investment 
combined with shortages of essential imported inputs results in declining real output.  Declining 
output and escalating current account deficits lead to increasing debt accumulation and rising debt 
servicing obligation. 
 1.2 Motivation for this Study 
Between 1975 and 1985, African countries embarked on rescheduling as a conventional method of 
debt management.  However, rescheduling compounded the debt problem as debtors had to pay a 
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lot more in interest (for example via recapitalization) than they had originally contracted.  The 
World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) came up with Structural Adjustment 
Programs (SAPs) that were supposed to rescue debtor countries by essentially making their 
budgetary thrust contractionary.  Instead, SAPs literally squeezed out every possible penny from 
ailing African economies in order to pay for bilateral and multilateral debts.  In a belated and 
seemingly reluctant attempt to address the pervasive stifling effects of debt burden on most of the 
developing world, creditor countries came up with the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) 
initiative in 1996 as a debt management scheme.  Its design was to write off the debts of heavily 
indebted countries.   
However, the major challenge of the HIPC initiative turned out to be its voluntary nature, which 
led to low participation by bilateral creditors.  There is also no legal basis requiring creditors to 
participate and provide debt relief on terms comparable to those granted by credibly committed 
creditors.  Despite the efforts made to reduce Africa‟s debt, the African countries continue to 
experience difficulties in managing the servicing of their relatively high stocks of external debt.  
This study seeks to find ways by which African countries can effectively manage their debt burden 
and possibly come up with self pre-qualification schemes that would forestall future debt burdens. 
Key questions 
1. How can African countries effectively manage their current debt burden? 
2. What can African countries do to forestall the occurrence of such high external debt 
accumulation in the future? 
 1.3 Goals of the Study 
1. Present an overview of the current debt problems among African countries. 
2. Derive a macroeconomic model of external debt, fit empirical data to it, and assess the 
impulse responses of pertinent variables in the model. 
3. Come up with possible prequalification schemes for better debt sourcing and management. 
 1.4 Key Findings and Innovations of the Study 
African countries have a tendency of being characterized by unsustainable external debts.  Despite 
efforts made by the World Bank and IMF through the HIPC initiative to cancel external debts of 
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low income countries, lending to these countries remain as high as before.  This study therefore 
provides concrete measures of debt management gains that are possible were African countries to 
adopt best practices in debt relevant macroeconomic management and governance infrastructure 
provision from other regions of emerging market economies.  To the best of my knowledge, there 
are no clearly computed thresholds for debt sustainability for African countries.  While computing 
the thresholds, I used Latin American and East Asian countries as benchmarks.  What came out is 
that different regions have their own threshold levels of sustainable external debts.  Specifically, 
African countries‟ external debt to gross domestic product should range between 40%-60% whilst 
the short-term-debt to international reserves ratio should range between 60%-80%.  
Additionally, I computed the equivalent effect of a change in institutional and policy variables vis-
à-vis exports and consumption imports.  In computing the equivalent effects, I followed Asiedu 
(2006) who computed similar effects on foreign direct investments.  I found that if African 
countries pursue export promotion policies similar to those of East Asian countries, they would 
boost their exports and thus reduce their foreign debts. 
Another key contribution to the literature is that I derive a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
model for African countries.  It is a microeconomic-based macroeconomic model and even though 
it shares some of the basic features of the small open economy models, it differs in two aspects.  
First, I include foreign debt in my model.  Second, in simulating the model, I first solve the 11 
dimensional model using Matlab and then I use the roots of the matrix quadratic equation to 
compute impulse responses unlike other studies that use the vector autoregressive method to 
compute impulse responses.  The key finding from the model is that exports reduce debt 
accumulation whilst consumption imports increase debt accumulation.  The simulations show that 
an expansionary monetary shock and a favourable world commodity price shock lead to an 
increase in external debt.  On the other hand, an increase in world interest rates leads to a fall in 
external debt.  
 1.5 Limitations of the Study 
In chapter three where I develop the model, I balance external debt as an arbitrage condition 
between exports and imports. I did not include transfers and fiscal policy into the equation whereas 
government spending and capital outflows play a major role on external debt accumulation 
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especially for African countries. The main focus of the study is on external debt and not public 
debt and consequently, the study does not take into account the budgetary implications of debt. 
There is also limitation on the availability of data on capital stocks for all sampled countries with 
the exception of South Africa.  Hence, I computed those countries‟ capital stocks using King and 
Levine (1994) and Limam and Miller‟s (2004) perpetual inventory method.  
 1.6 Outline of the Study 
In order to answer the aforementioned questions and achieve the goals of the study, the next 
chapter presents a review of debt crises effects on African countries and the consequences of these 
crises on their economies.  The effectiveness and/or ineffectiveness of SAPs and other debt 
management initiatives such as HIPC, Paris club and rescheduling are reviewed.   
Chapter three derives a macroeconomic model of external debt‟s potential burden.  The model has 
similar features of real business cycle (RBC) models such as first, firms and households optimize 
explicit objective functions subject to the resource and revenue constraints that they face.  Second, 
all agents have rational expectations and there is continuous market clearing.  Third, actual cycles 
are generated by providing a propagation mechanism for shocks.  In addition to these features, I 
model the evolution of foreign debt.  In my model, foreign debt balances into an arbitrage 
condition between exports and imports.  Another plausible assumption included in my model is 
that monetary authorities pursue money growth as their monetary policy following McCallum 
(1994) but money supply is driven by inflation gap and output gap following Taylor (1993).   The 
policy of money growth is in line with the actual practices of monetary authorities in this 
economy. If the economy is not growing, this money growth policy weakens the external value of 
its currency and increases the burden of servicing external debt. 
The model derived in this chapter is an eleven-dimensional model and it is estimated for 11 
African countries.  To solve the linear version of the model, I make use of Uhlig‟s (1999) method 
of undetermined coefficients.  I subsequently run simulations of 50 time periods to assess the 
model‟s impulse responses of important economic variables to debt-related macroeconomic 
shocks.   
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Chapter four derives possible national strategic schemes for better debt sourcing and management.  
In this chapter, I compute debt sustainability and liquidity thresholds for external debt using a 
panel data of 11 African countries.  I use middle income Latin American and East Asian countries 
as benchmarks in establishing Africa‟s debt sustainability and liquidity levels.  I also analyze the 
role that governance plays in external debt accumulation and thus, implied potential effective 
external debt policy.  Finally, chapter five concludes the study.  
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CHAPTER TWO: THE REVIEW OF DEBT CRISES EFFECTS ON AFRICAN 
COUNTRIES 
2.1 Definition of Debt Crises and their History 
The inception of the debt crisis refers to a period in the early 1980s when countries in emerging 
market economies reached a point where their foreign debt exceeded their earning power and they 
were not able to service their debt.  Un-payable debt is a term used to describe when the interest 
cost on external debt exceeds the amount that the country produces (earns), thus preventing the 
repayment of the debt. 
Between 1968 and 1973, the World Bank played a major role in the indebtedness of emerging 
market economies.  It urged on these countries of “the South” to borrow massively to finance the 
modernization of their export „apparatus‟ and to draw them more tightly into the world market.  
These loans constituted the multilateral part of the external debt equation.  When the world 
economy went into a recession during the 1970s and early 1980s, and oil prices skyrocketed, it 
created a breaking point for most developing countries.  Importantly, much of the current levels of 
debt were amassed following the 1973 oil crisis when the members of Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) pushed the price of oil up, making the oil-producing Arab nations 
very wealthy.   
The OPEC members decided to deposit their oil earnings in western banks, which in turn 
„recycled‟ a major portion of the deposits as loans to emerging market economies (Boyce, 1992).  
The banks lent large amounts of money to developing countries without much attention to where 
the money would be spent or whether countries would be capable of repaying the amount.  While 
some of this money went towards improving the standards of living for some in these countries, 
most of the loans never reached the poor of these countries.  Instead, it either went towards 
purchasing of armaments, private bank accounts of dictators, repression of their own people, civil 
wars or towards inappropriate large scale development projects; many of which proved to be of 
little value. 
The 1973 oil price shock also triggered a worldwide inflation and pushed industrial economies 
deeper into a recession.  The decision to fight inflation by using contractionary monetary policies 
in the rich industrial economies led to an increase in real interest rates.  The resultant slow-down in 
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growth dampened the demand for commodity imports from Africa.  Prices for exportable 
commodities (largely primary in nature) from Africa weakened while prices of imports (rich 
countries‟ exports, then reflecting high cost of energy inputs) for African countries increased, and 
consequently worsened the terms of trade for the African region. 
The debt crisis began in August 1982, when the international markets became aware that Mexico 
would not be able to repay its loans.  Faced with the possibility of losing their investments, lender 
countries proposed a variety of structural adjustment programs to fundamentally reorient emerging 
economies.  Most called for drastic reduction in public welfare spending, focusing economic 
output towards direct export and resource extraction, providing attractive investment concessions 
to multinational investors, increasing the fluidity of investment flows and generally enhancing the 
rights of foreign investors.  In response to the crisis, most developing countries abandoned 
“wholesale” the import substitution industrialization models for their economies and adopted 
export oriented industrialization strategy encouraged by the IMF.   
According to Ayittey (1999) and Boyce (1992), Africa‟s debt crisis originated from three basic 
missteps.  First, many of the loans were simply consumed and therefore did not generate the 
returns needed to repay the loans.  Consumption loans were borrowed to finance recurrent 
expenditures such as paying civil servants‟ salaries, import of consumer goods and purchase of 
arms and ammunition.  Use of the loans did not produce any foreign exchange earnings.  Second, 
the loans were invested in projects that turned out to be hopelessly unproductive.  Africa has more 
than 3000 state enterprises, majority of them being “white elephants”.  These enterprises, set up 
with foreign loans, were supposed to earn or save the foreign exchange needed to service the loan.  
Instead, they racked up loses upon loses, used up additional foreign exchange and compounded the 
debt crisis.  Third, many foreign loans were contracted under dubious and corrupt circumstances.  
In 1990, Nigeria discovered that US$4.5 billion of its debt was fraudulent and spurious.  While the 
country sank in debt, its former military rulers amassed huge personal fortunes estimated at US$13 
billion (Ayittey, 1999).  In 1995, Ghana‟s debt stood at US$5.5 billion with a population of 17 
million.  To finance its industrialization drive, the country borrowed heavily from abroad under a 
supplier credit
2
 scheme.  Under this arrangement, Ghana bought obsolete equipments at inflated 
                                                 
2 In a supplier credit arrangement, a fast-talking equipment peddler would sell to Ghana equipment over a period of time, generally 
4-6years. The peddler then would obtain credit from private banks, and have it guaranteed by his own country‟s governmental 
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prices.  For example, it bought three expensive Illyushin jets from the Soviet Union which turned 
out to be old jets that had been repainted.   
As pointed out by Ayittey (1999), most of the funds embezzled by Africa‟s “Kleptocrats” were 
siphoned out to overseas (Western) banks.  An estimated US$20 billion flees the continent 
annually.  In Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire), Mobutu Sese Seko erected an 
institutional structure that allowed him rapid accumulation of wealth from foreign borrowing.  His 
control over the central bank allowed him to transfer money directly into his personal accounts and 
secret budget lines.  He also diverted large amounts of government funds through “special 
accounts” that only he and his appointees had access (Ndikumana and Boyce, 1998).  While the 
country had a debt of US$9.6 billion in 1997, Mobutu bragged to be among the World‟s richest 
individuals.  His personal fortune was estimated to be between US$10 and US$15 billion, more 
than enough to pay off Zaire‟s entire foreign debt (Ayittey, 1999).   
The creditors also had their fare share in contributing to the exacerbation of Africa‟s external 
indebtedness.  First, the Western governments and development agencies failed to exercise 
prudence in the grant of aid and loans to African governments.  Much of the aid was used to 
finance grandiose projects of little economic value and to underwrite economically ruinous 
policies.  For instance, in 1983, the US built silos in Senegal and placed them in locations where 
peasant farmers never visited.  In 1980s, Canada funded a fully-automated modern bakery in 
Tanzania but there was no flour to bake bread.  In Somalia, the Italian government funded a 
banana-boxing plant but the production capacity needed to make the plant break-even exceeded 
the country‟s entire output of bananas.  In Northern Kenya, the Norwegian government built a fish 
freezing plant in the 1980s to assist the Turkana people but the Turkana do not fish, they raise 
goats (Ayittey, 1999).  This fish freezing plant could have been more economically viable for 
Kenya if it was located in the Lake Victoria region. African leaders are equally culpable for 
permitting such edifices to be built knowing that there were no logical bases to support them. In 
view of the fact that African leaders permitted these edifices to be built knowing that there were no 
logical bases to support them, they are equally culpable in intensifying the external debt burden.  
                                                                                                                                                                
export credit insurance organization. After this arrangement, any future dealings will be between Ghana and the export credit 
organization, not the peddler. 
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Second, foreign aid allocations were often cocooned in bureaucratic red-tape and shrouded in 
secrecy.  The programs lacked transparency and the people being helped were seldom consulted.  
In this way, the donors set themselves to be duped.  In fact, corruption in the use of Zairian loan 
proceeds was widely reported in the press and official documents but creditors, particularly 
governments and multilateral institutions, continued to give loans to Congo (Ndikumana and 
Boyce, 1998).  For example, the United States gave Mobutu Sese Seko nearly US$1.5 billion in 
various forms of aid since the time he took power in 1965 but Mobutu claimed that during the cold 
war he and his fellow African autocrats were fighting the Soviet Union influence and were unable 
to concentrate on creating viable economic and political systems.  The reality is that during that 
time Mobutu was becoming one of the World‟s wealthiest individuals while the people of Zaire 
were being pauperized (Millet and Toussaint, 2004; Ayittey, 1999).   
Third, the West knew that billions of dollars were being transferred to Swiss and other Western 
banks by greedy African leaders and elites instead of being used for the purported reasons for 
which African governments borrowed the funds.  It was profitable for the banks of the “North” 
since the money that came back into their coffers could be loaned again to reasonable others who 
would service their debts.  For instance, in 1988 France sent US$2.59 billion in aid to Africa but in 
the same year, nearly US$1.2 billion (47 percent of the total aid) was exchanged in Europe by the 
bank of France, some of it exported in suitcases.  In 1991, US$200 billion or 90 percent of the 
region‟s GDP was shipped to foreign banks, an amount that was more than half of its total debt.  In 
fact, Ndikumana and Boyce (2003) argue that out of every dollar that was borrowed from abroad 
by African countries, as much as 80 cents was channeled back abroad as capital flight.  In 1980s 
and 1990s, about over US$98.8 billion was stashed away by Nigerians to foreign banks (Swiss, 
German, United Kingdom and United States).   
For Africa as a whole, whereas its total external debt stood at US$178 billion in 1996, its 
cumulative capital flight amounted to US$193 billion, which indicates that capital flight exceeded 
stock of debt by US$14.5 billion (see Boyce and Ndikumana, 2001 and 2002, for details).  By 
2004, capital flight (US$420 billion) exceeded external debt (US$270 billion) by US$ 150 billion.  
Apparently, these large sums of money from developing countries were moved between banks in 
Western countries without eyebrows being raised (Aluko, 2000).  As Boyce and Ndikumana 
(2002) noted, creditors continued to pour loans into the hands of corrupt regimes, despite ample 
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evidence that these funds were not being used for legitimate purposes.  Sound banking practices 
would have dictated a moratorium, if not a cease and desist, on lending to such governments.  
Failure to halt lending suggests either that creditors were shielded from losses or that they were 
pursuing other objectives.   
Africa‟s debt can also be linked to the dependency theory.  Africa, by design and default, pursued 
mono-crop and primary macro-economy systems, driven largely by agriculture.  This, in turn, 
created unfavorable terms of trade, generated chronic balance of payments problems, and 
consequently spawned new pressures towards borrowing from external sources.  In the wake of the 
1982 Mexican moratorium, African countries took radical policy measures to reduce current 
account deficits in order to generate foreign exchange for debt service payments.  The measures 
included drastic cuts in imports, and sought to substantially increase exports.  Due to structural 
rigidities of African economies, worsening terms of trade, inelasticity of demand for commodities 
and protectionist measures practiced by the developed countries, most of the resources needed to 
honor debt service obligations had to be raised through reduction in imports which, in some cases, 
were as high as 55 percent of GDP.  African countries increased their production of export 
commodities (tea, coffee, groundnuts, cocoa, cotton, copper, etc) in order to sell more to the 
international market but both the demand and prices for their primary export products did not 
increase.  Rather the surplus primary product exports led to severe collapses in the prices of export 
commodities in 1986, resulting in loss of export earnings of more than US$19 billion.  In 1986, the 
magnitude of the debt that Africa had to service using reduced foreign earnings reached US$200 
billion.  Further, a larger part of this debt was as a result of fluctuations in exchange rates. 
The external debt of Africa witnessed a rapid build-up during the period immediately after the 
global debt crisis, with external debt obligations skyrocketing from US$72.4 billion in 1980 to 
US$ 223 billion in 1995.  By 2004, the external debt of Africa had increased to US$ 270.3 billion.  
The sharp external debt build-up in the post-1989 period was attributable to continued decline in 
the terms of trade, uncontrolled fluctuations in export earnings, higher international interest rates, 
realignment of exchange rates and, rescheduling and refinancing of Africa‟s external debt.  In fact, 
increases in Africa‟s external debt since 1982 can be attributed to exogenous factors largely 
beyond the control of the countries.  Indeed, the doubling of Africa‟s external debt stock in the 
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1980s took place against the background of when countries borrowed virtually no additional 
money for productive investment but the meager borrowing was directed mainly to debt servicing. 
Debt itself became a self-generating phenomenon that created an even heavier burden when debtor 
countries rescheduled their debt.  Of the 42 countries that rescheduled their debt between 1975 and 
1985, 19 were from the African region.  As from 1986 to 1990, the IMF extracted through debt 
rescheduling over US$3 billion more than it gave as development or stability loans to low-income 
countries in Africa.  On aggregate, as a consequence of rescheduling, Africa‟s interest payment 
more than doubled from US$0.5 billion in 1975 to US$1.4 billion in 1979 and by 1990, it had 
risen to US$5.3 billion.  In fact, by 2005, interest payments on debt for Africa had skyrocketed to 
US$8.1 billion.  Thus, although foreign loans were supposed to alleviate the recipient‟s budgetary 
crisis, the result in reality was and is that debtors are continuously digging a new pit to fill the old 
one (Akokpari, 2001). 
Although the share of Africa‟s debt as a proportion of the total debt of developing countries is low, 
the relative debt burden borne by African nations remains high.  This external debt is largely long-
term.  Moreover, there is a growing importance of debt owed to bilateral and multilateral creditors, 
a trend away from concessionality
3
 to non-concessionality and an increase in the importance of 
interest and principal arrears (usually capitalized through the Paris and London clubs) as a 
component of long-term debt.  Indicators of the debt burden also disclose that African countries‟ 
total debt is enormous relative to the capacity of the economies, and, in particular their export 
sectors.     
2.2 Effects of External Debt on Emerging Market Economies and Africa 
2.2.1 Empirical Evidence of Debt on African Countries 
Most African countries have been subjected to net financial outflows (of debt servicing related 
flows) since the mid 1980s.  The performance of these economies, coupled with a mounting debt 
burden, indicates that African countries are incapable of simultaneously servicing their debt and 
attaining a reasonable level of economic growth, let alone addressing issues of poverty alleviation.  
                                                 
3
 External debt with concessionality is a loan contracted at below market interest rates with a grace period and a longer 
term to maturity. 
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The repayment of a debt which has swollen to colossal proportions prevents the populations from 
satisfying their most basic needs.    
Debt grew more rapidly than exports as shown by the debt export ratio which increased by 338 
percent from 82.6 percent in 1980 to 279.2 percent in 1994.  It declined to 249 percent in 1999 and 
has since been declining (see Table 2.1 below).  The high debt export ratio is of great concern 
because of its negative effects on investment and savings.  The high ratio points to potential debt 
servicing problems, because most of the foreign currencies needed to service foreign debt largely 
come from export earnings (which are frequently denominated in foreign currencies).  The high 
debt-to-exports ratio show that African countries‟ external debt increases faster than exports.  The 
high debt exports ratio for Africa are indications that Africa‟s debt is unsustainable and likely un-
repayable.  The debt as a fraction of exports of goods and services is among the highest in the 
developing World as can be seen in Table 2.1 below. 
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Table 2.1: Comparative Data for External Debt to Export Ratio 
 
 
 
Year 
Emerging 
Markets & 
Developing 
Countries 
 
 
 
Africa 
 
Sub-
Saharan 
(SSA) 
Africa 
 
 
Western 
Hemisphere 
 
 
Developing 
Asia 
 
 
Middle 
East 
1980 88.0 95.5 82.6 202.3 121.3 26.9 
1981 101.2 125.7 120.3 234.0 130.6 29.4 
1982 124.2 161.4 164.4 298.4 148.1 41.8 
1983 138.2 178.7 186.4 312.3 161.7 54.3 
1984 139.7 183.3 189.0 295.4 157.6 56.7 
1985 158.3 200.8 204.1 312.0 185.2 66.0 
1986 189.3 257.5 249.3 371.9 212.9 109.0 
1987 181.0 248.5 238.4 364.8 195.3 91.8 
1988 168.6 251.0 243.0 305.2 178.8 95.3 
1989 160.8 235.7 227.8 273.0 166.3 83.7 
1990 164.9 229.8 231.6 267.4 163.6 72.0 
1991 168.9 253.8 260.6 275.1 159.9 69.1 
1992 170.5 244.7 252.0 268.5 151.0 68.7 
1993 176.3 260.3 269.1 267.7 154.4 87.9 
1994 167.3 273.3 279.2 249.4 138.5 90.6 
1995 150.7 247.4 251.2 228.1 125.9 79.9 
1996 142.3 232.8 239.8 214.3 120.3 71.6 
1997 139.5 221.6 231.6 204.1 116.7 69.9 
1998 161.9 250.2 262.0 230.2 128.7 106.6 
1999 155.4 232.8 249.0 225.7 119.8 87.5 
2000 122.1 182.0 200.1 181.6 93.9 60.9 
2001 125.1 183.5 205.6 192.4 97.6 65.1 
2002 118.7 183.8 205.4 188.9 86.4 62.9 
2003 107.3 158.8 176.0 178.6 74.7 54.8 
2004 91.2 130.6 146.1 148.0 62.5 48.6 
2005 75.8 94.5 107.0 116.0 53.2 40.5 
2006 67.4 68.7 78.8 94.6 48.2 40.5 
2007 74.0 61.1 68.6 95.8 45.0 53.5 
2008 65.1 50.1 57.0 87.1 41.5 38.7 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Online Database, April 2009 
 
In the 1980s and early 1990s, high interest rates, low growth rate of output, and primary deficits 
contributed to an increase in the debt to GDP ratio of African countries.  The debt to GDP ratio 
rose by 304 percent from 25.1 percent in 1980 to 76.2 percent in 1994 which implies that debt 
increased at an average rate of 22.5 percent per annum in a span of 14 years (see Table 2.2).  In 
fact, Africa‟s external debt as a ratio of GDP is the highest as compared to all developing countries 
as shown in Table 2.2 below.  The debt-to-GDP ratio more than doubled in a span of 6 years and 
rose from about 25 percent in 1980 to about 60 percent in 1986.  The ratio continued rising as 
countries accumulated more debt and by 1994, the ratio had risen to about 76 percent.  The high 
debt-to-GDP ratio implies that African countries have been accumulating more external debt than 
GDP.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
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Table 2.2: Comparative Data for Debt to GDP Ratio 
Year 
Emerging 
Markets & 
Developing 
Countries 
Africa 
Sub-Saharan 
(SSA) 
Africa 
Western 
Hemisphere 
Developing 
Asia 
Middle 
East 
1980 17.1 29.1 25.1 28.5 14.4 14.2 
1981 19.3 32.1 28.8 32.6 16.6 14.6 
1982 22.0 37.4 35.1 45.1 17.9 16.2 
1983 23.3 42.2 41.6 52.2 18.8 16.5 
1984 24.5 48.4 49.3 52.5 19.5 15.6 
1985 26.9 54.1 57.3 49.0 23.2 20.1 
1986 27.4 58.4 61.5 51.2 25.7 22.4 
1987 27.9 59.3 61.1 53.3 27.0 20.9 
1988 25.8 59.4 59.0 46.0 25.7 22.3 
1989 24.8 57.9 56.8 40.3 25.5 22.3 
1990 26.7 59.7 57.5 39.3 29.9 24.0 
1991 27.9 60.9 59.6 38.5 32.1 23.1 
1992 38.3 61.4 62.2 37.0 31.5 23.0 
1993 38.6 66.1 68.0 36.7 31.7 30.7 
1994 38.6 74.6 76.2 34.3 34.1 32.5 
1995 37.0 69.4 69.1 35.5 31.6 29.4 
1996 35.2 68.1 69.1 34.3 29.9 27.2 
1997 35.3 66.4 67.8 33.2 31.1 26.2 
1998 40.4 69.3 72.2 37.4 35.1 32.3 
1999 42.0 68.6 72.2 43.5 32.3 30.3 
2000 37.3 64.1 68.3 37.9 28.3 26.2 
2001 36.9 61.9 67.0 39.6 27.7 25.4 
2002 37.0 60.4 65.2 44.1 25.7 26.1 
2003 35.7 54.0 58.1 43.7 23.7 25.2 
2004 33.0 46.9 51.1 38.2 22.1 25.3 
2005 28.7 37.0 40.0 29.5 20.2 23.6 
2006 26.3 28.1 30.9 24.6 19.1 24.0 
2007 27.0 24.1 26.0 22.9 17.4 31.7 
2008 24.1 21.0 22.7 20.9 15.6 23.7 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Online Database, April 2009 
 
Gross Domestic Product and external debt for Africa moved in the opposite direction in most of 
the years between 1980 and 2008, which implies that as countries accumulated more debt, their 
GDPs declined.  As shown in Figure 2.1 below, from 1980 to 1985, GDP declined whereas 
countries accumulated more debt in the form of structural adjustment loans.  Between 1992 and 
1994 debt increased while GDP declined; after 1995, GDP increased while external debt declined.  
As from 2003, there was a sharp increase in GDP while debt declined as a result of debt relief.  
This negative relationship between external debt and GDP implies that even though debt was 
meant to boost the economies‟ output, external funds did not improve these economies.  Perhaps 
the negative relationship confirms the fact that the borrowed funds were mainly shipped back to 
the West by the rulers as opposed to being invested in the economy and boost GDP. 
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Figure 2.1: Level of External Debt and Gross Domestic Product for Africa (1980 – 2007) 
  
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Online Database, April 2007 
The process of debt servicing compounded the external debt of Africa.  As African governments 
strengthened their determination to demonstrate a capacity to repay debt in order to establish 
credit-worthiness, a great percentage of loans and export earnings were committed to servicing 
existing debt (see Table 2.4 below).  For example, Uganda committed 81.4 percent of its meager 
export earnings in 1990 to debt servicing.  Ghana and Zambia committed more than half of their 
export earnings (56 percent and 52.1 percent, respectively) to debt serving in 1988 and 1980, 
respectively.  Nigeria‟s debt service exports ratio rose by 8 times from 4.1 percent in 1980 to 32.9 
percent 1984.  The same applied to Zimbabwe where debt export ratio increased by 8.5 times from 
3.8 percent in 1980 to 32.3 percent in 1987.  Such high debt service ratios led to further external 
borrowing and virtually nothing was left for development.  In the late 1990s, debt service to 
exports ratios drastically fell amidst deficient export earnings.  This decline in debt service to 
exports ratio hides more than it reveals.  
Rugumamu (2001) argues that external debt repayment is economically exhausting as it continues 
to block future development; it is politically destabilizing as it threatens social harmony; and, it is 
ethically unacceptable as it hurts the poorest of the poor.  As countries committed more funds to 
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Fig 1.1: Level of External Debt and Gross Domestic Product for SSA (1980 - 2007)
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service their debts, GDP was depressed.  As can be seen in Figure 2.2, there was a negative 
relationship between growth rates of debt service and GDP between 1980 and 2004.  This implies 
that servicing of debt places an enormous fiscal pressure on African countries.   
Figure 2.2: Growth Rates of Gross Domestic Product and Debt Service for Africa (1980 – 2007) 
 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Online Database, April 2007 
Servicing of external debt places an enormous fiscal pressure on African countries.  Such pressure 
has had an adverse effect on public investment and provision of social services as is reflected in 
the decline in the share of public investment in GDP from late 1970s onwards as well as high level 
of fiscal deficit.  Table 2.3 below shows the decline in public investments for selected African 
countries.  Naturally, a reduction in levels of public investment has adverse consequences for 
physical and social infrastructure. 
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Fig 1.2: Growth Rates of Gross Domestic Product and Debt Service for SSA (1980 - 2007)
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Table 2.3: Public Investment and Debt Service for Selected African countries (1980 – 2005) 
Country 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Cote 
d'Ivoire PI/GDP 9.0 8.8 6.8 6.3 4.6 3.7 3.6 4.5 4.1 4.4 3.6 3.4 3.8 3.7 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.8 5.1 4.2 2.8 1.8 3.2 2.6
TDS/GDP 13.8 18.2 20.3 18.5 16.6 16 14.4 13.6 10.5 11 11.7 12.2 10.4 9.9 15 9.51 11.3 11.6 10.8 11.5 9.79 5.89 7.24 4.16 3.51 2.84
Ghana PI/GDP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 7.8 7.5 8.3 10.3 11.1 13.3 14.0 13.3 12.4 11.3 9.8 10.4 10.4 9.6 7.8
TDS/GDP 3.58 2.81 2.75 3.58 3.01 3.54 3.98 8.18 10.5 8.61 6.19 4.45 4.79 4.95 6.26 5.98 6.42 7.33 6.4 5.51 7.81 5.26 2.89 5.96 2.74 2.65
Kenya PI/GDP 10.4 10.4 8.6 6.9 7.5 10.7 8.1 7.1 8.3 7.8 9.4 8.3 7.1 8.0 8.5 7.4 7.0 6.4 6.0 5.5 5.5 5.1 4.6 4.4
TDS/GDP 5.97 7.08 7.73 8.61 9.35 10.1 9.36 8.67 8.83 8.57 9.21 8.82 8.15 11 12.3 10 6.95 5.01 4.7 5.37 4.65 3.73 4.1 3.95 2.11 1.26
Malawi PI/GDP 17.5 10.2 8.4 8.3 9.8 8.3 10.0 5.0 8.2 7.6 8.0 8.3 10.2 8.4 15.1 9.7 6.5 6.7 8.8 10.3 10.0 10.4 8.0 9.7
TDS/GDP 7.06 9.25 7.98 6.6 8.78 9.72 12.3 9.78 7.64 6.02 7.05 5.84 6.01 3.78 6.72 8.45 3.88 3.19 4.95 4.12 3.61 2.67 1.89 2.36 3.15 4.56
Nigeria PI/GDP .. 14.3 9.6 7.2 3.6 4.4 6.4 7.8 7.2 .. .. 11.4 13.4 10.7 3.6 5.3 5.2 7.1 11.3 10.4 9.3 12.1 10.2 9.9
TDS/GDP 1.79 2.99 4.19 7.33 14.4 15.6 10.1 4.72 9.67 8.88 11.7 10.8 11.5 6.98 7.91 6.52 7.11 3.91 4.14 3.06 4.01 5.33 3.19 2.82 2.4 8.98
Senegal PI/GDP 5.9 4.2 3.9 4.0 4.0 3.9 4.0 4.1 3.9 4.2 4.1 4.6 5.2 4.2 5.0 4.4 6.4 6.4 7.2 8.3 6.2 6.4 7.9 9.0
TDS/GDP 8.68 7.38 4.78 4.69 6.91 7.35 7.96 8.41 7.8 8.24 5.69 5.65 3.47 2.33 6.43 6.32 6.31 5.74 6.91 5.04 5.11 4.66 4.42 3.81 4.4 2.35
South 
Africa PI/GDP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 7.7 7.0 6.1 5.2 4.4 4.1 4.3 4.4 4.5 1.8 1.5 1.4 1.9 1.3 1.2
TDS/GDP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 2.14 2.24 2.95 4.4 3.27 3.22 2.91 3.68 4.23 2.59 1.78 1.99
Tanzania PI/GDP 11.6 5.1 4.1 2.3 2.0 1.8 1.8 2.2 2.3 3.5 3.1 1.7 2.7 4.2 6.0 3.4 3.5 2.9 3.3 3.1 6.0 5.6 7.6 7.4
TDS/GDP 3.14 3.01 2.28 2.67 2.33 2.71 3.45 3.05 3.17 4.01 4.2 4.14 5.1 4.95 4.07 4.42 4.14 2.2 2.83 2.62 1.89 1.62 1.11 0.89 1.05 1.05
Uganda PI/GDP 5.6 4.9 6.6 6.0 5.3 5.4 6.2 7.4 7.4 6.7 4.8 4.7 4.5 4.1 4.7 5.4 6.4 5.8 5.3 4.7
TDS/GDP 4.58 5.09 2.89 3.82 3.55 4.4 4.37 2.55 3.1 3.56 3.36 4.43 3.96 4.79 3.73 2.35 2.45 2.57 2.33 2.18 1.25 0.88 1.21 1.34 1.51 1.97
Zambia PI/GDP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 6.2 7.8 6.7 4.0 5.1 6.1 5.4 11.3 10.6 10.0 11.1 11.8 11.5
TDS/GDP 10.6 10.5 8.62 8.98 8.94 6.06 23.2 7.55 5.07 4.76 6.1 17.6 11 11 11.2 75.1 7.67 6.29 6.24 4.74 5.73 5.09 6.14 13 7.82 3.29
Zimbabwe PI/GDP 4.7 5.3 9.9 11.7 9.8 9.5 7.3 7.6 6.7 5.7 2.9 3.4 3.5 3.8 3.1 2.9 2.3 2.8 1.8 4.1 0.0 1.0 1.7 1.8
TDS/GDP 0.98 1.35 2.44 6.5 5.63 7.49 7.65 7.9 6.82 5.3 5.36 5.32 8.89 9.52 8.68 8.94 7.45 7.85 15.6 10.5 5.69 1.63 0.5 0.68 1.97 6.66
Source: World Bank, African Economic Indicators, 2005. 
PI is public investments and TDS is total external debt. 
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The gross fixed capital formation also declined for selected African countries as shown in Table 
2.4.  The gross fixed capital formation as a percentage of GDP for Côte d'Ivoire declined from 
24.4 percent in 1980 to 8.5 percent in 1990.  That of Malawi declined from 22.2 percent in 1980 to 
12.2 percent in 1986, Nigeria (24.4 percent in 1981 to 9.6 percent in 1985), and Zambia (18.2 
percent in 1980 to 6.6 percent in 1989).  The decline in gross fixed capital formation implies that 
the borrowed funds were used to finance consumption as opposed to investment projects that 
stimulate growth. 
As shown in Figure 2.3 below, servicing of debt also reduces foreign direct investments.  This 
confirms the debt overhang theory which stipulates that if there is some likelihood in the future 
that external debt will be larger than the countries‟ repayment ability, then; the expected debt 
service would discourage both domestic and foreign investments. In fact, debt service and foreign 
direct investments moved independently from 1980 to 1991 and from 1997 to 2001.  Foreign 
direct investment hovered around US$1 billion during 1980 to 1991. 
 
Figure 2.3: Level of Total Debt Service and Foreign Direct Investment for Africa (1980 – 2005) 
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2006 Online Database. 
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Fig 1.3: Level of  Total Debt Service and Foreign Direct Investment for SSA (1980 - 2005)
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Servicing of the external debt erodes foreign exchange reserves, which might otherwise be 
available for purchase of imports.  As debt servicing soaks up a large proportion of export earnings 
and government expenditure, it reduces the resources available for imports, investment and 
socioeconomic development, as was evident in the „import compression problem‟ in which 
shortage of foreign exchange adversely affected levels of public and private sector investment.  As 
shown in Figure 2.4, although exports and imports have followed the same trend from 1980 to 
2005, they have diverged generating trade deficits and trade surpluses.  Exports and imports which 
were about 32 percent of GDP in 1981 fell, in a span of two years, to about 25 percent of GDP in 
1983.   
 
Figure 2.4: Level of Export and Imports as a Percentage of GDP for Africa (1980 – 2005) 
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2006 Online Database 
Reduction in imports can be seen by the import-debt ratio which declined for most of the countries 
under review (see Table 2.4 below).  Imports as a percentage of external debt for Côte d'Ivoire 
which was 112.9 percent in 1970 fell by 200 percent to 56.1 percent in 1980.  By 1993, the import 
to debt ratio had fallen to 15 percent.  Nigeria‟s import-debt ratio declined from 649.3 percent in 
1976 to 138.1 percent in 1980.  By 1988 it had declined to 17 percent, Ghana (29 percent in 1980 
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to 8.1 percent in 1982), Kenya (77 percent in 1980 to 27.5 percent in 1993), Senegal (88.3 percent 
in 1980 to 35.9 percent in 1987) and Zimbabwe (225.5 percent in 1980 to 49.7 percent in 1987).  
Most of the reduction in imports was in vital goods such as spare parts that were needed to keep 
existing machinery running.  Exports also declined during the same period suggesting that one of 
the effects of reduced important intermediate goods imports is to depress exportable goods. 
The region‟s external debt grew faster than GNP.  The region‟s debt-GNP ratio doubled in five 
years rising from 28.7 percent in 1981 to 56.2 percent in 1986.  By 1994 it had risen to the highest 
level of 78.7 percent.  Most of the countries under review owe several times more than the value of 
their GNPs (see Table 2.4 below).  Zambia‟s debt/GNP ratio rose from 90.3 percent in 1980 to 
414.9 percent in 1986 representing a 459 percent increase in a span of 6 years.  Nigeria, whose 
debt/GNP ratio was at 14.6 percent in 1980 rose by 11 times to 161.7 percent in 1993.  Côte 
d'Ivoire‟s debt/GNP rose from 77.1 percent in 1980 to 230.7 percent in 1994.  These high 
debt/GNP indicators point to serious debt management problems since these countries do not have 
the capacity to generate income that can sustain the debt.  
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Table 2.4: Debt Indicators for Selected African Countries (1980 – 2005)  
Country Indicator 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Cote 
d'Ivoire ETD/GNP 77.1 102.9 127.5 144.0 134.6 153.4 135.2 147.6 143.4 177.0 187.3 199.2 189.1 197.0 230.7 188.7 174.0 141.9 123.6 112.2 124.8 117.1 109.2 93.6 79.5 68.7
TDS/GNP 14.5 19.4 21.9 20.6 17.9 17.7 15.6 14.9 11.6 12.9 13.7 14 11.8 11.3 16.5 10.4 12.2 12.4 11.5 12.3 10.5 6.26 7.7 4.4 3.68 2.97
TDS/XGS 38.7 52.6 54.1 49.9 37.5 34.8 35.4 38.4 32.4 33.2 35.4 37.9 32.1 33.2 35.2 23.1 26.5 26.2 25.7 26.8 22.6 13.3 13.9 8.6 6.9 5.5
MGS/ETD 56.1 43.8 33.2 27.6 25.5 23.4 24.1 22.0 21.4 19.1 17.0 15.6 16.9 15.0 14.0 20.0 20.2 24.9 28.4 30.7 28.6 30.4 32.5 39.4 51.9 64.6
GFCF/GDP 24.4 24.4 21.7 17.7 13.0 11.8 11.8 11.8 11.5 10.3 8.5 8.6 8.5 9.3 11.5 13.7 14.8 14.3 10.7 14.4 11.2 9.9 10.9 9.7 9.8 10.7
Ghana ETD/GNP 31.7 36.6 36.9 41.4 44.9 50.7 49.0 66.5 60.4 64.2 64.7 64.2 67.2 78.2 95.7 86.9 85.3 84.6 86.2 85.1 126.7 121.9 115.5 101.5 81.5 63.6
TDS/GNP 3.59 2.82 2.76 3.61 3.04 3.6 4.07 8.4 10.7 8.8 6.31 4.53 4.87 5.04 6.39 6.11 6.56 7.47 6.53 5.63 8.05 5.37 2.95 6.09 2.8 2.69
TDS/XGS 13.1 14.2 15.5 30.4 21.6 23.5 28.3 45.8 56.3 50.2 38.1 27.2 27.1 24.3 24.4 24.0 25.0 29.5 18.5 16.9 15.6 11.4 6.8 13.9 6.9 7.1
MGS/ETD 29.0 14.6 8.1 14.6 24.3 27.3 42.0 40.5 40.9 38.8 40.7 40.5 43.5 47.5 39.2 38.7 48.0 63.9 55.3 59.8 55.0 54.2 48.2 52.5 75.8 98.1
GFCF/GDP 6.1 4.7 3.5 3.8 6.9 9.5 9.3 10.4 11.2 13.2 14.4 15.8 12.7 23.8 22.6 21.1 20.3 23.8 22.4 20.7 24.0 26.6 19.7 23.2 28.4 29.0
Kenya ETD/GNP 48.1 48.6 54.5 62.7 58.6 70.5 65.8 75.2 72.3 73.4 85.8 95.8 87.7 131.9 105.0 83.8 57.6 49.9 48.9 50.9 48.9 43.0 47.9 47.6 43.2 33.1
TDS/GNP 6.16 7.3 8.04 8.9 9.66 10.5 9.68 8.99 9.18 8.83 9.62 9.25 8.52 11.7 13 10.4 7.09 5.07 4.75 5.44 4.7 3.77 4.14 4 2.12 1.27
TDS/XGS 21.0 27.0 30.5 33.8 34.8 38.7 35.6 39.8 39.0 36.6 35.4 32.6 31.1 27.1 32.9 30.4 27.5 21.9 22.9 25.4 20.9 15.6 16.0 15.5 7.6 4.4
MGS/ETD 77.0 71.8 60.3 46.5 56.5 44.2 47.0 36.4 39.7 42.3 38.1 31.1 31.8 27.5 34.3 48.5 50.7 58.3 54.8 51.2 61.1 72.5 61.1 61.9 74.1 106.0
GFCF/GDP 18.3 18.6 19.0 18.1 17.2 17.3 19.6 19.6 20.4 15.1 20.6 19.0 16.6 16.9 18.9 21.4 16.0 15.4 15.7 15.6 16.7 18.2 17.5 16.1 16.2 18.6
Malawi ETD/GNP 72.9 71.1 77.9 77.4 76.4 94.6 103.0 121.4 102.5 91.5 84.8 77.2 97.1 90.0 177.5 165.8 103.1 84.9 142.7 158.1 158.5 153.5 152.8 179.9 183.9 155.6
TDS/GNP 7.68 9.91 8.49 7.01 9.2 10.2 13 10.3 7.95 6.22 7.22 5.96 6.14 3.86 6.98 8.74 3.94 3.24 5.07 4.22 3.69 2.72 1.94 2.42 3.23 4.66
TDS/XGS 27.8 36.0 35.0 29.3 31.1 39.8 53.7 37.4 30.9 30.9 29.3 24.7 24.9 22.4 22.4 24.9 15.9 14.4 14.8 14.0 13.3 9.4 7.6 .. .. ..
MGS/ETD 57.9 47.5 39.4 38.8 36.3 33.1 25.6 24.1 33.0 38.9 40.3 38.8 44.7 36.5 36.1 30.0 31.5 40.2 27.4 28.0 22.8 26.0 30.7 28.3 28.5 34.8
GFCF/GDP 22.2 15.1 14.6 13.7 13.0 13.3 12.2 15.4 18.1 20.2 20.1 17.0 17.2 13.0 26.8 14.8 9.7 9.3 11.1 12.6 12.3 13.8 10.4 10.8 14.4 13.7
Nigeria ETD/GNP 14.6 19.6 24.6 51.2 64.9 68.1 118.2 137.9 132.6 138.4 130.7 134.9 97.5 161.7 155.3 131.7 95.0 83.7 103.3 87.5 77.9 70.4 74.7 68.8 62.5 25.6
TDS/GNP 1.88 3.07 4.29 7.47 14.8 16.2 10.9 5.26 9.9 9.73 13 11.8 12.6 7.84 8.78 7.08 7.59 4.16 4.54 3.19 4.58 5.81 3.65 3.25 2.86 10.2
TDS/XGS 4.1 9.2 16.2 23.6 32.9 32.7 38.0 14.1 30.4 24.7 22.6 21.9 28.7 12.5 17.9 13.8 14.0 7.8 11.3 6.9 8.2 12.2 7.6 5.7 4.3 15.8
MGS/ETD 138.1 139.5 92.7 34.9 20.5 19.0 18.7 19.9 17.0 19.9 24.5 25.5 45.7 34.9 29.1 34.8 30.8 48.1 40.4 49.1 47.2 50.3 63.8 69.7 71.2 157.2
GFCF/GDP 21.4 24.4 22.1 15.9 11.3 9.6 14.5 17.0 19.3 17.7 14.5 23.4 21.8 23.2 19.6 16.3 14.2 17.4 24.1 23.4 20.3 24.1 26.2 23.9 22.4 20.9
Senegal ETD/GNP 51.0 70.5 75.4 87.2 99.4 104.4 89.5 91.5 81.5 73.9 68.0 67.5 62.3 72.4 105.4 90.4 82.7 88.2 88.0 84.3 83.6 81.2 83.9 69.5 51.2 46.9
TDS/GNP 8.99 7.72 5 4.9 7.3 7.73 8.33 8.79 8.16 8.62 5.89 5.86 3.55 2.42 6.69 6.55 6.41 5.84 7 5.14 5.22 4.74 4.52 3.89 4.49 2.39
TDS/XGS 28.7 17.1 12.8 11.3 16.7 20.8 26.1 32.4 31.4 28.6 19.9 20.9 13.4 9.4 17.1 16.8 19.1 17.5 20.7 14.5 14.3 12.3 11.7 10.4 11.8
MGS/ETD 88.3 78.4 66.3 55.5 51.8 42.3 38.3 35.9 37.3 45.5 46.2 44.5 46.5 40.3 41.1 46.0 44.0 41.3 42.6 45.9 48.6 50.5 50.9 60.8 82.7 90.5
GFCF/GDP 13.2 12.6 12.2 13.0 12.3 11.6 12.0 12.4 12.7 13.3 12.9 13.5 14.0 13.5 16.0 14.7 16.3 15.7 17.6 19.4 17.0 18.8 16.4 20.4 23.1 21.6  
With exception of South Africa‟s debt data, data source is the World Bank‟s World Development Indicators 2006 Online Database and IMF‟s IFS online database. The 
source of South Africa‟s debt data is the Reserve Bank of South Africa‟s website. ETD is External Debt Stock, GNP is Gross National Product, TDS is Total Debt 
Service, GDP is Gross Domestic Product, XGS is Exports of Goods and Services, MGS is Imports of Goods and Services, and GFCF is Gross Fixed Capital Formation. 
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Continuation of Table 2.4 
Country Indicator 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
South 
Africa ETD/GNP 1 1.22 1.59 1.48 1.92 1.92 1.45 1.11 0.95 0.64 0.7 0.65 0.65 1.2 16.3 17.1 18.5 17.4 18.9 18.4 19.2 21.0 23.2 17.2 13.6 13.1
TDS/GNP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 2.18 2.29 3.01 4.49 3.35 3.3 2.98 3.8 4.34 2.67 1.82 2.04
TDS/XGS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 9.4 9.5 11.6 17.2 12.2 12.1 9.8 11.3 12.0 8.6 6.3 6.7
MGS/ETD 3366 2871 1970 1780 1378 1341 1657 1971 2392 3235 3432 3300 3190 1736 124.4 131.7 128.0 138.0 133.0 126.7 133.2 128.4 126.3 138.5 205.5 223.3
GFCF/GDP 25.9 27.5 27.5 26.0 24.0 22.8 19.6 17.8 19.4 20.2 19.1 17.2 15.7 14.7 15.2 15.9 16.3 16.5 17.1 15.5 15.1 15.1 15.0 15.8 16.2 17.2
Tanzania ETD/GNP 103.9 98.6 93.3 110.5 131.5 143.9 110.5 111.7 122.2 138.0 158.5 137.5 151.1 165.8 166.3 144.6 115.8 91.4 88.3 89.6 77.4 66.8 70.5 68.1 69.4 64.4
TDS/GNP 3.14 3.02 2.29 2.64 2.37 2.75 3.53 3.17 3.29 4.18 4.4 4.3 5.31 5.15 4.21 4.53 4.22 2.23 2.86 2.65 1.91 1.63 1.12 0.89 1.06 1.05
TDS/XGS 21.2 22.1 28.6 33.4 25.7 39.9 35.1 39.2 31.9 33.0 32.9 39.9 40.1 26.8 18.9 17.9 18.9 13.5 20.1 19.1 12.8 8.4 5.5 4.1 4.5 4.3
MGS/ETD 25.4 21.1 19.1 12.7 12.9 11.8 23.1 24.4 23.7 24.9 24.7 25.4 27.1 29.9 27.2 27.3 26.9 29.5 32.5 29.6 29.8 37.3 35.1 40.3 40.2 41.1
GFCF/GDP 20.5 20.9 23.6 17.4 17.6 16.9 23.8 21.6 16.1 17.7 25.8 26.0 27.0 24.9 24.4 19.6 16.5 14.7 13.7 15.4 17.4 16.8 18.9 18.5 18.3 18.8
Uganda ETD/GNP 55.5 53.1 40.5 45.8 30.0 35.5 36.4 30.9 29.8 41.8 61.1 85.1 105.7 95.5 85.8 62.9 61.4 62.1 59.6 58.5 60.5 67.4 70.0 74.8 71.8 52.2
TDS/GNP 4.61 5.13 2.93 3.9 3.59 4.47 4.42 2.57 3.12 3.6 3.42 4.51 4.09 4.87 3.79 2.37 2.47 2.57 2.33 2.19 1.28 0.9 1.24 1.37 1.54 2.01
TDS/XGS 17.3 24.8 18.2 23.3 30.2 41.6 40.7 47.9 75.7 67.6 81.4 74.8 59.7 51.5 27.5 19.8 18.2 20.2 20.8 13.8 7.8 4.7 6.1 7.2 6.9 9.2
MGS/ETD 47.2 42.0 43.8 30.4 48.4 42.9 42.3 58.9 60.2 43.8 32.3 26.2 23.7 22.5 22.6 33.5 38.4 33.6 34.3 41.6 39.0 36.9 38.9 36.3 39.2 53.1
GFCF/GDP .. .. 9.7 7.9 8.2 8.7 8.4 9.7 10.8 11.1 12.7 15.2 15.9 15.2 14.6 16.4 17.0 16.9 15.9 19.3 19.6 18.2 18.9 20.1 22.1 20.9
Zambia ETD/GNP 90.3 92.5 100.6 122.1 153.6 226.0 414.9 337.3 201.7 182.7 229.5 232.5 233.7 214.6 218.9 215.1 230.4 179.7 227.3 196.9 185.8 174.9 182.4 165.8 145.6 83.3
TDS/GNP 11.4 10.8 9.18 9.72 9.95 6.87 28.4 8.9 5.69 5.29 6.67 19.8 12.2 12 12 80.8 8.18 6.63 6.69 4.99 6.02 5.33 6.41 13.5 8.48 3.52
TDS/XGS 25.2 35.9 30.9 29.1 25.0 15.7 52.1 19.0 15.1 13.3 14.7 46.9 .. .. .. .. .. 19.4 21.0 16.1 20.2
MGS/ETD 54.4 45.8 38.6 27.9 24.1 18.7 13.0 12.5 14.6 20.6 17.4 18.1 22.8 20.4 18.1 19.9 18.0 20.7 18.5 22.0 17.8 17.8 16.6 17.5 20.3 32.4
GFCF/GDP 18.2 17.5 17.2 14.7 12.6 10.2 10.7 9.0 7.7 6.6 13.5 11.4 10.6 11.5 11.3 12.4 11.2 13.1 14.8 16.0 17.2 18.7 21.6 24.8 24.6 24.7
Zimbabwe ETD/GNP 11.9 16.1 22.7 29.3 35.3 43.9 43.5 44.1 35.5 34.9 38.6 41.6 63.7 67.3 68.0 73.5 60.3 60.9 80.9 75.6 53.6 36.2 17.9 58.0 106.1 132.2
TDS/GNP 0.99 1.38 2.52 6.75 5.79 7.67 7.89 8.14 7.02 5.43 5.54 5.51 9.27 9.9 9.06 9.37 7.71 8.25 16.6 11 5.89 1.69 0.5 0.7 2.07 6.97
TDS/XGS 3.8 6.4 13.2 36.9 26.2 29.0 31.1 32.3 28.5 22.4 23.1 23.1 32.3 31.0 25.2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
MGS/ETD 225.5 164.7 101.4 69.0 60.6 51.4 51.0 49.7 59.0 63.8 61.1 67.6 59.7 50.1 56.1 58.3 61.7 77.0 59.6 61.8 70.0 62.2 57.1 47.8 50.1 41.9
GFCF/GDP 14.1 17.2 18.4 18.0 17.0 14.3 15.1 16.1 15.6 14.0 18.2 20.6 22.4 23.6 21.4 24.6 18.0 18.0 20.6 13.3 11.8 12.1 10.2 12.9 17.1 17.3  
With exception of South Africa‟s debt data, data source is the World Bank‟s World Development Indicators 2006 Online Database and IMF‟s IFS online database. The 
source of South Africa‟s debt data is the Reserve Bank of South Africa‟s website. ETD is External Debt Stock, GNP is Gross National Product, TDS is Total Debt 
Service, GDP is Gross Domestic Product, XGS is Exports of Goods and Services, MGS is Imports of Goods and Services, and GFCF is Gross Fixed Capital Formation. 
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2.2.2  Theories of External Debt and their Evidence in Emerging Market Economies  
There are five channels through which external debt and its attendant debt servicing affects the 
economies of emerging market economies and Africa.  These channels are embodied in the debt 
overhang hypothesis, crowding-out effect, macroeconomic propagated shocks, default and loss of 
creditworthiness, and capital flight. 
 2.2.2.1 Debt Overhang Hypothesis 
When a country‟s debt service burden is so heavy that a large portion of its current output accrues 
to foreign lenders and consequently creates disincentive to invest, it results in debt overhang.  The 
debt overhang hypothesis suggests that if there is some likelihood in the future that external debt 
will be larger than the country‟s repayment ability, then, the expected debt service costs would 
discourage further domestic and foreign investment and harm economic growth.  Investors would 
be less willing to incur costs today for increased output in the future, as the additional output 
would be used to meet external debt servicing demands.  High debt service burden increases 
expected future taxes on the private sector and lowers private investment.  In addition, debt 
overhang can worsen economic performance by changing the quality of investment when quick-
yielding projects are preferred to higher value long-term investments (Sen, Kasibhatla and Stewart, 
2007; Servén, 1997).  This misallocation of investment in turn lowers the efficiency of overall 
capital accumulation.  Numerous studies on debt overhang (Ajayi, 1997; Khan and Villanueva, 
1991; Elbadawi, Ndulu, and Ndung‟u, 1996; Greene and Khan, 1990; Fosu, 1999; Moughalu and 
Ezirim, 2006) have found that debt overhang has adverse consequences on investment and growth.   
Krugman (1988) argues that if there is some likelihood that in the future debt will be larger than 
the country‟s repayment ability, then expected debt service will be an increasing function of the 
country‟s output level.  Thus, returns from investing in the country would face a high marginal tax 
by external creditors, and new domestic and foreign investment would be discouraged.  On the 
other hand, Corden (1989) argues that high debt reduces growth mainly by lowering the efficiency 
of investment rather than its volume.  Any activity that requires incurring costs today for the sake 
of increased output in future will be discouraged due to fears that, part of the proceeds will be 
taxed away by creditors.  Debt overhang leads to a poor macroeconomic policy environment, 
which in turn affects efficiency of investment.  In support of Corden are Pattillo, Poirson, and 
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Ricci, (2001) who posit that the poor macroeconomic environment leads to investment projects 
that are poorly designed, poorly implemented and badly allocated, thus lowering the contribution 
of capital accumulation to growth.  This was mainly the case for highly indebted poor countries 
whose poor policies and continued borrowing in the face of negative external conditions meant 
that the investment, to the extent that it actually took place, did not contribute much to growth. 
Instead, the continued borrowing of these countries and poor export performance led to very high 
accumulated debt stocks that have created uncertainty and debt overhang effects. 
Authors like for example Koeda (2006), argue that a country‟s initial debt condition, initial income 
and total factor productivity will determine whether or not the country is trapped in a debt 
overhang.  With larger initial debt, the country has stronger incentives to manage its debt at a low 
interest rate by stagnating around the cut-off (an income level above which the country loses its 
eligibility for aid assistance), thus becomes permanently aid-dependent.  Since the cost of 
servicing debt is kept artificially low, the country may be motivated to carry a large amount of 
debt by consuming excessively, resulting in low growth.  With a lower initial income, the country 
tries to borrow a larger quantity of concessional loans to raise both investment and consumption in 
the short-run; and thus becomes more likely to be trapped in the low steady state.  With a lower 
level of total factor productivity, the benefit of remaining at the cut-off is more likely to exceed the 
long-run benefit of achieving the high steady state.  In the absence of effective measures to raise 
the country‟s total factor productivity, the low income country may have an incentive to 
accumulate a significant amount of concessional debt and allocate resources to consumption as 
opposed to investments.  Koeda further asserts that a one-time debt relief stock treatment may help 
the country to get out of the poverty trap, provided that the freed-up resources are used effectively.  
If the country‟s initial debt and income conditions are relatively poor, it is important for the 
country to allocate the freed-up resources for development purposes that would directly raise the 
country‟s total factor productivity. 
Cassimon and Vaessen (2007) posit that an excessive debt burden can provoke a series of ill-
advised actions by the government, creating a vicious circle that can only be stopped by reducing 
debt to a sustainable level.  Excessive debt service might not only severely crowd-out spending on 
development priorities, but it might also elicit sub-optimal fiscal policy and other government 
behavior (such as excessive domestic borrowing, excessive inflationary financing, and excessive 
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taxation of some sectors of the economy) and lessen incentives for economic reforms.  As a 
consequence, both private domestic and foreign investors are discouraged from investing 
productively in the recipient country; thus, leading to a depressed economic growth rate.   
2.2.2.2 Crowding-out Effect 
Another consequence of external debt is the crowding-out effect.  High debt service payments put 
great pressure on budgets, leading to rising fiscal deficits in the highly indebted countries.  The 
stiff demand of high debt service payments on the budget results in forced reductions in public 
spending, thus “crowding out” spending on education and health care (Iyoha, 1999).  Servicing of 
external debt also crowds out domestic investment (Cohen, 1993).  Likewise, Ajayi (1997) argues 
that resources used to service debt crowd-out public investment and discourage private investment 
because of the complementarity between public and private investments.   
As Berben and Brosens (2007) confirm, the level of government debt has a significant negative 
effect on private consumption for high debt countries.  This means that a fiscal expansion will be 
partly crowded-out by private consumption.  In low debt countries, government debt is not 
relevant for private consumption.  They therefore posit that in high debt countries, fiscal policy 
may be less effective in stabilizing business cycle fluctuations.  Pozzi, Heylen, and Dossche 
(2004) assert that high and rising government debt to GDP ratios may raise the welfare cost to 
consumers who ignore future taxes.  On the other hand, it may induce banks to reduce the amounts 
they lend, thereby raising the incidence of liquidity constraints and excess sensitivity of private 
consumption. 
2.2.2.3 Capital Flight 
Foreign borrowing can cause capital flight, while at the same time capital flight can lead to more 
external borrowing. Boyce (1992) argues that foreign borrowing causes capital flight by 
contributing to an increased likelihood of a debt crisis, worsening macroeconomic conditions, and 
the deterioration of the investment climate.  In such cases of debt-driven capital flight, Boyce 
posits that capital flees a country in response to economic circumstances attributable to the 
external debt itself.  High levels of debt also may be interpreted as a signal of higher tax rates in 
the future as the government seeks to service the debt.  These effects will deter domestic 
investment while inducing capital flight.  Foreign borrowing also provides the resources as well as 
 © Stella Muhanji Page 27 
 
a motive for channelling private capital abroad; a phenomenon Boyce (1992) terms debt-fueled 
capital flight. In such cases, funds borrowed abroad (by the government or by private borrowers 
with government guarantees) are re-exported as private assets.  The debt-fueled capital flight 
typically involves a process of “layering” between the external creditor and the private resident in 
whose name external assets are acquired.  On the creditor‟s books, the debt is owed by the 
government or by a corporate entity, typically with a government guarantee of repayment in case 
of default.  The external assets, by contrast, are in the names of individuals: government officials 
who siphoned part of the proceeds of the loan, or private residents who borrowed in the name of a 
firm. The holder of the external asset thus is not identical to the holder of the external liability. Yet 
in practice the same individual is engaged in both transactions.  In the case of flight-driven 
external borrowing, capital flight drains national foreign exchange resources, forcing the 
government to borrow abroad. In the case of flight-fueled external borrowing, flight capital 
directly provides the resources to finance foreign loans to the same residents who export their 
capital, an observable fact that Boyce (1992) refers to as “round-tripping” or “back-to-back loans,” 
motivated by the desire to obtain government guarantees on foreign borrowing, or by the need to 
devise a pretext for unexplained wealth. 
As a matter of fact, Boyce and Ndikumana (2008) found strong linkages between capital flight and 
external borrowing.  The regression results suggest that out of every dollar of new borrowing, as 
much as 60 cents left the country in the form of capital flight the same year.  Furthermore, a one-
dollar increase in the stock of debt resulted in 3 to 4 cents of capital flight in subsequent years. 
Mwinyimvua and Ngasamiaku (2006) emphasize that capital flight (which occurs through over-
invoicing imports and under-invoicing exports) leads to erosion of the domestic tax base in as far 
as income generated and wealth held abroad cannot be taxed.  This reduces the potential 
government revenue and also shifts the tax burden from capital to less mobile assets like land and 
labor.  Ajayi, (1997) echoes the same findings in his study of African countries.  He also finds 
evidence of trade-faking (over-invoicing and under-invoicing of both exports and imports), instead 
of over-invoicing imports and under-invoicing exports in Africa‟s severely indebted low income 
countries.   
Alesina and Tabellini (1989) argue that the uncertainty over future fiscal policies leads 
simultaneously to capital flight, low domestic investment and occurrence of large external debts.  
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Capital flight and excessive government borrowing are more likely to occur in politically turbulent 
countries.  Mahdavi (2004) supports their argument and asserts that external debt increases when 
fiscal deficits, coupled with over-valued exchange rates, encourage capital flight.  This in turn 
drains national foreign exchange reserves and leads to flight-driven external borrowing.   
2.2.2.4 Macroeconomic Shock Propagation 
Shock-propagation has been identified as another salient consequence of high external 
indebtedness.  Uncertainty concerning the longevity of shocks generates forecast errors that are 
autocorrelated even when decision makers use rationally all available information.  These 
autocorrelated forecast errors can generate substantial debt accumulation.  In particular, decision 
makers tend to over-borrow during periods of negative, permanent external shocks (permanent 
decline in the terms of trade and permanent increase in the world interest rate) and during periods 
of positive transitory external shocks.  Senhadji (1997) argues that over-borrowing occurs if a 
permanent decline in the terms of trade is perceived to be transitory or if a transitory improvement 
in the terms of trade is believed to be permanent.  This over-borrowing behavior can be relatively 
persistent, generating debt accumulation, especially if shocks are highly unpredictable.  His 
findings support the view that the short-lived commodity booms of the 1970s may have done more 
harm than good by encouraging some developing countries to over-borrow, contributing to their 
debt accumulation, and hence increased their vulnerability to the exceptionally high interest rates 
of the early 1980s.  Senhadji‟s findings corroborate those of Bevan et al (1993), who in their study 
of trade shocks in developing countries find that when the windfall from a boom accrues to the 
government, it invests in over-ambitious projects in the construction industry.  When the boom 
reverts to normal levels, governments are unable to reduce investment expenditures and therefore 
resort to external borrowing to finance these projects and consequently accumulate external debt. 
The world interest rate has been identified as a potential mechanism for transmitting international 
shocks to small open economies.  Glenn (1997) argues that when the marginal cost of borrowing 
increases (after an adverse world interest rate shock), consumers put off current consumption for 
the future and thus consumption drops.  He also argues that debt is an increasing function of the 
marginal cost of borrowing and therefore debt increases as world interest rates increase.  On his 
part, Senhadji (1997) argues that over-borrowing will occur if a permanent increase in the World 
interest rate is perceived to be transitory or if a transitory decline in the World interest rate is 
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believed to be permanent.  On the contrary, Blankenau, Kose and Yi, (2001) found that world 
interest rates have little effect on output, domestic investments, net exports and net foreign assets.  
Their results substantiate Mendoza‟s (1991) which found that world interest rate fluctuations 
contribute to small fluctuations in macroeconomic variables.  Kose and Riezman (1999) also found 
that world interest rates play a minor role in driving domestic economic activity.  Specifically, 
world interest rates account for less than 1 percent of the output fluctuations in Africa.  Kose and 
Riezman state that the world interest rate only results in a shift from domestic savings to foreign 
assets and decreases investment in production.   
Mendoza and Smith (2006) argue that when a country‟s debt is “sufficiently high”, an adverse 
productivity shock triggers credit collateral constraints on domestic agents.  If the asset market is 
liquid, in the sense that the asset holdings of domestic agents are above short-selling limits, 
collateral constraints force domestic agents to fire-sell assets to foreign traders.  These traders are 
slow to adjust their portfolio because of high trading costs, and as a result asset prices fall and the 
equity premium rises.  The price fall sets in motion Fisher‟s debt-deflation mechanism4 as 
domestic agents engage in further fire sales of assets to comply with increasingly tight collateral 
constraints.  At high leverage ratios, these fire sales cannot prevent a correction in the economy‟s 
net foreign asset position, and as a result the price decline is accompanied by reversals in 
consumption and the current account.  Thus a “Sudden Stop5” takes place.  Sudden stops become 
rare in the long run, after economies build up buffer stocks of savings that lower the long-run 
probability of catastrophic events (see Mendoza and Smith, 2006).   
On the other hand, Kose (2002) studied the effect of a favourable productivity shock in small open 
economies.  His finding is that an increase in productivity leads to an economy wide boom as 
output increases and the representative household increases consumption.   However, the increase 
in consumption is smaller than the increase in output as households aim to smooth out 
consumption.  He also found that the increase in productivity causes an increase in demand for 
imported capital and labour supply.  The increase in investment is larger than the increase in 
                                                 
4
A situation in which the collateral used to secure a loan, or another form of debt, decreases in value.  This can be 
detrimental to the borrower, as it may lead to a restructuring of the loan agreement or even a loan recall.   
5
 This is defined as unusually large recessions marked by sharp, abrupt reversals in capital inflows and the current 
account, large contractions in absorption and production, and collapses in real asset prices and in the price of non-
tradable goods relative to tradables. 
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output.  Additionally, he found that the trade balance deteriorates as households increase foreign 
borrowing to increase their capital stock and take advantage of the favourable productivity shock. 
World price shocks play a significant role in driving business cycles in developing economies.  
Evidence is provided by Kose (2002) who found that World price shocks have a direct impact on 
output fluctuations especially for an economy that heavily relies on imported intermediate inputs.  
World price disturbances also play an important role in explaining consumption variation.  
Additionally, Cashin, Liang and McDermott (2000) examined the persistence of shocks to world 
commodity prices.  Their findings are that if shocks to commodity price series are extremely 
persistent, then an adverse price shock to any given commodity is likely to engender depressed 
prices for a long period of time.  In such circumstances, government-supported price-stabilization 
activities and compensatory financing are unlikely to be ineffective, and external borrowing for 
consumption-smoothing is likely to be unsustainable. 
Monetary shock has a relative effect on real economic variables such as output, interest rate, 
consumption and investment.  Lane (1999) argues that the impact effect of monetary shock is an 
increase in the level of domestic output and consumption.  The world real interest rate falls and 
nominal depreciation translates into a decline in the domestic terms of trade.  In support of Lane 
are Muscatelli, Spinelli and Trecroci (2007) who point out that monetary shocks generate a 
temporary depreciation of the real exchange rate in a flexible exchange rate regime.  As a result, 
the depreciated exchange rate creates a trade surplus which is used to repay foreign debt.  
However, the persistence of the depreciation rate depends on the degree of nominal rigidity in 
wage and price-setting.   
2.2.2.5 Risk of Default and Loss of Creditworthiness 
External debt increases the vulnerability of indebted emerging market economies to 
macroeconomic volatility and financial crises.  Capital account reversals often lead to sovereign 
debt repayment crises that are only resolved after prolonged and difficult debt restructuring.  
Foreign indebtedness exacerbates domestic financial distress or crisis, increasing both the 
incidence and severity of crisis for emerging market economies.  International capital flows to 
emerging markets are themselves volatile and sometimes propagate external shocks to domestic 
consumption and investment.  Higher levels of external debt increase the exposure of developing 
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countries to world output and interest rate fluctuations and to the possibility of capital flow 
reversals.  Debt crises, defaults and delayed debt restructuring are all very costly and are 
associated with income losses for debtor countries (Kletzer, 2005). 
When a country‟s debt exceeds some safe limit, new loans dry up, and default becomes more 
attractive.  The inability to borrow creates an intertemporal distortion that generates conflicting 
incentives: one is to increase creditworthiness with a view to returning to the financial market to 
finance valuable investment opportunities; and second is to reduce creditworthiness in an attempt 
to get better terms in an eventual debt settlement that includes debt relief.  For countries with a 
binding credit ceiling, a policy of trade intervention increases welfare.  The choice between export 
promotion (EP) and import substitution (IS) depends on whether it is more profitable to increase 
the ceiling above inherited debt in order to borrow more, or to reduce it below inherited debt in 
order to repay less.  The determinants of this choice of a joint trade and debt strategy are the stock 
of inherited debt, the level of world interest rates, the terms of trade and the behavior of creditors.  
The IS policy is more profitable with a large inherited foreign debt, a high interest rate and low 
terms of trade and it becomes relevant when creditors fail to reduce inherited debt (Diwan, 1990). 
Cole and Kehoe (2000) argue that if every investor expects other investors not to lend to the 
country, and if that would trigger default then no individual investor would be willing to lend new 
funds thus self-fulfilling their expectations.  Their model implies that the only way to avoid debt 
crises is to avoid relatively high levels of debt with a short maturity structure.  On the other hand, 
Chamon (2007) demonstrates that if the coordination failure as argued by Cole and Kehoe (2000)
 
is the only reason investors are unwilling to lend, then the coordination failure can be overcome by 
offering the new debt through a mechanism where investors are allowed to condition their 
participation on a large amount of debt being issued successfully.  The borrowing country can then 
choose any outcome for that issue provided it satisfies the participation constraints laid out by the 
investors in their contingent bids.   
Furthermore, the repayment of today‟s investors may also depend on whether or not future 
investors will lend to the country.  Alesina, Prati and Tabellini (1990) argue that investors today 
expect their future counterparts not to lend and if this prospect implies a default on the debt 
offered today, then today‟s investors are not willing to hold the country‟s debt.  This triggers a 
default and following it, future investors will not lend to the country, making the initial 
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expectations self-fulfilling.  However, this coordination failure can be eliminated if the setting is 
modified to one where the country is forced to pay its debt over a long but finite horizon or be 
forced to default (Chamon, 2007).  As a result, investors at that future date would be willing to 
lend to a fundamentally sound country under the expectations that their future counterparts will 
not.  The country can self-impose the constraint that it must pay its debt before that future date or 
be forced to default by issuing state-contingent securities that pay a large amount of debt that is 
enough to force a default if that condition is not met.  
On their part, Grossman and Huyck (1988) assert that a sovereign‟s decision to validate lender‟s 
expectations about the servicing of its debt presumably depends mainly on the sovereign‟s 
concerns for its trustworthy reputation for debt servicing.  A trustworthy reputation is valuable 
because it provides continued access to loans.  They show that although all bad states of the world 
cause excusable default, only the worst state of the world can produce total default.  Moreover, 
when a sovereign is consistent with lender‟s expectations about debt servicing, excusable default 
does not preclude continued access to loans.  They further argue that in the reputational 
equilibrium, the amount of debt and associated debt servicing expectations are such that the short-
run gains from repudiation are smaller than the long-run costs from loss of a trustworthy 
reputation.  Thus, although sovereigns sometimes excusably default, they always resist the 
temptation, which is greatest in the good states of the world, to repudiate their debts. 
Blanchard (2006, Pp. 560-567) points out that the higher the ratio of debt to GDP, the larger the 
potential for catastrophic debt dynamics.  Even if the fear that the government may not fully repay 
the debt was initially unfounded, it can easily become self-fulfilling.  The increased interest cost 
the government must pay on its debt can lead the government to lose control of its budget and can 
lead to an increase in debt to a level such that the government is unable to service the debt, thus 
validating the initial fears.  When debt ratios are very high, debt repudiation becomes the solution.  
Repudiating the debt (cancelling it in part or full) allows for a decrease in taxes and thus a 
decrease in distortions.  It decreases the risk of vicious cycles.  Repudiation is generally 
considered a last resort to be used when everything else has failed. 
Countries will be unable to repay their debt because they are either insolvent or illiquid.  Manasse, 
Roubini and Schimmelpfennig (2003) posit that a sovereign‟s  stock of debt relative to its ability to 
pay, measured, for example, by GDP, exports or government revenues determines whether it is 
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insolvent or not.  A sovereign is solvent, if the discounted value of future primary balances is 
greater or equal to the current public debt stock.  Likewise, a country is solvent, if the discounted 
value of future trade balances exceeds the current stock of external debt.  The exchange rate 
regime and exchange rate misalignment impact these considerations because an overvaluation can 
cause an external imbalance that leads to debt accumulation.  They further argue that a currency 
crisis, triggered by overvaluation, can lead to severe balance sheet effects if part of the debt is in 
foreign currency.  Openness can affect the costs of default and thus a country‟s willingness to 
default or not.  Measures of macroeconomic stability such as low inflation and/or money growth 
reflect policy credibility and predictability and thus influence investors‟ risk attitudes towards a 
country.   
Drudi and Giordano (2000) argue that the government would always prefer to inflate away its debt 
instead of defaulting on it explicitly, by simply not repaying or restructuring it.  Even though 
default is a non-distortionary lump-sum tax, it also has very high costs in terms of loss of 
reputation for defaulting governments, income redistribution and risk of bankruptcies in the 
financial sector. 
Large external debt and its servicing leads to deterioration of the relations between African 
countries and creditors, hence reduces the amount of trade financing that could be obtained.  It also 
creates macroeconomic uncertainty, causing investors to exercise their option of waiting until the 
uncertainty is resolved or the returns are high enough to compensate for the risk of investment.  
The outcome is that capital formation tends to be dominated by short-term investments in trading 
activities with quick returns rather than long-term physical investment (Mwega and Rwegasira, 
2003).  The creditworthiness of many African countries was put to severe test in the wake of 
mounting debt servicing obligations.  Many African countries experienced great difficulties in 
borrowing on reasonable terms and conditions in the 1980s and 1990s, at the very time when 
external resources were most needed. 
2.3 The History and Effectiveness of Attempts to Address the Debt Problem 
2.3.1 Rescheduling 
For many decades, creditor countries relied on debt rescheduling and refinancing, complemented 
by minor cancellations, especially for Official Development Assistance (ODA) debts; debt buy-
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back
6; debt conversion and other restructuring mechanics in addressing Africa‟s debt crisis.  Debt 
rescheduling was initially negotiated with debtor countries on a case-by-case basis.  This was 
however replaced by a more systematic framework that applied standard terms to debtor countries 
and provided increasing concessionality.   
In 1987, the Venice terms were introduced for the poorest countries that were undertaking 
adjustments.  Several countries benefited from this rescheduling arrangement, which provided for 
lower interest rates, and larger payments and grace periods.  The Toronto terms succeeded the 
Venice terms in June 1988 and were made available for the low income, heavily indebted 
International Development Association (IDA) countries only.  This arrangement provided lower 
interest rates, further lengthening of maturities and partial debt service write-offs that could 
provide about 33 percent debt service relief.  The Houston terms were proposed in July 1990 for 
middle income countries and allowed for deferral of payments, rather than debt reduction.  Nigeria 
rescheduled its debt four times under this arrangement.  The London terms were formulated in 
1991 to provide 50 percent debt service reduction as well as other enhancements that could ensure 
more even spread of debt service payments.  The Naples terms were adopted in December 1994 
for the poorest and most indebted countries.  They provided up to 67 percent debt relief on the 
present value (PV) of the debt.   
During the period 1980 to 1986, not less than 22 African countries negotiated debt rescheduling 
under the Paris and London Clubs.  The large number of rescheduling within these few years and 
their frequency reveal a serious problem of debt servicing by many African countries.  African 
countries have gone through numerous rescheduling arrangements but these initiatives have failed 
to restore debt sustainability or reverse the growth of debt stock.  Rescheduling did not provide 
debt burden relief, but merely postponed debt service payments while at the same time increased 
the debt burden by applying market-related interest rates.  For instance, Africa received US$294 
billion in disbursements, paid out US$268 billion in debt service and yet remained saddled with a 
debt stock of around US$210 billion in 1994.  In fact, Table F1 in appendix F shows that the ratio 
of external debt-to-exports and that of external debt-to-GDP more than doubled, during the 
rescheduling period, for most African countries. 
                                                 
6
 This is the purchase by a debtor of its own debt, discounted at par. 
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2.3.2 Structural Adjustment Programs 
As Africa‟s debt mounted, the international financial institutions instituted structural adjustment 
programs (SAPs) both as a method of managing the debt and as an alternative path to recovery.  
They emphasized policy measures such as liberalization, de-subsidization, downsizing, 
devaluation and privatization.  SAPs were to check state intervention and patronage, which were 
considered to be the central causes of the region‟s economic downturn.  In an effort to establish 
SAP as a credible alternative development paradigm, the international financial institutions 
granted huge amounts of loans to countries considered strong adjusters. 
Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL) was launched in February 1980 by the World Bank.  Its aim 
was to help countries reduce their current account deficits to more manageable proportions by 
supporting programs of adjustment.  SALs were supposed to facilitate balance of payments 
correction and were intended to end after a period of several years of adjustments.  The reforms 
envisaged by the program were designed to improve the level of public savings and the efficiency 
in the use of public resources; restructure public enterprise management, financing and 
accountability to ensure efficient market oriented operations; reflect the costs of providing public 
services to the public sector; and restructure incentives to promote efficient export-oriented 
industrial development. 
In fact, after a decade of strict implementation of SAPs, the results have been mixed at best.  Iyoha 
(1999) asserts that in virtually all African countries, structural adjustments meant a period of 
austerity, declining income and standards of living, mounting unemployment and increasing 
poverty.  Devaluation, which featured virtually in all SAPs, led to an increase in total debt and 
debt service payments denominated in domestic currencies.  The deflation required by the SAPs 
led to a fall in domestic product and a reduction in national income available for consumption, 
provision of public services and investment.  In his empirical study, Easterly (2005) finds that per 
capita growth did not improve with increased intensity of structural adjustment lending.   
The Table below shows the performance of economic variables during the SAPs period.  As 
shown in the Table, during the structural adjustment period, Ghana reduced its expenditure on 
education from 3.08 percent of GDP in 1980 to 1.48 percent in 1984 while that of Zambia declined 
from 5.39 percent of GDP in 1983 to 1.95 percent in 1993.  In Nigeria, 2.99 percent of its GDP 
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went to debt service in 1981 while education expenditure was 6.21 percent.  By 1984, a span of 
three years, Nigeria had reduced its education expenditure by 5.5 times to 1.13 percent whereas 
debt service increased by 5.2 times to 15.58 percent.  By 1992, its expenditure on education had 
declined to 0.43 percent. In almost all the sampled countries, the proportion of GDP that went to 
debt service far outweighed the percentage that went to education expenditure.  Expenditure in 
domestic investments also fell in most of the countries.  Specifically, Côte d‟Ivoire‟s domestic 
investments fell by four times from 28.2 percent of GDP in 1980 to 6.7 percent in 1990.  Nigeria‟s 
domestic investments fell from 21.5 percent of GDP in 1980 to 6 percent in 1984 whereas that of 
Zambia fell from 23.3 percent of GDP in 1980 to 8.2 percent in 1994.  A reduction in investment 
meant a fall in economic growth.  Meanwhile, foreign investment which was expected to increase 
on the adoption of SAPs failed to materialize due to political instability, poor macroeconomic 
policies, weak economic performance and the debt overhang syndrome.  In fact, foreign direct 
investment was negative for some of the countries under review during the structural adjustment 
period (see Table 2.5 below).    
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Table 2.5: Education, Domestic Investment, Foreign Direct Investment and Debt Service Indicators for Selected African Countries (1980 – 2005) 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Cote 
d'Ivoire EDUC/GDP 6.86 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 6.78 6.90 5.19 4.74 4.06 4.03 3.74 5.27 4.63 4.63 .. .. .. .. 
TDS/GDP 13.83 18.18 20.35 18.54 16.65 15.97 14.42 13.56 10.48 11.03 11.69 12.19 10.40 9.90 14.97 9.51 11.32 11.60 10.82 11.54 9.79 5.89 7.24 4.16 3.51 2.84
TDI/GDP 28.20 25.90 23.20 20.60 10.90 12.60 11.10 12.20 14.40 8.90 6.70 7.40 6.90 8.30 13.70 15.60 12.10 14.40 13.30 13.10 10.10 11.00 10.40 9.70
FDI/GDP 0.93 0.388 0.627 0.549 0.318 0.418 0.772 0.868 0.504 0.19 0.446 0.155 -2.07 0.796 0.938 1.923 2.217 3.543 2.973 2.578 2.253 2.586 1.851 1.204 1.828 1.626
Ghana EDUC/GDP 3.08 2.45 .. .. 1.48 2.53 3.38 3.32 3.20 3.37 3.22 .. 4.46 4.26 4.21 4.68 4.08 .. .. 4.11 .. .. .. .. .. 5.45
TDS/GDP 3.58 2.81 2.75 3.58 3.01 3.54 3.98 8.18 10.45 8.61 6.19 4.45 4.79 4.95 6.26 5.98 6.42 7.33 6.40 5.51 7.81 5.26 2.89 5.96 2.74 2.65
TDI/GDP 5.60 4.60 3.40 3.70 6.90 9.60 9.40 10.40 10.90 13.20 14.40 15.60 12.80 22.20 24.00 20.00 21.20 24.80 23.10 21.00 24.00 26.60 19.70 23.00
FDI/GDP 0.351 0.385 0.404 0.059 0.045 0.124 0.075 0.093 0.096 0.286 0.251 0.303 0.351 2.095 4.283 1.649 1.733 1.188 2.24 3.161 3.337 1.681 0.957 1.794 1.57 0.993
Kenya EDUC/GDP 6.54 6.41 6.13 4.70 5.32 6.13 .. 6.81 6.15 .. 6.73 6.70 6.29 7.01 6.71 6.47 6.35 .. .. 5.32 5.19 5.21 6.14 6.47 6.74 .. 
TDS/GDP 5.97 7.08 7.73 8.61 9.35 10.13 9.36 8.67 8.83 8.57 9.21 8.82 8.15 10.99 12.33 10.00 6.95 5.01 4.70 5.37 4.65 3.73 4.10 3.95 2.11 1.26
TDI/GDP 29.20 27.70 21.80 20.80 20.70 26.00 21.80 24.30 25.00 20.60 19.70 19.30 13.70 17.70 16.40 17.50 16.80 15.40 17.30 16.20 15.40 14.60 13.40 12.90
FDI/GDP 1.087 0.206 0.202 0.397 0.174 0.47 0.452 0.494 0.005 0.752 0.664 0.231 0.077 0.027 0.052 0.359 0.106 0.15 0.081 0.107 0.873 0.041 0.214 0.558 0.284 0.113
Malawi EDUC/GDP 3.10 3.53 2.85 2.68 2.49 3.30 3.63 3.24 3.23 3.33 3.17 3.17 4.72 4.34 4.13 5.33 .. .. .. 4.55 4.14 .. .. 5.81 .. .. 
TDS/GDP 7.06 9.25 7.98 6.60 8.78 9.72 12.33 9.78 7.64 6.02 7.05 5.84 6.01 3.78 6.72 8.45 3.88 3.19 4.95 4.12 3.61 2.67 1.89 2.36 3.15 4.56
TDI/GDP 24.70 17.60 21.40 22.80 12.90 18.60 12.30 15.40 18.70 21.20 19.70 20.20 19.90 15.20 29.10 17.40 12.30 11.60 13.50 14.70 13.60 13.90 10.90 11.20
FDI/GDP 0.766 0.09 0.508 0.209 2.259 0.046 -0.25 0.008 1.264 0.584 1.239 -1.3 -0.39 0.386 2.115 0.404 0.693 0.558 0.691 3.296 1.491 1.124 0.305 0.221 -0.04 0.145
Nigeria EDUC/GDP .. 6.21 2.02 1.84 1.35 1.13 1.60 .. 0.73 0.86 0.89 0.89 0.43 0.83 0.83 0.65 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
TDS/GDP 1.79 2.99 4.19 7.33 14.42 15.58 10.14 4.72 9.67 8.88 11.71 10.78 11.46 6.98 7.91 6.52 7.11 3.91 4.14 3.06 4.01 5.33 3.19 2.82 2.40 8.98
TDI/GDP 21.50 21.40 15.40 11.40 6.00 7.50 9.70 11.40 15.60 17.70 14.70 23.40 21.80 23.30 19.60 16.30 14.20 17.40 24.10 23.40 17.70 22.80 26.10 23.10
FDI/GDP -1.15 0.905 0.865 1.043 0.671 1.709 0.956 2.605 1.657 7.903 2.065 2.608 2.741 6.301 8.28 3.84 4.514 4.249 3.271 2.89 2.479 2.48 4.012 3.44 2.601 2.035
Senegal EDUC/GDP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 3.92 3.92 4.24 4.25 3.85 3.84 3.77 .. 3.46 3.41 3.38 3.52 3.63 .. 4.06 5.38
TDS/GDP 8.68 7.38 4.78 4.69 6.91 7.35 7.96 8.41 7.80 8.24 5.69 5.65 3.47 2.33 6.43 6.32 6.31 5.74 6.91 5.04 5.11 4.66 4.42 3.81 4.40 2.35
TDI/GDP 15.30 11.90 11.30 11.90 11.70 9.80 11.00 11.70 12.50 11.90 13.80 12.90 14.80 14.10 18.50 16.70 18.50 17.80 19.80 20.60 18.50 18.10 18.50 20.10
FDI/GDP 0.485 1.387 1.086 -1.4 1.245 -0.61 -0.22 -0.09 0.3 0.579 0.998 -0.14 0.355 -0.01 1.836 0.708 0.188 4.024 1.51 3.221 1.435 0.7 1.567 0.819 1.01 0.655
South 
Africa EDUC/GDP .. .. .. .. .. .. 5.43 5.58 5.13 5.42 5.92 5.92 6.24 6.18 6.40 5.89 6.80 .. .. 6.03 5.58 5.29 3.77 3.08 2.92 2.89
TDS/GDP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 2.14 2.24 2.95 4.40 3.27 3.22 2.91 3.68 4.23 2.59 1.78 1.99
TDI/GDP 29.90 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 16.50 11.80 11.90 12.00 14.00 16.80 18.00 17.30 16.60 17.00 16.40 15.90 15.30 16.10 17.20
FDI/GDP -0.01 0.075 0.412 0.082 0.493 -0.67 -0.06 -0.18 0.138 -0.16 -0.07 0.211 0.003 0.009 0.276 0.826 0.568 2.561 0.41 1.129 0.729 6.136 0.663 0.471 0.327 2.612
Tanzania EDUC/GDP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 2.31 2.21 2.82 2.82 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 2.17 .. .. .. .. .. .. 
TDS/GDP 3.14 3.01 2.28 2.67 2.33 2.71 3.45 3.05 3.17 4.01 4.20 4.14 5.10 4.95 4.07 4.42 4.14 2.20 2.83 2.62 1.89 1.62 1.11 0.89 1.05 1.05
TDI/GDP 23.00 20.60 21.00 13.60 15.30 15.70 19.50 22.50 19.80 17.40 22.60 26.20 26.80 26.10 24.60 19.80 16.60 14.90 13.80 15.50 17.60 17.00 19.10 18.60
FDI/GDP 0.089 0.319 0.259 0.025 -0.15 0.226 -0.17 -0.01 0.074 0.132 2E-04 2E-04 0.264 0.48 1.108 2.282 2.31 2.055 2.056 5.982 5.104 4.949 4.398 5.119 4.154 3.909
Uganda EDUC/GDP 1.24 2.52 1.69 2.43 3.43 .. .. 5.10 .. 1.45 1.47 1.47 .. .. 2.20 2.53 .. .. .. .. 2.46 .. .. .. 5.23 .. 
TDS/GDP 4.58 5.09 2.89 3.82 3.55 4.40 4.37 2.55 3.10 3.56 3.36 4.43 3.96 4.79 3.73 2.35 2.45 2.57 2.33 2.18 1.25 0.88 1.21 1.34 1.51 1.97
TDI/GDP 6.20 .. .. 9.10 8.80 9.90 12.50 12.90 10.10 11.10 12.70 15.20 15.90 15.20 15.40 12.80 20.70 18.50 16.40 19.50 20.00 18.60 19.70 20.70
FDI/GDP 0.321 .. 0.093 .. .. -0.11 .. .. 0.072 -0.03 -0.14 0.03 0.105 1.695 2.21 2.106 2.002 2.791 3.189 2.337 2.712 2.667 3.164 3.235 3.26 2.946  
Source: World Development Indicators, 2006 Online Database, IFS database  
EDUC is Education Expenditure, GDP is Gross Domestic Product, TDS is Total Debt Service, TDI is Total Domestic Investment and FDI is Foreign Direct Investment. 
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Continuation of Table 2.5 
Country Indicator 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Zambia EDUC/GDP 4.13 4.01 5.16 5.39 5.00 4.15 3.34 2.66 2.39 2.45 2.41 2.76 2.10 1.95 1.98 2.04 .. .. 2.31 1.93 1.99 1.99 .. .. 2.83 1.99
TDS/GDP 10.55 10.47 8.62 8.98 8.94 6.06 23.18 7.55 5.07 4.76 6.10 17.57 10.98 11.05 11.19 75.12 7.67 6.29 6.24 4.74 5.73 5.09 6.14 13.02 7.82 3.29
TDI/GDP 23.30 19.30 16.80 13.80 14.70 14.90 23.80 13.90 11.40 10.80 17.30 11.00 11.90 15.00 8.20 15.90 12.80 14.60 16.40 17.60 18.70 20.00 23.00 26.10
FDI/GDP 1.5899 -0.958 1.0069 0.775 0.6307 2.2879 1.7018 3.2893 2.501 4.0966 6.1666 1.0169 1.4138 9.6044 1.1953 2.7892 3.5807 5.3038 6.1164 5.1735 3.7576 1.9714 2.2182 3.9754 4.4071 3.5625
Zimbabwe EDUC/GDP 5.22 .. 5.52 5.72 6.26 6.83 7.01 7.44 6.82 5.91 7.73 7.73 7.11 6.86 .. .. .. .. .. .. 4.57 .. .. .. .. .. 
TDS/GDP 0.98 1.35 2.44 6.50 5.63 7.49 7.65 7.90 6.82 5.30 5.36 5.32 8.89 9.52 8.68 8.94 7.45 7.85 15.55 10.52 5.69 1.63 0.50 0.68 1.97 6.66
TDI/GDP 18.80 23.10 21.20 15.90 19.00 21.10 19.40 19.10 19.70 15.00 17.40 19.10 20.20 22.80 23.70 19.70 18.50 18.10 17.10 16.10 12.60 7.80 8.30 11.40
FDI/GDP 0.0232 0.0443 -0.01 -0.027 -0.039 0.0506 0.1199 -0.453 -0.231 -0.123 -0.139 0.0323 0.2217 0.4264 0.5034 1.6551 0.9459 1.603 7.324 0.9892 0.3135 0.037 0.1183 0.048 0.1846 3.0482  
Source: World Development Indicators, 2006 Online Database, IFS database  
EDUC is Education Expenditure, GDP is Gross Domestic Product, TDS is Total Debt Service, TDI is Total Domestic Investment and FDI is Foreign Direct Investment. 
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Structural adjustments programs failed because of design flaws.  The commitment to reform was 
demonstrably weak and where economic and political reforms were accepted they were poorly 
implemented.  SAPs amounted to reorganizing a bankrupt company and placing it, together with 
massive infusion of new loans or capital, in the hands of the same incompetent managers who 
ruined it in the first place (Ayittey, 1999).  Furthermore, SAPs assumed that development occurred 
in a vacuum such that civil wars, infrastructural deterioration and environmental degradation had 
no effect on economic development.   
The deterioration of macroeconomic conditions of African countries during the 1980s and 1990s 
even with availability of structural adjustment loans has been explained by Vamvakidis (2007).  
He asserts that foreign aid is often given through low interest-rate loans and therefore a 
government that can easily borrow abroad may use such borrowing to postpone otherwise 
necessary reforms.  This is because there is less urgency to cut a high fiscal deficit when it can be 
easily financed by borrowing abroad.  Furthermore, the availability of external financing may 
postpone the eventually inevitable adjustment in an economy in which macroeconomic conditions 
are deteriorating and there is urgent need for structural reforms.  In this case, external financing 
acts like a “pain reliever”, postponing the very much needed treatment.    
2.3.3 Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative 
The introduction of HIPC initiative in 1996 was a tacit admission by the creditors that SAPs, in 
which more confidence was reposed, lacked the capacity to halt the rise in developing countries‟ 
debt.  By this time, the overall external debts for African countries had become so large relative to 
their economic sizes and their export earnings such that it was evident that it would be impossible 
for them to pay a significant part of their debts without the imposition of an insurmountable 
burden on them.   
The HIPC initiative initially identified 41 poor countries for debt forgiveness, 33 were in Africa.  
Currently there are 40 countries under HIPC of which 32 are in Africa after Angola was dropped 
in 2000 because its debt could be reduced to levels deemed sustainable through other debt relief 
mechanisms.  The objective of the initiative was to reduce the external debt burden of the poor 
countries adjudged to be heavily indebted to a level that they would not have the capacity to repay.  
The purpose of the initiative was to encourage improved economic and social performance in 
debtor countries, to facilitate the provision of interim finance to strong performers, foster a more 
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productive relationship between creditors and debtors, and to provide debtor countries an exit 
facility from repeated debt rescheduling exercises.  The modalities for implementing the HIPC 
initiative were based on two overriding principles: eligibility and sustainability.  Sustainability 
refers to a debt level that allows a debtor country to meet its current and future external obligations 
in full without resorting to rescheduling in the future or accumulation of arrears.   
However, this debt relief initiative had serious flaws both in its design and implementation.  
Firstly, the eligibility for debt reduction was too closely linked to performance under the 
IMF/World Bank economic reform programs that had previously failed.  Secondly, very few 
countries were viewed as sufficiently impoverished or indebted to qualify.  The criteria used by the 
World Bank and IMF (PV of debt to exports of 200-250 percent and the debt-service to GDP ratio 
of 20–25 percent) were not only high but also arbitrary.  Thirdly, the criteria for eligibility and 
debt sustainability still required poor countries to divert scarce resources away from vital human 
needs and investment in authentic development.  Finally, the time frame for receiving debt relief 
was too long.  Under typical HIPC debt relief conditions, countries had to establish a good track 
record for implementing IMF economic policy reforms for three years before receiving bilateral 
debt relief from creditor governments.  They had to wait up to three more years to receive relief 
from IMF and World Bank.  Besides these built-in design problems, political bickering and lack of 
political will among creditors led to serious problems in HIPC implementation.  By the end of 
1998, out of 41 HIPCs that desperately needed debt reduction, only six countries, namely Uganda, 
Bolivia, Côte d‟Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Guyana and Mozambique had entered into the agreement 
IMF and IDA (2006a).   
In recognition of the failure of the initial HIPC initiative to deliver on debt relief, coupled with 
aggressive world-wide campaigns for debt cancellation, HIPC II (the enhanced version) was 
adopted in 1999, making it easier for countries to meet the qualifying conditions, including 
implementing World Bank and IMF structural adjustment programs.  HIPC II was designed to 
provide faster, deeper and broader debt relief and strengthen the link between debt relief, poverty 
reduction and social policies. 
In order for countries to reach the decision point, all eligible countries requesting for HIPC 
initiative assistance are expected to prepare a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) detailing 
how the money saved will be spent on the social sector.  To qualify for HIPC II, the ratio of the 
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country‟s debt to export should be higher than 150 percent.  Where the ratio of debt-to-revenues is 
used, this should exceed 250 percent.  Upon the attainment of the decision point, the country 
receives from the participating creditor countries at least 90 percent debt relief, until it attains 
completion point when it would get the total debt relief.  During the period between the decision 
and completion points, which is not time bound, the country should establish another track record 
of good policy performance under the IMF/World Bank supported programs which include 
satisfactory implementation of key structural macroeconomic policies and poverty reduction 
strategy.  Whatever debt stock relief creditors give at the completion point is irrevocable for both 
official and commercial creditors.  As of July 2006, of the 32 African countries eligible or 
potentially eligible HIPCs, fifteen had reached the completion point
7
.  There were ten countries 
that had reached decision point and seven countries that were in pre-decision point
8
.    
In order to deal with debt problems of non-HIPC countries, the Paris Club approved in October 
2003 the Evian approach.  The Evian approach was designed to improve Paris Club capacity to 
deal efficiently with the debt of non-HIPCs.   Its aim was to take into account debt sustainability 
considerations; given that Paris Club standard treatments have not been able to address debt 
sustainability problems and could lead to debtor countries bearing, unsustainable debt into cycles 
of debt rescheduling.  It is supposed to tailor Paris Club debt treatments to the financial needs of 
the debtor countries over time and contribute to the efforts of resolving crisis more orderly, timely 
and predictably. 
The Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) was launched in June 2005 by the G8 to reduce 
further the debt of HIPCs and provide additional resources to help them meet the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs).  The MDRI is separate from the HIPC initiative but linked to it in 
terms of operation.  Under the MDRI, the multilateral institutions - IMF, IDA and African 
Development Bank (AfDB) provide 100 percent debt relief on eligible debts to countries that have 
reached completion point under the HIPC initiative (IMF and World Bank, 2006). 
                                                 
7
 The fifteen countries are Benin, Burkina-Faso, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, 
Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. 
8
 The ten countries that have reached decision point include Burundi, Chad, Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic 
of Congo, The Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Malawi, São Tomé and Príncipe and Sierra Leone.  The seven at the 
pre-decision point are countries are Central Africa Republic, Comoros, Côte d‟Ivoire, Liberia, Somalia, Sudan and 
Togo. These statistics are in IMF and IDA (2006a and 2006b) 
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HIPC initiative and MDRI relief have significantly lowered debt ratios in beneficiary countries, 
but other economic circumstances remain unchanged.  IMF and IDA (2006d) acknowledge that the 
HIPCs‟ project and debt management capacities remain generally weak.  HIPCs face large MDG-
related needs, yet most of the related expenses (for example in health and education) do not 
immediately generate the cash flows required to service commercial debt.  The apparent borrowing 
space created by debt relief poses new policy challenges.  Debt relief frees up resources that 
African countries may wish to use to make faster progress towards achieving the MDGs.  
Meanwhile, there is emergence of new lenders, both public and private who present new 
opportunities.  Such lending, however, if in excessive volumes or on unfavorable terms, could 
contribute to the re-emergence of debt vulnerabilities in these countries and create risks to 
development. 
2.3.4 Challenges of the Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative 
Jubilee Plus, a London-based debt activist group concluded, after analyzing the World Bank data, 
that at least 15 African countries would continue to face unsustainable levels of debt after 
receiving HIPC relief.  Their argument was that the Bank‟s definition of sustainable debt failed to 
include new debt which the poorest countries must continue to borrow in order to pay charges on 
their remaining old debt.  The bank also fails vital ongoing obligations such as key social and 
infrastructure spending that must be met by the poorest countries.  As some observers have noted, 
HIPC cannot provide an exit from current debt problems and long-term debt sustainability is a 
mirage (Gumisai, 2001).   
The major challenge of HIPC initiative is its voluntary nature which has contributed to the low 
participation of non-Paris Club official bilateral creditors.  Even though efforts have been 
deployed to encourage all creditors to join in, with a view of ensuring that debt relief provided 
would be comprehensive and the costs shared equally, there is no legal basis requiring creditors to 
participate and provide debt relief on terms comparable to those granted by other creditors.  In 
practice, many non-Paris Club creditors as well as commercial creditors have not participated in 
the HIPC initiative (IMF and IDA, 2006d).  Debt relief delivered to HIPCs by non-Paris Club 
official bilateral creditors is low even under optimistic assumptions.  Estimated debt relief 
delivered ranges between US$1.1 billion and US$1.4 billion in end-2005 PV terms, or 27 percent 
and 37 percent of total HIPC initiative assistance costs attributable to these creditors.  Even under 
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the most optimistic scenario, this is less than half of the debt relief expected to be delivered by 
non-Paris Club official bilateral creditors. 
Commercial creditors account for about 4 percent of the total cost of HIPC initiative debt relief to 
the 29 post-decision-point countries.  Their share in total debt relief has almost doubled since mid-
2005, mainly due to Republic of Congo reaching its decision point.  However, commercial 
creditors pose a challenge to the HIPC initiative.  Firstly, very few commercial creditors have 
provided their share of HIPC debt relief.  According to a recent survey conducted by IMF and 
IDA, some commercial creditors have only provided debt relief for three countries – Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Guyana and Madagascar.   This debt relief only amounts to 5.5 percent of the 
total HIPC initiative assistance to be provided by commercial creditors to the 29 post-decision-
point HIPCs.  The low participation of commercial creditors could hinder some HIPCs‟ access to 
debt relief from IMF.  HIPCs that have significant debt to commercial creditors (such as the 
Republic of Congo, Côte d‟Ivoire and Liberia) could find it difficult to get the financing 
assurances required to access interim relief from creditors such as IMF.  As of end-July 2006, the 
IMF had not received sufficient financing assurances to start disbursing interim assistance to the 
Republic of Congo which reached its decision point in April 2006. 
Secondly, a growing number of commercial creditors and distressed debt funds are engaging in 
litigation against HIPCs.  The HIPCs facing the most litigation are the Republic of Congo, Guyana 
and Uganda with eight, seven and six lawsuits, respectively.  Of the total 44 litigations, 26 
creditors have obtained court judgments in their favour against seven HIPCs
9
 amounting to about 
US$1 billion.  Litigation has lead to significant financial and economic costs to HIPCs.  The total 
reported claims under litigation as of 2006 amount to about US$1.9 billion, and are about 22 
percent higher than the total HIPC initiative debt relief to be provided by commercial creditors.  
For example, lawsuits against Cameroon and Nicaragua have resulted in court awards equivalent 
to more than half and four times, respectively, of the debt relief that should have been provided by 
commercial creditors to these countries.  In Republic of Congo, and São Tomé and Príncipe, 
litigated debts are equivalent to about 15 percent and 13 percent of GDP, respectively. 
                                                 
9
 The seven are Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Nicaragua, Sierra Leone, Uganda 
and Zambia.  Sierra Leone, Uganda and Zambia have already paid cumulative US$30 million to some of their 
litigating creditors, although through out-of-court settlements.  
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IMF and IDA admit that helping countries move through the HIPC initiative process has become 
challenging.  Some HIPCs experienced extended interruptions to Poverty Reduction and Growth 
Facility (PRGF)-supported program implementation, mainly due to fiscal policy slippages.  Weak 
budget execution and poor policy implementation have slowed the achievement of agreed triggers.  
Preparing fully participatory Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) takes longer than 
expected, given that many countries lack the institutional and human capacity needed to prepare 
such documents.  Progress in several pre-decision-point countries has been hindered by internal 
conflict, governance issues and protracted arrears. 
Moreover, access to debt relief by some pre-decision-point HIPCs could be curtailed by the 
initiative‟s sunset clause.  A sunset clause was included in the initial legal framework in 1986 in 
order to prevent HIPC from becoming permanent, minimize moral hazard and encourage early 
adoption of reforms.  IMF and IDA have subsequently extended the sunset clause four times and it 
was to take effect on December 31, 2006 (IMF and IDA 2006c).  These extensions were granted to 
allow countries more time to start qualifying programs so as to be able to benefit from HIPC debt 
relief.  As of July 2006, members of IMF and IDA had decided to let the sunset clause take effect 
and grandfather all countries that were assessed to have met the income and indebtedness criteria 
based on end-2004 data
10
.  This would permit the countries to qualify for HIPC debt relief at their 
own pace. 
Although HIPCs that have reached completion point have received debt relief, debt has increased 
substantially, exceeding the HIPC thresholds.  By 2003, debts to export ratios for selected HIPCs 
were above 150 percent (see Table 2.6 below).  In fact, debt to export ratios at completion points 
for most HIPCs are on average almost 40 percentage points higher than those projected at decision 
points.  Debt burdens of HIPCs have accelerated because of exogenous shocks/structural 
vulnerability (commodity price shocks, natural disasters, unexpected changes in discount rates and 
exchange rate fluctuations) of these economies, high current account deficits, inadequate debt 
management policies, inadequate social and structural policies that can stimulate growth and 
attract investments, lending policies of many creditors (loans with commercial interest rates and 
with short maturity period) and political instability.  As World market prices for commodity 
products have decreased substantially in recent years, growth rates of the HIPCs are below the 
                                                 
10
 The countries to be grandfathered are Comoros, Eritrea, Liberia, Somalia and Sudan. 
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expectations on which the original sustainability analysis was based.  This is because these 
countries depend on a small number of commodity export products.  This lack of diversification is 
largely a reflection of the low development levels of these countries.  
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Table 2.6: External Debt and Current Account Balance Indicators for Selected African Countries 
Year CA bal 
ETD/X
GS ETD CA bal 
ETD/X
GS ETD CA bal 
ETD/
XGS ETD CA bal 
ETD/
XGS ETD CA bal 
ETD/
XGS ETD CA bal 
ETD/
XGS ETD 
1980 -1826.5 205.0 7462.4 30.2 115.5 1401.7 -876.3 164.3 3386.8 -259.6 263.7 829.9 5177.6 32.1 8921.4 -386.1 162.7 1473.3
1981 -1411.3 279.2 8140.8 -419.2 184.8 1538.8 -561.6 179.5 3228.2 -145.6 258.7 821.4 -6473.9 58.6 11420.7 -461.5 156.6 1670.7
1982 -1016.1 315.1 8961.4 -107.3 207.7 1484.2 -305.3 206.6 3367.8 -111.7 321.4 864.7 -7281.8 92.8 11971.6 -265.6 192.6 1859.9
1983 -928.7 349.0 8858.4 -172.2 348.5 1665.9 -47.3 237.9 3628.3 -130.8 323.2 892.3 -4331.8 161.5 17560.8 -304.4 201.7 2073.0
1984 -72.8 281.8 8545.9 -38.8 318.0 1959.4 -126.9 211.1 3511.5 -41.7 257.7 879.9 122.6 143.9 17770.5 -272.4 227.4 2197.2
1985 67.9 301.9 9659.0 -133.9 331.7 2243.3 -115.0 260.2 4180.6 -126.4 369.7 1020.7 2603.6 137.9 18643.3 -359.6 281.2 2559.4
1986 -297.7 307.3 11449.8 -85.3 341.1 2746.6 -45.0 242.0 4602.8 -84.9 425.7 1157.3 210.9 411.7 22211.9 -368.8 281.0 3220.6
1987 -968.3 381.1 13577.1 -97.9 362.2 3284.4 -502.1 332.6 5782.9 -60.6 442.0 1366.7 -73.2 370.5 29021.4 -429.8 336.9 4026.6
1988 -1238.9 402.0 13342.3 -67.1 316.8 3056.4 -471.3 307.1 5809.0 -86.9 397.9 1359.0 -296.5 406.8 29621.0 -404.6 313.4 3883.0
1989 -966.4 457.6 14820.6 -93.9 366.0 3294.4 -590.4 304.4 5888.7 -51.2 455.1 1410.1 1089.5 350.8 30122.0 -347.9 245.4 3268.5
1990 -1214.2 484.5 17251.1 -223.2 391.1 3734.4 -527.1 315.9 7055.1 -86.2 344.4 1558.2 4988.2 226.4 33438.9 -363.3 230.0 3743.8
1991 -1074.1 537.8 18174.0 -252.1 385.7 4156.5 -213.3 337.9 7453.1 -227.7 319.3 1664.9 1202.6 249.9 33527.2 -371.7 240.6 3579.2
1992 -1012.7 513.1 18546.5 -377.0 374.2 4238.5 -180.2 320.5 6897.9 -284.9 393.1 1708.9 2267.8 222.3 29018.7 -401.3 235.8 3674.2
1993 -891.7 579.2 19070.9 -558.8 377.4 4575.2 71.2 305.3 7111.4 -165.6 522.4 1826.2 -780.4 257.8 30735.6 -433.0 280.9 3794.9
1994 -13.8 491.7 17395.2 -254.6 364.9 5101.1 97.9 266.3 7124.2 -180.7 569.7 2021.1 -2127.9 317.3 33092.3 -187.5 269.7 3687.7
1995 -492.4 417.5 18898.5 -143.7 340.7 5494.9 -400.4 245.8 7309.0 -78.0 472.5 2238.8 -2578.4 257.4 34092.5 -244.5 232.6 3906.0
1996 -162.3 376.7 19523.6 -306.9 325.6 5787.7 -73.5 224.1 6813.6 -147.4 415.4 2311.7 3506.9 175.3 31406.6 -200.7 246.9 3776.0
1997 -154.7 300.6 15608.7 -403.5 334.5 5712.3 -456.8 215.5 6465.1 -276.2 376.0 2225.6 551.6 156.6 28454.9 -184.8 264.2 3795.3
1998 -290.2 275.5 14851.8 -521.7 243.9 6310.9 -475.3 236.2 6824.0 -4.4 418.1 2438.9 -4243.5 257.6 30294.5 -247.5 260.8 4068.8
1999 -119.5 243.4 13170.0 -964.3 254.9 6419.9 -89.6 237.8 6474.8 -157.5 523.3 2742.0 505.8 189.2 29127.6 -320.2 237.8 3930.7
2000 -241.3 269.0 12138.0 -386.5 245.8 6115.9 -199.4 217.9 6145.0 -73.5 573.9 2705.5 7429.0 138.9 31354.9 -332.4 229.8 3589.7
2001 -61.3 249.3 11618.1 -324.6 257.7 6342.7 -320.3 177.6 5520.9 -60.0 533.5 2584.7 2477.8 147.7 31041.6 -245.5 211.6 3643.7
2002 768.2 196.5 11791.4 -31.9 264.9 6961.7 -117.7 185.2 6127.8 -200.7 603.1 2887.4 1083.1 156.0 30476.0 -316.8 216.8 4085.6
2003 294.2 184.0 12186.7 302.3 231.0 7572.9 146.2 184.2 6881.9 .. .. 3098.9 3390.7 121.4 34700.2 -436.6 185.0 4366.7
2004 240.9 149.1 11739.4 -315.8 200.0 7067.1 -352.9 155.0 6947.0 .. .. 3416.6 16840.3 93.5 37883.1 -513.1 134.8 3825.2
2005 -12.4 126.6 10734.8 -811.6 168.0 6738.7 -495.0 114.3 6169.2 .. .. 3154.8 24202.0 39.4 22178.3 .. .. 3792.9
Nigeria SenegalCote d'Ivoire Ghana Kenya Malawi
 
Source: Global Development Finance  
CA bal is current account balance, ETD is external debt stock, and XGS is exports of goods and services.  CA balance and ETD are in Millions of US$. 
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Continuation of Table 2.6 
Year CA bal 
ETD/ 
XGS ETD CA bal 
ETD/ 
XGS ETD CA bal 
ETD/ 
XGS ETD CA bal 
ETD/ 
XGS ETD CA bal 
ETD/ 
XGS ETD 
1980 3161.4 2.6 .. -521.2 698.7 5322.8 -82.7 207.8 687.1 -516.3 199.7 3244.4 -149.4 45.6 0.8
1981 -4978.4 4.2 .. -406.6 719.8 5821.3 25.4 256.7 703.0 -720.6 308.2 3603.6 -546.1 75.0 1.3
1982 -3525.8 6.0 .. -523.3 1169.0 6198.4 -69.9 250.8 870.5 -560.6 339.1 3658.0 -632.1 118.7 1.9
1983 -323.2 5.7 .. -304.6 1397.2 6864.1 -72.2 273.5 1005.5 -263.0 365.7 3747.2 -397.9 160.2 2.2
1984 -1951.8 7.9 .. -359.0 1428.0 7225.0 103.5 252.3 1070.0 -146.6 385.8 3752.8 -42.9 159.3 2.2
1985 2261.4 6.5 .. -375.1 2085.2 9104.7 4.6 330.7 1231.4 -395.3 517.2 4487.2 -64.2 166.1 2.4
1986 2766.0 5.2 .. -321.1 1098.7 4901.2 -43.3 335.4 1413.6 -347.6 760.4 5633.3 16.8 171.5 2.6
1987 5104.7 4.1 .. -407.4 1379.9 5507.9 -112.0 575.6 1920.2 -245.2 719.3 6480.4 58.0 174.9 2.9
1988 2533.6 3.8 .. -356.5 1185.5 6011.3 -195.2 722.1 1922.9 -293.2 535.2 6694.2 125.3 143.9 2.7
1989 1498.0 2.9 .. -335.1 1088.4 5852.9 -259.5 784.2 2177.7 -218.6 459.4 6553.4 16.9 143.8 2.8
1990 1551.6 2.7 .. -558.9 1185.8 6454.0 -263.3 1453.1 2583.7 -594.4 507.0 6904.8 -139.8 161.1 3.3
1991 1399.1 2.8 .. -737.5 1278.2 6559.8 -169.8 1411.5 2778.2 -305.7 549.9 6958.5 -456.9 174.2 3.5
1992 1980.2 2.9 .. -714.2 1141.3 6670.0 -99.6 1542.5 2927.7 .. .. 6700.2 -603.7 221.9 4.1
1993 2803.1 5.1 .. -894.8 862.6 6786.1 -171.1 1010.0 3029.8 .. .. 6477.9 -115.8 210.8 4.2
1994 29.6 70.0 21671.0 -637.4 748.1 7245.8 -174.2 623.5 3372.7 .. .. 6808.5 -424.9 189.1 4.5
1995 -2493.2 71.4 25358.0 -589.8 572.2 7421.3 -281.5 525.4 3583.1 .. .. 6957.8 .. .. 5.0
1996 -1678.2 71.2 26050.0 -412.8 519.3 7387.0 -211.5 452.9 3685.5 .. .. 7060.1 .. .. 5.0
1997 -2227.4 66.6 25272.4 -473.4 550.9 6910.0 -315.7 487.0 3884.9 -182.0 524.8 6659.8 .. .. 4.9
1998 -2199.1 68.6 24752.7 -751.0 619.6 7308.4 -363.7 531.5 3918.3 -570.4 712.5 6870.4 .. .. 4.6
1999 -675.2 67.3 23907.3 -835.3 645.1 7654.9 -293.2 369.4 3498.9 -386.4 635.2 5859.4 .. .. 4.3
2000 -190.6 62.9 24861.0 -498.6 516.9 6931.1 -358.8 366.6 3498.1 -552.7 623.6 5722.5 .. .. 3.8
2001 342.6 62.6 24050.0 -237.4 341.9 6245.2 -369.5 348.1 3732.5 .. 567.16 6069.1 .. .. 3.6
2002 884.3 64.3 25040.5 22.4 346.8 6840.3 -362.0 347.2 3993.3 .. 605.61 6460.6 .. .. 3.9
2003 -1902.4 55.8 27807.3 -111.0 310.2 6989.6 -354.3 393.7 4575.0 .. 516.65 6926.6 .. .. 4.5
2004 -7003.3 46.6 28499.9 -246.2 291.7 7804.8 -191.8 322.0 4789.6 .. 346.9 7279.2 .. .. 4.8
2005 43.1 30631.6 -536.3 260.8 7763.3 -259.1 238.8 4462.6 .. 209.0956 5668.3 .. .. 4.3
Zambia ZimbabweSouth Africa Tanzania Uganda
 
Source: Global Development Finance  
CA bal is current account balance, ETD is external debt stock, and XGS is exports of goods and services.  CA balance and ETD are in Millions of US$.   
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2.4 What is the way forward in Addressing Africa’s Debt Burden? 
From the foregoing discussion, external debt and its attendant debt service have led to debt 
overhang problem, crowding-out of domestic investments and expenditure on education, and thus 
hampered economic growth for African countries.  External debt burden has also led to capital 
flight and subjected these countries to risks of default and creditworthiness.  As has been discussed 
in the review, there is a negative relationship between debt service and foreign investments in 
Africa.  This means that as countries committed more funds to debt service their foreign direct 
investments declined because of the debt overhang syndrome.  There is also a negative 
relationship between external debt and GDP which implies that as debt stock increased, GDP 
declined.  Furthermore, there is a negative relationship between growth rate in debt service and 
growth rate in GDP which suggests that debt service depressed growth rate in GDP.  Moreover, 
the countries imported more than they exported during the review period suggesting that most of 
the imports were in consumables instead of intermediate inputs that would have grown exports, 
which in turn would have contributed to reducing the debt burden.  Poor performance of exports 
led to reduction of the foreign exchange earnings that are required for servicing external debts and 
import of basic equipment and raw materials.   
Creditor countries have come up with several debt management initiatives such as SAPs, 
rescheduling, and HIPC.  In all African countries, structural adjustments have meant a period of 
austerity, declining income and standards of living, mounting unemployment and increasing 
poverty.  Rescheduling compounded the debt stock as countries had to repay more debt than they 
had initially bargained or contracted.  The substantial number of rescheduling the countries had to 
go through is a further indication of Africa‟s seeming intractable debt problem.  Although the 
HIPC initiative has provided total debt cancellation to some of the highly indebted poor countries 
it is evidently not enough to alleviate Africa‟s external debt burden.  Its main purpose appears to 
be the strengthening and legitimizing of the structural adjustment policies imposed by the World 
Bank and the IMF as an appendage to the HIPC initiative. 
Irrespective of the debt management programs put forward largely by the creditors, Africa‟s debt 
burden has continued to increase over the last two decades and reached the highest level of 
US$270.3 billion in 2004.  External debt crisis has been exacerbated by the region‟s limited 
governance and macro-economy management capacity.  Past efforts at finding solutions to 
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Africa‟s indebtedness have been unimaginative and therefore can be adjudged as inadequate for 
resolving Africa‟s external indebtedness.  Debt burden and its attendant debt service can only be 
appropriately dealt with, if and only if the countries adopt better present and future debt 
management and macroeconomic policies.  In the next two chapters, this study starts the process 
of identifying theoretically grounded and more improved debt management policies that will 
prevent future build-up of unsustainable debts by African countries.   
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CHAPTER THREE: A MACROECONOMIC MODEL OF EXTERNAL DEBT BURDEN 
FOR AFRICA 
3.1 Recap of the Sources of External Debt  
This chapter derives a macroeconomic model of external debt‟s potential burden for Africa.  As 
discussed in chapter one, the external debt burden of African countries increased immediately after 
the two oil crises of 1973 and 1979.  Ndikumana (2004) argues that the rush to lend by oil 
exporters and their bankers, who were faced with excess supply of dollars resulting from the oil 
revenue booms of the 1970s, contributed to the indebtedness of African countries.  That is, over-
borrowing during the 1970s was generally a result of OPEC‟s surpluses, in addition to high growth 
of African countries, improved terms of trade of Africa countries, and low world interest rates.  
Further, the oil price shocks of the 1970s triggered worldwide inflation.  The contractionary 
monetary policy that was used to fight this inflation led to an increase in world interest rate and 
consequently exacerbated Africa‟s debt burden.  Huang and Guo (2007) confirm that an oil price 
shock triggers an immediate depreciation of the real exchange rate.  Exchange rate depreciation, in 
turn, leads to worsening of the terms of trade and potentially increases foreign debt. 
Another factor that contributed to the accumulation of external debt is the commodity booms of 
the 1970s.  Senhadji (1997) notes that the commodity boom of the 1970‟s contributed to the 
indebtedness of African countries through over-borrowing that became common among these 
countries.  He posits that over-borrowing occurs if a permanent decline in the terms of trade is 
perceived to be transitory or if a transitory improvement in the terms of trade is believed to be 
permanent.  Similarly, over-borrowing can occur if a permanent increase in the world interest rate 
is perceived to be transitory or if a transitory decline in the world interest rate is perceived to be 
permanent.   
This debt-fostering international economic environment of the 1970s (i.e., commodity price booms 
and low interest rates) ended in early 1980s.  The collapse in commodity prices in 1986 led to 
losses in export earnings while import prices headed in the opposite direction.  This led to 
unfavorable terms of trade for most African countries; this in turn, forced these countries to 
borrow from external sources and thus engendered the accumulation of more debt (Iyoha, 1999; 
Boyce, 1992; and Ndikumana, 2004).   
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Additionally, there was need for African countries to borrow in order to finance and sustain 
development programs of the post-independence era.  However, most of the loans contracted were 
either consumption loans or loans invested in projects that were unproductive.  Lots of these loans 
did not earn the foreign exchange that was needed to repay the debt; thus, exacerbating the 
external debt burden of African countries.   
According to Ndikumana (2004), adverse external shocks such as terms of trade shocks, world 
recessions that reduce the demand for developing country‟s products, drought and political crises, 
accentuate the accumulation of external debts by distorting balance of payments and weakening 
fiscal situations.  As noted by Nishimura and Ohyama (1995) and Senhadji (2003), a permanent 
increase in the terms of trade raises the marginal product of capital, which in turn stimulates 
investment.  Consumption responds positively to investment spending, resulting in an increase in 
GDP.  Exports increase more than imports, yielding a surplus in both trade and current account.  
Foreign borrowing falls, as the trade surplus is used to repay some of the foreign debt.  Senhadji 
(2003) further asserts that a permanent increase in the world interest rate depresses both 
consumption and investment.  Aggregate output falls because of the large trade surplus that is set 
aside to pay for the high cost of servicing the foreign debt.  The economy responds to the 
permanent increase in debt service cost by reducing new borrowing. 
Therefore, the rapid external debt build-up of the 1980s is attributable to the then continued 
decline in the terms of trade, uncontrolled fluctuations in export earnings due to weak export 
markets, higher international interest rates, realignment of exchange rates, and rescheduling and 
refinancing of Africa‟s external debt (Iyoha, 1999 and Ndikumana, 2004).  The accumulation of 
foreign debt by African countries during the late 1980s and 1990s is deemed to be due mainly to 
cost increases in servicing the debt which in turn is believed to be caused by increases in the world 
interest rate and declining terms of trade.    
The extent to which the highlighted unfavorable environment contributed towards debt 
accumulation in African countries is the focus of this chapter.  This chapter analyses how the 
world commodity price shock
11
, the world interest rates shock, the unfavorable terms of trade and 
the fluctuations in exchange rates led to the accumulation of external debt in African countries.  I 
                                                 
11
 In this study, the world commodity price shock refers to shocks to export prices.  A negative world commodity price 
shock refers to a fall in commodity prices and vice versa. 
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derive a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model of external debt‟s potential 
burden for a small open economy.   The choice of the DSGE model is based on the fact it 
explicitly specifies the objectives and constraints faced by households and firms, and then 
determine the prices and allocations that result from their market interaction in an uncertain 
environment (Ruge-Murcia, 2007). In addition, most econometric models suffer from the Lucas 
Critique particularly when the model encompasses the estimation of rational expectations that have 
an explicit structural interpretation. The DSGE model that I develop is explicitly derived from first 
principles.  It describes the general equilibrium allocations and prices of a model economy in 
which agents (households, firms, financial intermediaries and so forth) dynamically maximize 
their objectives (utility, profits, etc) subject to their budget and resource constraints.  The DSGE 
model parameters describe the tastes and preferences of agents, the production function 
(technology), and other features of the economy.   
The model I derive shares some of the basic small, open-economy features of models by Adolfson, 
Laséen, Lindé and Villani (2007), Smets and Wouters (2003), Kose (2002), Senhadji (1997), 
McCallum and Nelson (1999) and Fuhrer (2000); but I include the evolution of foreign debt.  The 
other distinguishing feature is that I assume monetary authorities pursue money growth as the 
monetary reaction policy as opposed to the Taylor rule.  Accordingly, the model is estimated by 
using data from 11 African countries.  The data is used to assess the model‟s impulse responses of 
important/target economic variables to debt-related shocks.  Further, insights from the model are 
used to derive pre-qualification schemes for better debt sourcing and management in a later 
chapter.  Section 3.2 looks at the outline of the structural model.  Section 3.3 presents the 
estimation of the model.  Section 3.4 provides simulations of the model and section 3.5 concludes 
the chapter.   
3.2 Outline of the Model 
3.2.1 Set up of the Model 
The model describes a small open economy that relies heavily on a narrow range of commodities, 
and a significant fraction of the economy‟s export revenue is used to pay back a huge foreign debt.  
As in Senhadji (2003), the developing economy is assumed to rely only on imports for capital 
formation and has imperfect access to international financial markets in the sense that the economy 
faces an upward-sloping supply function of foreign loans.  Households consume both imports and 
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domestically produced goods.  If the price of imported goods increases, it causes inflationary 
pressure in the economy.  If monetary authorities increase domestic interest rates to a level greater 
than interest rate on foreign debt, households increase their consumption of foreign debt. 
Firms export some of the domestically produced goods.  According to Kose (2002), when the 
relative price of exports falls, it leads to a substantive decline in the importation of productive 
inputs, which in turn results in a contraction of exports.  This leads firms to reduce domestic 
investment and production.  Firms‟ profits decline and further exacerbate foreign debt 
accumulation, as internal equity finance, which could have at least maintained current production 
levels, shrinks.   
Monetary authorities in this economy control money supply.  I follow Lane (1999), and assume 
that an expansionary monetary shock will lead to an increase in domestic output and consumption, 
and consequently increase domestic interest rates.  In addition, monetary shocks generate a 
temporary depreciation of the real exchange rate under a flexible exchange rate regime.  The 
depreciation translates into a decline in the domestic terms of trade, thus foreign consumption in 
the economy increases.  Nishimura and Ohyama (1995) suggest that terms of trade improvement 
would improve the country‟s current account and, therefore, decrease its external debt.  Apart from 
controlling money supply, monetary authorities respond to inflationary pressures engendered by 
oil price shocks by tightening monetary policy.  This leads to an increase in interest rates.  
Monetary authorities also respond to adverse commodity price shocks by increasing foreign 
borrowing.  This is because negative commodity price shocks depress economic growth.   
 3.2.2 Household’s Behaviour  
The representative economy is populated by identical households.  Households maximize a utility 
function with three arguments – domestic goods consumption, import goods consumption and 
money balances – over an infinite life horizon.  Consumption appears in the utility function 
relative to a time-varying external habit variable, along the lines of Fuhrer (2000) and Smets and 
Wouters (2003).  Habit formation implies that households‟ marginal utility of consumption in the 
current period is affected by the quantity of goods they consumed in the previous period.  Fuhrer 
(2000) shows that habit formation impacts a utility-based smoothing motive for both changes and 
levels of consumption.  Consequently, habit formation improves the ability of the model to match 
the hump-shaped response of consumption to shocks. 
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Formally, households maximize an intertemporal utility function given by: 
    
   
 
    ,             (1) 
where β is the discount factor.  The instantaneous utility function is separable in the consumption 
of domestic goods, imports, real money balances and labour.  The utility depends positively on the 
consumption of domestic goods,   , relative to an external habit variable,     It depends positively 
on the consumption of the imports,    , relative to an external habit variable,   , negatively on 
labour supply      and positively on the real cash balances     .  Just as McCandless (2008, 236) 
argues, the rationale for adding real balances to the utility function is the presumption that 
additional real balances reduce the cost of making transactions.  The benefit of putting money in 
the utility function is that if there are other assets that individuals can hold, for instance capital 
assets, the model will produce a real rate of return for money that is less than that of the other 
assets.  In addition, holdings of real balances might provide insurance against certain individual or 
economy-wide shocks and might permit transactions with unknown individuals with whom credit 
transactions might not be feasible.  The utility function for this economy is thus: 
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where   is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, θ represents the inverse of the 
elasticity of imports, ω represents the inverse of the elasticity of money holdings with respect to 
the interest rate and   is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of labour supply.  As pointed 
out by Blanchard (2006, 49),    determines the household‟s willingness to shift consumption 
between different periods.  When   is small, the marginal utility falls more slowly as consumption 
rises, and so the household is more willing to allow its consumption to vary over time.  If   is 
close to zero, utility is almost linear in consumption, and so the household is willing to accept 
large swings in consumption to take advantage of small differences between the discount rate and 
the rate of return on saving.  Equation (2) has four preference shocks:      represents a general 
shock to preferences that affects domestic goods;       represents a preference shock to imports; 
    is a preference shock to money demand and     is a labour supply shock.  The external habit 
stocks are assumed to be proportional to past consumptions and take the forms: 
       
 
 
 ,          
                      (3) 
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   is the habit formation reference consumption level,   measures the importance of the reference 
level relative to current consumption,     and is the habit formation reference level of 
consumption of imports.  If        habit stock has no relevance and utility depends on current 
consumption.  If        habit stock is important and utility depends on both current and past 
consumption.   
Households own the capital stock, which they rent to firms that produce intermediate goods.  They 
can increase their supply of rental services from the capital stock either by investing in additional 
capital stock or by directly increasing the utilization rate of the physical capital stock.  The capital 
accumulation adjustment cost follows Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005), hereafter CEE, 
and Smets and Wouters (2003), and is given by: 
                  
     
     
                (4) 
where    is the capital stock,   
  is the imported investments,    is the depreciation rate, and      is 
the installation cost for capital, which is assumed to be strictly convex.  The installation cost for 
capital is a positive function of changes in investment and equals zero in the steady state.  In this 
model,      takes the form  
 
 
 
  
 
    
  
 
   
 .  The investment adjustment cost parameter is     The 
inclusion of investment adjustment cost allows the model to produce fluctuations in the relative 
price of investment and consumption goods, which is given by the marginal rate of substitution 
between investment and consumption.  As pointed out by Mendoza (1991), investment adjustment 
cost ensures that the cost of changing the capital stock by a fixed amount increases with the speed 
of the desired adjustment, giving agents an incentive to gradually undertake changes in 
investments.   
Households hold their financial wealth in the form of cash balances  , domestic bonds     and 
capital stock.  They also contract foreign debt   
 
.  The current income and financial wealth can be 
used for consumption and investment in physical capital.  Households maximize their objective 
function subject to an intertermporal budget constraint which is given by: 
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where   
 
 is the interest rate on foreign debt,     is the interest rate on domestic bonds,     is the 
price of capital,   
 
 is the price of imports,     is the exchange rate,    is the risk premium,     
  is 
the nominal cost of imported investment good,    is the revenue from both foreign and domestic 
markets,      
     
 
  
 is the real exchange rate,      is the aggregate employment inherited from the 
previous period,  
 
 
 
  
    
 
 
    is the labour adjustment cost and   is the labour adjustment cost 
parameter.  I include labour adjustment costs just as in Janko (2008) because firms incur costs 
whenever labour hours fluctuate over time.  Labour adjustment costs also play an important role in 
affecting the firm‟s production process.   
In view of the fact that households can smooth their consumption stream by borrowing and 
lending in the international market, the possibility of households playing a ponzi game
12
 and 
accumulating an infinite amount of debt is ruled out by imposing the no ponzi condition: 
  i         
 
       
      This condition prohibits households from operating ponzi-type 
schemes. 
3.2.3 Firm’s Behaviour 
Firms produce domestic goods, export some of the goods to the foreign market and import 
intermediate inputs, as they do not have the capacity to produce investment goods.  The final 
domestic goods are produced by different firms and production is represented by a simple Cobb-
Douglas production function with constant-returns-to-scale.  The production function depends on 
capital and labour.  The output produced is sold to both foreign and domestic markets.  The 
production function for this economy takes the form: 
    
       
   
       0 <   < 1.                  (6) 
where    is technological progress,    is the capital stock,    is labour,   is the share of capital in 
output,     is the share of labour in output and     is the productivity shock.  Productivity shock 
                                                 
12
A ponzi game is a scheme in which households issue bonds and roll over the interest and principal from period to 
period by perpetually issuing new bonds to render debt service. That is, the issuer always obtains the funds to pay off 
debt when it comes due by issuing new debt. Such a scheme allows the issuer to have a present value of lifetime 
consumption that exceeds the present value of his/her lifetime resources. 
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affects output through technological progress.  It is exogenously determined and follows an AR (1) 
process.   
In this economy, revenue is derived from the output that is sold to both foreign and domestic 
markets.  The economy is assumed to be susceptible to world commodity price shock and 
productivity shock.  If there is an adverse commodity price shock, revenue from the foreign 
market falls, thus reducing the economy‟s total revenue.  This leads to accumulation of foreign 
debt as the economy has to borrow from abroad to purchase foreign investment goods which 
foreign exchange earnings from the dwindling commodity sale would have funded.  An 
unfavorable productivity shock leads to a reduction in investment, consumption and gross 
domestic product.  Thus, the revenue function for this economy is given by:  
       
             
       
   
    .             (7) 
Where   represents the share of output that is sold to the domestic market whilst        is the 
share of output that is sold to the foreign market.  When   is zero, the economy‟s revenue is driven 
by the foreign market and this implies that the economy is susceptible to world price shock    .  
The shock directly affects the economy because it employs imported capital.  When   is large, the 
economy is not vulnerable to global/world commodity price shocks because revenue is driven by 
the domestic market, thus fluctuations in world commodity prices will not affect the economy‟s 
revenue.  Equation (7) implies that when the exchange rate     depreciates, most of the revenue for 
the economy will be driven by output sold to the foreign market. 
3.2.4 First Order Conditions 
The maximization of the objective function (1) subject to the budget constraint (5) and the revenue 
function (7) by choosing a sequence                    
       
        
 
  yields the following 
first order conditions: 
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From equation (8), it follows that 
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where    is the budget constraint multiplier.  The first order conditions result in the following 
optimality equations for consumption, demand for imported consumption goods, money balances, 
demand for imported investment goods, arbitrage condition for price of capital and the labour 
demand. 
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                         (22) 
where     
     
 
  
 is the real exchange rate. 
A common approach to solving DSGE models involves the linearization of the first order 
conditions by means of the first order Taylor series expansion around a deterministic steady state.  
Log-linearization of RBC models has been extensively used in recent years following the works of 
Blanchard and Kahn (1980), King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988 a, b) and Campbell (1994).  The 
process of log-linearization is to first take the logarithms of the functions in equations 17-22 and 
then take first-order Taylor expansion around the steady state.  After log-linearization of the first 
order conditions using the Taylor expansion, I re-write equations (17) to (22) as follows: 
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where                        
     
       
  
             
  ,    is 
the government spending gap,    is the exports gap,    is the output gap and a tilde on top of a 
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variable is the log deviation from steady state.  The output gap is defined as the difference between 
the actual and the potential output. 
Equations (23) to (30) are the demand for imported consumption goods function, the interest rate 
function, the consumption based IS, the demand for imported investment goods function, the 
arbitrage condition for price of capital, the arbitrage condition for interest rates, the labour function 
and the equilibrium in the goods market, respectively.  Equation (23) implies that when the 
exchange rate depreciates, the demand for imported consumption goods reduces.  This is because a 
shock to the exchange rate directly affects the price of imports.  If habit formation reference level 
  is equal to zero, consumption of imports will be affected by previous period‟s imports and the 
real exchange rate.   
The LM equation (24) shows that the economy will increase money supply if the interest rates are 
high.  Consequently, when    , the real interest rate will be driven by both the real money 
balances and the current consumption.  The consumption based IS equation (25) shows the 
relationship between consumption and the expected consumption and the real interest rate.  The 
equation is similar to that of Smets and Wouters (2003) and shows that if a rise in consumption is 
expected, only a high interest rate can prevent agents from borrowing against that future rise.  The 
fundamental feature of the IS-LM that is consistent with Romer (2000) is that different interest 
rates are relevant to different parts of the model.  The real interest rate is relevant to the demand 
for goods and thus the IS curve, while the nominal interest rate is relevant to the demand for 
money and thus the LM curve.  
Equation (26) illustrates that capital stock is positively related to imported investments and this 
substantiates the fact that most of these countries import capital for investment purposes.  It also 
shows that when the exchange rate depreciates, the imported investments fall.  In addition, the 
equation demonstrates that if agents speculate that imported investments will increase in future, 
they increase importation of investment goods in the current period.  Demand for imported 
investments also increases when there is an unfavourable productivity shock.  Equation (27) 
implies that a depreciation of the exchange rate will increase the price of capital.  This is because 
the economy relies on imports for capital formation.   
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Equation (28) is the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) condition which suggests that the 
difference between domestic and foreign interest rates equals the future change in the exchange 
rate minus the risk premium.  To ensure a well-defined steady state, I follow Adolfson et al (2008) 
in assuming that there is a time-varying risk premium     in the foreign debt holding and that the 
time-varying risk premium is negatively correlated with the expected change in the nominal 
exchange rate.  This will account for the so called „forward premium puzzle‟ recorded in data: that 
a currency whose interest rate is high tends to appreciate, implying that the risk premium must be 
negatively correlated with the expected exchange rate depreciation (see e.g.  Adolfson et al, 2008; 
Fama, 1984; Froot and Frankel, 1989). 
Labour demand equation (29) shows that consumption, productivity shock and depreciation of the 
exchange rate increases labour whereas commodity price shock and real interest rates increases 
reduce the demand for labour.  A depreciation of the exchange rate boosts exports and therefore 
increases labour demand while a negative commodity price shock leads to a fall in exports and 
thus labour demand reduces. 
Firms sell some of the output produced in the economy to the foreign market.  Following 
McCallum and Nelson (1999), foreigners‟ demand function for households‟ exports is positively 
related to the real exchange rate and the revenue of the foreign economy.  The foreigners‟ demand 
function for households‟ exports is given by:  
     
   
  
       ,    .                   (31) 
   is the real exchange rate and     
 
 is the revenue in the foreign economy.  Equation (31) implies 
that a depreciation of the exchange rate will lead to an increase in exports.  Log linearizing 
equation (31) around the steady state gives the following equation for foreigner‟s demand for 
domestically produced goods (exports): 
            
                                   (32) 
Equation (32) indicates that if the revenue in the foreign economy increases, exports will increase.  
Moreover, a depreciation of the real exchange rate leads to an increase in exports.  Exports are 
used to repay the foreign debt.  Therefore an increase in exports will lead to a reduction in the 
foreign debt. 
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3.2.5 Evolution of Foreign Debt 
From the uncovered interest parity condition (equation 28), the choice between the domestic and 
foreign debt holdings balances into an arbitrage condition.  The interest rate on foreign debt is 
assumed to be a function of the domestic interest rate      the expected change in the exchange rate 
and the time-varying risk premium.  The interest rate on foreign debt is given by: 
  
                                      (33) 
When     is equal to zero, equation (33) boils down to the conventional UIP condition.  Hostland 
and Karam (2006) argue that when the risk premium on external debt exceeds some threshold 
level, foreign investors become unwilling to lend and issuers become unable to borrow.  Also, 
when the debt burden rises above the initial level, investors demand a higher risk premium to 
compensate for the higher probability of debt default at some point in the future.  As in Senhadji 
(1997), the time-varying risk premium    is a function of the foreign debt to exports ratio and the 
world commodity price shock.  In this study the time-varying risk premium takes the form: 
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  is the previous period‟s foreign debt,   measures the persistence of risk premium and   is the 
coefficient of the time-varying risk premium.  When the coefficient of the time-varying risk 
premium is zero, the time-varying risk premium will be driven by changes in the world commodity 
prices.  When the world commodity prices fall, the time-varying risk premium increases.  The 
world commodity price shock     appears in the risk premium because private banks and 
multilateral institutions tend to over-lend during periods of commodity booms.  This leads 
countries to take on more foreign debt, thus time-varying risk premium increases.  Note that risk 
premium reduces as countries become more efficient.   
Linearizing equation (34) around the steady state gives the following equation for    : 
               
                             (35) 
Substituting equation (35) into (33) gives the following equation for the interest rate on foreign 
debt:  
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Equation (36) shows that when exports increase, the interest rate on foreign debt declines.  The 
world price shock is negatively related to the interest rate on foreign debt.  This means that when 
the world commodity price declines, the interest rate on foreign debt increases.   
Following Nishimura and Ohyama (1995) and Schmitt and Uribe (2003), I assume that the average 
interest cost the debtor country must bear increases as the size of its current borrowing increases.  
This assumption is plausible because it reflects the fact that a country‟s risk of solvency is greater 
when she borrows more.  Nishimura and Ohyama argue that lenders may need to be compensated 
for the increasing risk of solvency or they may merely wish to discourage the debtor country from 
borrowing beyond her repayment ability by raising the rate of interest as the amount of her 
borrowing increases.  The interest rate change may be positive or negative depending on whether 
lenders wish to discourage or encourage the country from borrowing in the current period on the 
basis of her borrowing performance which is represented by the amount of borrowing in the 
previous period.   
In addition, foreign debt evolves according to the balance between imports and exports.  When the 
price of an imported input (for example, oil price) increases, the economy has to borrow from the 
foreign market in order to finance its imports.  Therefore, the equation for evolution of foreign 
debt is given by: 
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where      represents the imports of goods into the economy,    is exports,         
      
 
 is the 
interest payment on foreign debt and    is the exchange rate.  The interest rate on foreign debt is an 
increasing function of foreign debt.  Equation (37) shows that foreign debt will increase if the 
economy runs a trade deficit.  For the economy to reduce its foreign debt it either has to increase 
its exports or reduce its imports, that is, it has to run a trade surplus.  In fact, if an economy has a 
large initial external debt, it must run a current account surplus that is sufficient to cover the 
interest rate payments on that debt.  Alternatively, an economy that runs a trade deficit should 
depreciate its currency (and increase exports) in order to reduce its foreign debt.   
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Combining equations (36) and (37) and after some substitutions, I obtain the following reduced 
form equation for the evolution of foreign debt: 
   
        
          
     
     
     
    
            
  
   
    
        
  
   
    
       
  
                                                 (38) 
  
Equation (38) implies that any fluctuations in the real exchange rate will have a direct impact on 
the economy‟s foreign debt.  The Equation also indicates that imports increase the accumulation of 
foreign debt while exports reduce the accumulation of foreign debt.  This re-emphasizes that the 
economy has to reduce its import and/or increase its exports in order to reduce its foreign debt.  
For the economy to swing towards a trade surplus there must be a large depreciation of the 
exchange rate. 
Furthermore, the world risk free interest rate   
  is positively related to the economy‟s foreign debt.  
If the world interest rate increases, the economy accumulates more foreign debt.  This is because a 
permanent increase in world interest rates depresses consumption and investments.  Aggregate 
output falls because of the trade surplus used to pay for the higher cost of servicing the debt.  The 
economy has to respond to the permanent increase in the cost of servicing debt by reducing new 
borrowing.  In addition, equation (38) shows that if there is a negative shock to world commodity 
prices, foreign debt increases. 
3.2.6 Price Setting and Inflation 
The interaction of firms and workers affects the setting of both prices and wages.  The nominal 
wage set by workers depends on the previous period‟s price level, the next period‟s price level and 
the output gap.  If workers anticipate that prices will increase in the next period, they set a higher 
nominal wage.  Likewise, if prices increased in the previous period, workers will demand a higher 
nominal wage.  The increase in the nominal wage leads to an increase in costs, which leads to an 
increase in prices set by firms and thus yielding a higher price level.  An increase in output leads to 
an increase in the nominal wage.  I assume pricing decisions are predetermined one period in 
advance and therefore the equation for wage determination is given by: 
        
     
         ,                      (39) 
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where   is the nominal wage,      is the previous period‟s price level,       is the next period‟s 
price level,    is the output gap and   is the degree of wage indexation
13
 to the unexpected 
changes in prices.  The degree of wage indexation can be full, where wages are automatically 
increased by a percentage equal to the inflation rate, or partial, or it can be plateau indexation 
where, for example, the bottom 10 per cent of wage-earners are indexed and the higher-paid 
workers receive a fixed monetary increase.  Plateau indexation gives a greater percentage increase 
to lower income earners than to others.  When     there is no indexation and the wages that 
cannot be re-optimized remain constant.  When      there is perfect wage indexation to past 
inflation.   
The domestic price is driven by a mark-up in addition to wages, the exchange rate and the price of 
imported goods.  Firms set the domestic price  following a simple mark-up pricing rule: 
                    
  
 
             (40) 
where ϙ is the price mark-up on top of production cost,    is the domestic price and   captures the 
relevance of the imported investment goods in the production of domestic goods.  When the mark-
up is equal to zero, the domestic price is equal to production cost.  Equation (40) shows that an 
increase in mark-up leads firms to increase their prices given the wages they have to pay.  It also 
shows that when the lagged price of imported goods increases, the domestic price increases.  
Moreover, when the exchange rate in the previous period depreciates, the domestic price increases.  
This argument is supported by Carranza et al (2009) who posit that if there is a high currency 
mismatch in the balance sheet of firms, a small variation in the real exchange rate leads to a 
positive and large inflation pass-through and domestic price index increases.  The source of the 
pass-through is, first, the direct “import inflation” due to the increase in the relative price of 
imported goods; and second, an “export push” effect stemming from higher demand of the 
country‟s tradables and from the increase in  investments required to meet the higher demand.  
These two effects lead to a higher inflation.  Additionally, a real depreciation can generate an 
indirect contractionary effect related to the increase in the financial cost of capital and thus 
imported capital goods become more expensive.  This effect is more intense in countries that rely 
heavily on imported capital goods.  The added financial cost is generated by the necessity of firms 
to increase investment so as to meet the larger demand for their output. 
                                                 
13
 Wage indexation has existed for decades under different names such as cost of living adjustment. 
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Substituting equation (39) into equation (40) gives the following equation for domestic price: 
             
     
                 
  
 
            (41) 
Defining domestic price inflation as      g           and after log-linearizing equation (41), I 
obtain the following Phillips curve: 
                                                                (42) 
The term      implies that, at any time, there is an upward-sloping relationship between inflation 
and output gap.  Modern Keynesian theories assume that there is some inertia in wage and price 
inflation.  Specifically, they assume that there is some link between past and future inflation 
beyond effects operating through expectations (see Romer, 2006).  Equation (42) differs from the 
classical Phillips curve because inflation responds not only to fluctuations in output gap but also to 
fluctuations in the exchange rate.  It shows that monetary policy affects inflation through the 
effects of the lagged exchange rate on the real price of imported inputs.  This Phillips curve 
equation is similar to that of Flamini (2007), except that he assumed pricing decisions are 
predetermined two periods in advance. 
3.2.7 Behavior of Monetary Authorities 
In view of the fact that the central bank in this economy does not control the world interest rates, I 
assume that it controls the monetary base as in McCallum (1994).  Given that the economy is 
characterized by falls in export prices, tax evasion and political stalemate which leaves the 
government with a large budget deficit, investors do not have confidence that the government will 
honour its debts.  Investors are therefore not willing to buy its bonds and so the Central Bank of 
this economy finances its current account balance through foreign borrowing and seignorage.  
However, supply of money in this economy is driven by the output gap and the inflation gap 
according to Taylor (1993).  In closing the model, I assume that money supply evolves according 
to the following monetary reaction function: 
                                                                 (43) 
where    is the degree of persistence of monetary smoothing,    and    represent the sensitivity 
of money supply to lagged inflation gap and lagged output gap, respectively.  Equation (43) shows 
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that monetary authorities adjust money supply in response to changes in inflation gap and output 
gap.  The monetary rule is that the central bank reduces money supply if inflation exceeds its 
target value and increases money supply when output falls below capacity.   
There are five exogenous shocks in this model and they include the world risk-free interest rate 
shock    
 , the world commodity price shock       the productivity shock       the government 
spending shock   
  and the labour demand shock     .  The exogenous shocks follow AR(1) process 
and take the following forms: 
   
         
                   (44) 
                            (45) 
                            (46) 
   
         
                   (47) 
                            (48) 
3.3 Estimation of the Model 
3.3.1 Estimation Method 
DSGE models are firmly grounded in economic theory and are often regarded as too stylized to be 
taken directly to the data, and often making traditional econometric methods for estimation, 
hypothesis testing and forecasting inapplicable (Ireland, 2004).  Moreover, since DSGE models 
make strong assumptions on so many details concerning the structure of the economy, they often 
yield results that appear to be fragile, at least at first glance.   
Various techniques have been employed in estimating DSGE models; for example maximum 
likelihood (Christiano, 1988; Ireland, 2004 and Canova, 2007), Bayesian (Smets and Wouters, 
2003 and Adolfson et al, 2007) and generalized method of moments (McCallum and Nelson, 
1999).  Ruge-Murcia (2007) used the one sector real business cycle model as a testing ground for 
four different methods of estimating DSGE models, namely maximum likelihood method (ML), 
generalized method of moments (GMM), simulated method of moments (SMM) and the indirect 
inference procedure.  He argues that although all methods deliver consistent parameter estimates, 
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weak identification, stochastic singularity, and small sample distortion are important 
considerations in the practical application of these methods.  
On the problem of identification, Canova and Sala (2009) investigate identification issues in 
DSGE models; explore their consequences for parameter estimation and model evaluation and 
provide diagnostics to detect problems in practice. Their suggestion is that if one uses a mixed 
calibration–estimation approach to analyze economic issues, it is advisable to conduct extensive 
sensitivity analysis to examine how economic conclusions change when calibrated parameters are 
varied within a reasonable interval. 
Stochastic singularity imposes restrictions on the variables and moments that may be used for 
model estimation.  DSGE models are singular because they use a small number of structural 
shocks to generate predictions about a large number of observable variables.  As shown by Ruge-
Murcia (2007), singularity affects more severely ML methods than moment-based methods.  This 
is because ML estimation is limited by the number of linearly independent variables while 
moment-based estimation is limited by the number of linearly independent moments.  Ruge-
Murcia also finds that GMM and SMM are generally more robust to misspecification than ML, 
and adding measurement errors and using information priors are helpful in limiting the effects of 
misspecification in the ML framework. 
Another study which compared ML estimation and simulated based approach in estimating DSGE 
models is Holtemöller and Schmidt (2006).  They compared the properties of the different 
estimation techniques using a simple New Keynesian Model.  Their results show that the 
coefficients of the ML estimations are closer to the true values than the coefficients of the 
simulation based approach.  This result is more pronounced in the small sample case and thus 
indicates that it is preferable to use the ML estimation approach for African countries because their 
data set is small.   
 I therefore employ maximum likelihood estimation method to estimate the parameters of this 
study‟s DSGE model.  Maximum likelihood involves four steps.  First, the linear rational 
expectations model is solved for the reduced form state equation in its predetermined variables.  
Second, the model is written in its state-space form.  This involves augmenting the state equation 
in the predetermined variables with an observation equation which links the predetermined state 
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variables to observable variables.  Third, the Kalman filter is used to form the likelihood function.  
Fourth, the parameters are estimated by maximizing the likelihood function.  In fact, Hansen and 
Sargent (2005) show that the ML estimator obtained by applying the Kalman filter to the state 
space representation of DSGE models is consistent and asymptotically efficient.  This is also 
confirmed by Canova (2007; 225-226) who argues that under regularity conditions ML estimates 
of the parameters of a state space model are consistent and asymptotically normal.  The conditions 
needed include first, that the state equation should define a covariance stationary process.  This is 
the case when the eigenvalues of the matrix are all less than one in absolute value for all t.  The 
second condition is that the true parameters should not lie on the boundary of the parameter space.   
I use the Kalman filter to generate optimal inferences about the unobserved state vector and to 
evaluate the joint likelihood function of observable endogenous variables.  As Ruge-Murcia 
(2007) observed, the maximization of this function yields consistent and asymptotically normal 
estimates of the model parameters.  To limit the effects of specification errors (ML estimates are 
prone to misspecifications) in the estimates, in addition to using information priors, I added 
measurement errors to the observation equations.  The linearized equations for the model 
presented earlier in section 2.2, form a dynamic system that determines the path of consumption, 
output, investment imports, consumption imports, price of capital, inflation, interest rates, debt, 
labour supply and money supply.  After some manipulations, these equations
14
 can be written as a 
state space representation of the form; 
                                      (49) 
                           (50) 
where equation (49) is the observation equation, equation (50) is the state equation and,
, 
 
X
m f
m t t t k t t t t tt t t
c c r m i p e y x b
 
.     
 t cm c m y xt t t t t
   
Vectors                     are transposes of vectors                      .  A tilde 
on a variable denotes percentage deviation from deterministic steady state.  The vector    is an 
      vector of predetermined variables at date t,    is a        vector of stochastic shocks, A 
                                                 
14
 See appendix B for simplified equations of the model. 
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and B are                 matrices, and C is an           matrix.  If the matrix A is 
invertible, then the first order difference system of equation (49) can be written as; 
    
         
                    (51) 
Description of Data 
I estimate the model using annual data from eleven African countries: Côte d‟Ivoire, Ghana, 
Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.  Data 
for labour is collected from Penn World Tables 6.1 and data for the other variables are collected 
from World Bank‟s World Development Indicators and IMF‟s International Financial Statistics.  
The sample is from 1970 to 2007 and the data is denominated in domestic currency.  Data were 
de-trended using the Hodrick-Prescott (1997) filter (hereafter HP filter) with the smoothing 
parameter λ = 100.  The HP filter decomposes the data into a cyclical component and a growth 
component and removes the latter.  The rationale behind the filtering is that the model is designed 
to explain business cycles as opposed to very short-run or long-run movements in data (Negro and 
Schorfheide, 2003).  In fact, Canova (2007, 83) argues that the HP filter has been and is still one of 
the preferred methods to extract cyclical components from economic time series.  The HP 
decomposition has two basic features; first, trend and cycle are assumed to be uncorrelated and 
second, trend is assumed to be a smooth process; that is, it is allowed to change over time as long 
as the changes are not abrupt.   
In view of the fact that there is no available time series data on capital stocks for most African 
countries, I employ the perpetual inventory method by Benhabib and Spiegel (1994), King and 
Levine (1994), and Limam and Miller (2004) to estimate capital stocks for these countries
15
.  To 
measure imported investments and the world interest rate, I used the gross fixed capital formation 
and the USA interest rate, respectively as proxies.   
3.3.2 Calibrated Parameters and Estimation Results  
A number of parameters were calibrated since they could not be estimated from the data.  
Preliminary attempts to estimate the parameters of the model led to unreasonable high estimates 
for habit formation reference level γ, investment adjustment cost parameter φ, inverse of the 
                                                 
15
 See Appendix A on how I computed capital stocks. 
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elasticity of imports θ, the share of output that is sold to the domestic market Ø and the foreign 
interest rate    
 
.  These parameters were therefore calibrated together with share of output in 
production α, depreciation rate δ, and the market value of a unit of capital Q*.  I choose values for 
these variables so that other relationships in the model have values similar to the ones we see in 
data. 
In the baseline calibration of the model‟s parameters, habit formation reference level is assumed to 
be 90 percent of past consumption for all the sampled countries.  This value is consistent with the 
findings reported by Fuhrer (2000), Smets and Wouters, (2003), Adolfson et al (2007), CEE 
(2005) and Boldrin, Christiano and Fisher (2001).  The depreciation rate δ is set equal to 0.07 
which implies a depreciation of fixed capital of 7% per annum.  I set α = 0.6, which implies a 
share of capital in production of 60%.  This is in line with growth and business cycle models.  The 
share of output that is sold to the domestic market is calibrated at 0.8 since these countries mainly 
consume domestically produced goods.  More recent evidence by Eichenbaum and Fisher (2007) 
suggest an investment adjustment cost parameter of 3.  The adjustment cost parameter is thus 
calibrated at 3 in line with Eichenbaum and Fisher (2007).  The calibrated parameter for the 
inverse of the elasticity of imports θ is 2.   
Turning to labour, the calibrated parameter for the labour adjustment cost parameter, ϖ, is 0.98, 
following Cooper and Willis (2009) and Janko (2008).  A large range of calibrations has been used 
for the inverse of the elasticity of labor supply,  .  I follow Smets and Wouters (2003) and 
calibrate the value at 2.  To calibrate foreign interest rate   
 
, I used the average of the USA 
interest rate which is equal to 0.03.  Finally, I computed an index for Tobin‟s Q as a proxy for the 
parameter Q*.  This was computed by means of getting an index of the investment-capital stock 
ratio.  I used the average steady state interest rate as the calibrated parameter for r*.  The calibrated 
values for Q* and r*, in addition to other calibrated and estimated parameters, for each country are 
reported in Table 3.1 below.   
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Table 3.1: Maximum Likelihood Estimation Results 
Estimated 
parameters 
Ghana Côte 
d’Ivoire 
Kenya South 
Africa 
Nigeria Senegal Uganda Zambia Malawi Zimbabwe Tanzania 
σ  0.43 
(3.70)*** 
0.53 
(5.69)*** 
 
0.53 
(5.97)*** 
0.11 
(0.64) 
0.43 
(5.88)*** 
0.37 
(2.87)*** 
0.55 
(5.70)*** 
0.49 
(7.83)*** 
0.71 
(13.01)*** 
0.01 
(0.05) 
0.47 
(4.88)*** 
ω  -0.24 
(-3.23) *** 
-0.13 
(-3.39)*** 
-0.38 
(-3.19)*** 
 
-0.03 
(-0.06) 
-0.16 
(-1.77)* 
-0.08 
(-1.14) 
-0.56 
(-4.27)*** 
-0.22 
(-4.58)*** 
-0.45 
(-2.84)*** 
-0.003 
(-0.12) 
-0.32 
(-1.79)* 
   0.82 
(12.49)*** 
0.66 
(9.73)*** 
 
0.49 
(7.83)*** 
0.58 
(5.09)*** 
0.57 
(4.20)*** 
0.98 
(26.93)*** 
0.  72 
(17.23)*** 
0.37 
(1.99)** 
0.65 
(7.55)*** 
0.40 
(22.28)*** 
0.95 
(8.36)*** 
χ  -0.77 
(-8.73)*** 
 
-0.99 
(-7.85)*** 
-0.46 
(-2.71)*** 
-0.70 
(-5.19)*** 
-0.52 
(-4.64)*** 
-0.41 
(-5.46)*** 
-0.31 
(-2.24)** 
-0.44 
(-5.12)*** 
-0.43 
(-4.67)*** 
0.04 
(1.99)** 
-0.91 
(-12.63)*** 
     0.66 
(4.81)*** 
 
0.59 
(3.69)*** 
0.57 
(3.29)*** 
0.24 
(1.02) 
0.63 
(2.39)** 
0.36 
(2.93)*** 
0.66 
(2.63)*** 
0.004 
(0.04) 
0.21 
(0.93) 
0.93 
(28.76)*** 
0.85 
(4.32)*** 
    -0.64 
(-1.22) 
 
0.72 
(1.37) 
1.73 
(1.30) 
-0.71 
(-0.70) 
-1.87 
(-1.13) 
0.74 
(2.21)** 
-0.68 
(-0.84) 
-0.26 
(-2.06)* 
-0.02 
(-0.63) 
-3.88 
(-0.63) 
-5.10 
(-0.66) 
    0.73 
(1.03) 
 
0.68 
(1.81)* 
0.60 
(0.60) 
0.78 
(1.52) 
1.40 
(1.51) 
0.73 
(2.97)*** 
0.06 
(0.08) 
1.03 
(4.55)*** 
0.31 
(1.21) 
-8.52 
(-0.90) 
0.09 
(0.03) 
   0.004 
(0.04) 
 
-0.009 
(-0.17) 
-0.10 
(1.43) 
-0.02 
(0.83) 
-0.11 
(-1.52) 
-0.07 
(-1.72)* 
-0.12 
(2.59)*** 
0.12 
(0.66) 
-0.04 
(-0.36) 
-0.24 
(-4.06)*** 
0.01 
(0.82) 
     -0.29 
(-2.75)*** 
 
0.20 
(0.98) 
0.46 
(1.83)* 
-0.23 
(-0.49) 
-0.37 
(-0.98) 
0.33 
(2.09)** 
-0.03 
(-0.20) 
-0.15 
(-1.70)* 
0.16 
(1.42) 
-0.10 
(-1.04) 
-0.39 
(-1.53) 
     0.35 
(1.40) 
 
1.04 
(4.45)*** 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.49 
(1.52) 
0.66 
(2.05)** 
0.58 
(2.69)*** 
0.80 
(3.99)*** 
0.81 
(7.36)*** 
0.24 
(1.29) 
-0.30 
(-1.92)* 
0.10 
(0.03) 
    0.41 
(1.53) 
 
0.18 
(1.15) 
0.50 
(2.02)** 
-0.07 
(-0.69) 
0.18 
(0.70) 
-0.32 
(-2.90)*** 
0.39 
(0.69) 
-0.04 
(-0.36) 
-0.20 
(-1.17) 
1.00 
(0.16) 
0.73 
(0.49) 
  
   0.19 
(1.28) 
 
0.12 
(1.07) 
0.18 
(2.79)*** 
-0.24 
(-6.20)*** 
-0.25 
(-2.49)** 
0.53 
(3.27)*** 
-0.03 
(-0.34) 
-0.37 
(-2.09)** 
-0.25 
(-1.02) 
-0.57 
(-6.28)*** 
0.08 
(1.23) 
   0.17 
(0.56) 
 
0.19 
(1.22) 
-0.12 
(-1.70)* 
-0.06 
(-0.31) 
-0.38 
(-1.94)* 
-0.38 
(-4.12)*** 
0.33 
(6.91)*** 
0.06 
(0.78) 
-0.58 
(-2.24)** 
0.54 
(7.27)*** 
-0.06 
(-0.31) 
  
   0.38 
(2.53)** 
0.23 
(2.01)* 
-0.02 
(-0.04) 
-0.10 
(-1.72)* 
-0.14 
(-1.39) 
0.11 
(0.72) 
-0.33 
(-3.22)*** 
-0.05 
(-0.38) 
-0.34 
(-2.22)** 
-0.39 
(-4.60)*** 
-0.007 
(-0.10) 
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Continuation of Table 3.1 
Estimated 
parameters 
Ghana Côte 
d’Ivoire 
Kenya South 
Africa 
Nigeria Senegal Uganda Zambia Malawi Zimbabwe Tanzania 
   0.67 
(5.01)*** 
 
0.66 
(4.77)*** 
0.29 
(2.03)** 
0.36 
(3.59)*** 
0.34 
(2.62)** 
0.58 
(5.27)*** 
0.40 
(2.95)*** 
0.35 
(1.78)* 
0.26 
(1.72)* 
0.46 
(3.78)*** 
0.93 
(6.22)*** 
   8.40 
(2.27)** 
 
2.32 
(1.37) 
1.95 
(1.71)* 
2.74 
(2.79)*** 
6.70 
(1.79)* 
-1.18 
(-1.14) 
4.53 
(1.79)* 
8.52 
(3.01)*** 
-1.74 
(-0.83) 
5.22 
(1.29) 
2.38 
(1.60) 
ϕ -1.39 
(10.98)*** 
 
-0.98 
(-2.29)** 
-0.74 
(2.30)* 
-1.83 
(-2.95)*** 
-1.19 
(-2.73)*** 
-0.41 
(-1.17) 
-0.47 
(-1.41) 
-0.63 
(-3.37)*** 
-0.62 
(-2.35)** 
0.33 
(2.70)*** 
-0.44 
(-1.71)* 
ψ 0.56 
(5.16)*** 
 
0.70 
(4.35)*** 
0.05 
(0.33) 
0.08 
(0.53) 
0.24 
(1.75)* 
0.53 
(2.83)*** 
0.16 
(0.92) 
0.42 
(1.91)* 
0.22 
(1.77)* 
0.07 
(0.27) 
0.25 
(1.65)* 
   -0.04 
(-0.29) 
 
-0.28 
(-0.66) 
-0.02 
(-0.10) 
0.36 
(0.53) 
0.11 
(0.33) 
-0.19 
(-0.66) 
-0.02 
(-0.35) 
0.17 
(1.01) 
0.06 
(0.23) 
-0.22 
(-3.18)*** 
0.83 
(3.44)*** 
    0.76 
(12.28)*** 
 
0.60 
(6.99)*** 
0.47 
(7.84)*** 
0.89 
(9.35)*** 
0.03 
(0.48) 
0.87 
(10.91)*** 
0.35 
(4.05)*** 
0.47 
(10.91)*** 
0.58 
(6.23)*** 
0.94 
(23.74)*** 
0.85 
(17.53)*** 
    0.18 
(5.05)*** 
 
-0.11 
(-2.10)* 
0.29 
(4.90)*** 
-0.05 
(-0.97) 
-0.02 
(-0.39) 
0.05 
(1.21) 
0.01 
(0.16) 
0.04 
(3.81)*** 
0.09 
(1.68)* 
0.07 
(1.25) 
0.10 
(2.73)*** 
    0.06 
(2.39)** 
 
0.26 
(11.54)*** 
0.06 
(1.42) 
0.14 
(5.21)*** 
0.30 
(8.89)*** 
0.11 
(2.70)*** 
0.27 
(5.78)*** 
0.41 
(10.65)*** 
0.13 
(2.10)** 
-0.05 
(-1.30) 
0.05 
(1.58) 
    -0.03 
(-1.62) 
0.04 
(2.18)*** 
-0.006 
(-0.24) 
0.01 
(0.75) 
0.03 
(1.67)* 
-0.03 
(-1.21) 
0.29 
(13.34)*** 
-0.03 
(-0.88) 
0.01 
(0.58) 
0.04 
(1.27) 
-0.03 
(-0.89) 
Calibrated parameters 
Ø  0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 
δ  0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 
γ  0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 
   0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 
θ  2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 
φ  3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Q* 1.4 2.5 1.3 1.5 1.02 1.1 2.6 1.45 2.0 1.9 1.3 
  
 
  0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
ϖ 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 
  2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 
    0.26 0.16 0.17 0.15 0.15 0.17 0.24 0.27 0.30 0.58 0.21 
where ϕ  
     
     
    
  , ψ  
  
   
    
  and the figures in parenthesis are the Z-statistics.  ***, **, and * indicate significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.   
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3.3.3 Discussion of the Estimated Results 
In addition to the prior distribution, Table 3.1 reports results of parameters estimated by using the 
maximum likelihood method.  Overall, most of the estimated parameters are significantly different 
from zero.  Given that the model is non-linear, there are several parameters that are attached to a 
composite coefficient. I therefore discuss the results for each parameter and the economic 
relationship that is portrayed by the results.  In discussing the relationships between variables, I 
make reference to the estimated equations of the model.   
3.3.3.1 Consumption Function 
The estimated parameter for the inverse of the elasticity of consumption σ ranged between 0.11 for 
South Africa and 0.71 for Malawi.  A small inverse of the elasticity of consumption implies that 
the country‟s utility is almost linear in consumption, and therefore, households are willing to 
accept large swings in consumption to take advantage of small differences between the discount 
rate and the rate of return on savings.  Most of the estimated σ values for the sampled countries are 
in line with the assumptions made in most RBC literature such as Smets and Wouters (2003) and 
CEE (2005).  Specifically, going by the σ values and the calibrated values of γ, a 1 percent 
increase in the real interest rate would have a negative impact on consumption of about 91 percent 
for South Africa (refer to equation 25).  Similarly, when the real interest rate increases by 1 
percent in Côte d‟Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Uganda, Tanzania and Zambia; consumption 
reduces by about 20 percent respectively, whereas in Malawi, a 1 percent increase in real interest 
rates leads to about 14 percent reduction in consumption.  These results imply that consumption is 
more sensitive to changes in interest rates in South Africa than in the other sampled countries.   
3.3.3.2 Interest Rate Function 
Turning to the inverse of the elasticity of money holdings ω, the estimated parameter is 0.003 for 
Zimbabwe, 0.08 for Senegal and 0.03 for South Africa.  However these low inverses of the 
elasticity of money holdings (high elasticities) are statistically insignificant.  The rest of the 
sampled countries report higher inverses of the elasticity of money holdings.  Since most of these 
countries do not adjust interest rates but adjust money holdings, when the central bank in Uganda 
reduces money balances by 1 percent, nominal interest rates increase by about 0.56 percent.  In 
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Zambia and Uganda, central banks reduce money balances by 1 percent in order for interest rates 
to increase by about 0.20 percent.   
3.3.3.3 Consumption Imports Function 
Referring to equation 23, the estimated parameter for σ combined with the calibrated parameters 
show that consumption imports are positively affected by current consumption.  Specifically, a 1 
percent increase in current consumption increases consumption imports by a high of about 0.36 
percent in Malawi and a low of about 0.05 percent in Zimbabwe.  Another finding is that a 
depreciation of the exchange rate reduces consumption imports by about 0.5 for all sampled 
countries. 
3.3.3.4 Phillips Curve 
Focusing on the parameter for wage indexation  , Zambia has a low wage indexation parameter of 
0.37 whereas Senegal and Tanzania have the highest wage indexation parameters of 0.98 and 0.95, 
respectively.  This implies that in Senegal and Tanzania, when past inflation increases by 1 
percent, wages adjust by 0.98 percent and 0.95 percent, respectively; whilst in Zambia wages 
adjust by about 0.35 percent when past inflation increases by 1 percent.  The high wage indexation 
parameters suggest that the Phillips curve (equation 42) is backward-looking in those countries.  
What the results suggest is that markets in African countries are incomplete and inefficient and 
therefore agents use past information to make present decisions.  Information is asymmetric and  
therefore, agents cannot speculate or form expectations since all the market participants do not 
have access to the information they need for their decision making processes.  The estimated wage 
indexation parameters for Africa are similar to Smets and Wouters‟ (2003) and Adolfson et al‟s 
(2007) wage indexation parameters of 0.763 and 0.45, respectively. 
The Phillips curve also shows that the relevance of imported investment goods in the production of 
domestic good   is positive as is expected but statistically insignificant for Ghana, Zambia and 
Tanzania. Surprisingly, Uganda, Senegal and Zimbabwe report negative and statistically 
significant values for the coefficient of imported investment goods effects in the production of 
domestic goods.  This result implies that a depreciation of the exchange rate in the previous period 
in these countries, leads to a drastic drop in investments and this offsets the positive 
competitiveness and imported inflation.  Therefore, the effect of the exchange rate pass-through is 
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negative.  Generally, a depreciation of the exchange rate boosts production of exports and 
discourages imports.   
Additionally, the slope coefficient   either has the wrong sign or is statistically insignificant except 
for Uganda and Zimbabwe.  Perhaps, the relatively small effect of the current output gap (or 
marginal cost) on inflation in the presence of trend inflation is due to the interaction between 
exogenous price stickiness and forward-looking price-setting behaviour.  Alternatively, these 
results suggest that the output gap may not be an appropriate measure of the real marginal cost as 
demonstrated by Gali, Gertler and López (2001).  They show that when the output gap is used as a 
proxy for marginal cost, the slope coefficient   has either wr ng signs  r is insignificant.  Their 
argument is that real marginal cost (computed by getting real wage divided by the marginal 
product of labour and averaged across firms) is the theoretically appropriate measure of real sector 
inflationary pressures as opposed to the cyclical measures used in traditional Phillips curve 
analysis such as detrended output gap or unemployment.   
3.3.3.5 External Debt Function 
An interesting result from Table 3.1 is that of the coefficient of risk premium χ.  Apart from 
Zimbabwe, all sampled countries reported a negative coefficient for risk premium.  These 
coefficients ranged from negative 0.91 for Tanzania to negative 0.31 for Uganda.  However, this 
negative relationship is too small to affect the relationship specified in equation 38 because the 
coefficient of risk premium is one of the parameters in a composite coefficient.  In reference to 
equation 38, the results indicate that the previous period‟s debt has a positive impact on the current 
period‟s debt.  For example, for Ghana and South Africa, a 1 percent increase in debt in the 
previous period leads to about 0.30 percent increase in current debt.   Likewise, for Côte d‟Ivoire, 
a 1 percent increase in debt in the previous period will result in about 0.04 percent increase in 
current debt whereas for Zimbabwe, current debt increases by about 0.90 percent.     
Another important finding is that of the relationship between exchange rate and foreign debt.  The 
analysis confirms the puzzling fact that devaluation, which featured virtually in all structural 
adjustment programmes (SAPs), leads to an increase in total debt for Ghana, Kenya, South Africa, 
Nigeria, Uganda, Zambia and Malawi.  In these countries, a depreciation of the exchange rate 
increases foreign debt by a low of about 0.20 for Uganda, Zambia and Malawi and a high of about 
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1.10 for South Africa
16
.  Note that in this study, debt is denominated in domestic currency and 
therefore a depreciation of the exchange rate increases foreign debt.  In contrast, in Côte d‟Ivoire, 
Zimbabwe and Tanzania a 1 percent depreciation of the real exchange rate leads to a fall in foreign 
debt by about 0.01 percent, 0.29 percent and 0.47 percent, respectively.  It has no effect for 
Senegal.   
The effects of imports and exports on the debt equation provide yet another set of interesting 
results.  Imports have a positive impact on debt for all the sampled countries just as is 
expected  ψ , with this effect being significant for Ghana, Côte d‟Ivoire, Nigeria, Senegal, 
Zambia, Malawi and Tanzania.  The sign suggests that when imports increase by 1 percent, foreign 
debt increases by about 0.20 percent in Nigeria and Malawi, and 0.70 percent in Côte d‟Ivoire.  
Except for Senegal and Zimbabwe, exports have a negative impact on external debt for the rest of 
the sampled countries.  Ghana and Malawi have the same negative impact such that a 1 percent 
increase in exports leads to about 0.21 percent reduction in foreign debt.  In Côte d‟Ivoire and 
Nigeria, a 1 percent increase in exports leads to about 0.30 percent reduction in foreign debt.  
South Africa and Tanzania have the highest percentages of the impact of exports on foreign debt 
of about 0.62 and 0.66 percent, respectively.  This finding implies that when exports increase, 
foreign debt declines; this makes sense because earnings from exports are used to repay foreign 
debt.    
An interesting finding is that the persistence of risk premium     is statistically insignificant for 
most of the sampled countries.  This can be explained by the fact that these countries mainly 
borrow from bilateral and multilateral institutions as opposed to commercial creditors.  Their debts 
are therefore not susceptible to high risk premium since loans from official sources generally carry 
below-market rates. 
3.3.3.6 Monetary Reaction Function 
Results for the monetary reaction function (equation 43), show that the degree of persistence of 
monetary smoothing      has a positive sign, as expected, for all the sampled countries.  The 
value ranges from a low of 0.004 for Zambia to a high of 0.93 for Zimbabwe; thus suggesting that 
                                                 
16
 The values 0.20 and 1.10 are computed from equation 38 by substituting the values of the parameters for the 
composite coefficient    
     
     
    
   where, 
     
     
    
  is represented by  ϕ in Table 3.1. 
 © Stella Muhanji Page 78 
 
about 0.90 percent of lagged money growth target deviation is carried over to the next period in 
Zimbabwe whereas in Zambia only 0.004 percent of the lagged money growth target deviation is 
carried over to the next period.  The sensitivity of money supply to inflation gap      ranges 
between -0.02 (Malawi) and -5.10 (Tanzania) whilst that of money supply to output gap      
ranges between 0.06 (Uganda) and 1.40 (Nigeria).  Referring to equation 43, the results suggest 
that in Ghana and Uganda, a 1 percent increase in past inflation will induce monetary authorities to 
reduce money supply by about 0.20 percent.  Likewise, a 1 percent increase in past inflation leads 
to about a 0.30 percent contraction of money supply in Zambia and Zimbabwe.   
Additionally, money supply responds positively to changes in output in all sampled countries 
except Zimbabwe, where the value is statistically insignificant.  For example, in Côte d‟Ivoire, 
Ghana, Kenya and Malawi, monetary authorities increase money supply by about 0.25 percent 
when output increases by 1 percent (see equation 43).  The positive relationship between money 
supply and output can be explained by the fact that when central banks increase money supply, 
interest rates decline and, in turn spur an increase in fixed capital formation.  Consequently, the 
increased fixed capital formation leads to an increase in output.  Similarly, a change in output has 
a positive impact on money supply in all sampled countries except Zimbabwe.  In Côte d‟Ivoire, 
Nigeria, Senegal and Uganda, a 1 percent change in output will lead monetary authorities to 
increase money supply by about 0.43, 0.24, 0.37 and 0.27 percent, respectively.  The results show 
that monetary authorities in African countries change money supply in response to changes in 
output gap as opposed to lagged output gap.  Both change in inflation and the lagged inflation gap 
are statistically insignificant for most of the sampled countries.   
3.3.3.7 Exports Function 
Further, the analysis shows that the exchange rate has a positive and significant impact on exports 
for all the sampled countries.  This is shown by the parameter υ.  The values range between 0.26 
(Malawi) and 0.93 (Tanzania), and they imply that a depreciation of the exchange rate leads to an 
increase in exports.  This outcome is in line with classical economics.  The parameter ς shows that 
world output has a positive impact on exports in all sampled countries except Senegal and Malawi. 
When output in the world increases by 1 percent, output in these countries rises by a low of about 
2 percent in Kenya and a high of about 8.5 percent in Zambia.   
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3.3.3.8 Equilibrium in Goods Market 
Consumption constitutes the highest percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in all the 
sampled countries except for Nigeria where consumption insignificantly constitutes 3 percent of 
GDP (refer to equation 30).  Consumption constitutes over 80 percent of GDP in Zimbabwe, South 
Africa, Senegal and Tanzania.  Another notable feature is that exports have a positive and 
significant impact on GDP for all the countries except for Zimbabwe, where exports 
insignificantly and negatively affect GDP.  Exports contribute about 30 percent of GDP in Côte 
d‟Ivoire, Nigeria and Uganda whereas in Zambia, exports contribute about 40 percent of GDP.  On 
the other hand, imports (investment plus consumption) play an insignificant role in affecting GDP 
in most of the sampled countries.  Government spending constitutes a small fraction of GDP for all 
the sampled countries.  Specifically, government expenditure only positively and significantly 
contributes towards GDP in Ghana, Kenya, Zambia, Malawi and Tanzania. 
3.3.3.9 Imported Investments Function 
The result show that the imported investment function (equation 26), is forward looking in the 
sense that if agents expect imported investments to increase in future, current imported 
investments increase by an average of about 0.8 for most of the sampled countries.  On the 
contrary, past imported investments positively affect current imported investments by about 0.2 for 
most of the sampled countries.  The results also show that capital stock has a positive impact on 
imported investments for most of the countries.  The value ranges from a low of 0.033 in Uganda 
to a high of 2.77 in Zambia.  Generally, a 1 percent increase in capital stock leads to an average of 
about 0.62 percent increase in imported investments.  This finding implies that these countries 
mainly rely on imported capital for investment purposes.  Another important relationship that 
surface in equation 26 is that a depreciation of the exchange rate leads to about a 2 percent fall in 
imported investments for most of the sampled countries. 
 3.4 Do Shocks Drive Business Cycles in Africa? 
Having estimated the structural model, I now perform a number of dynamic simulations to 
investigate whether an expansionary monetary policy shock and two exogenous shocks (world 
commodity price shock and world interest rate shock) drive business cycles in African countries. 
Before running the simulations to compute the impulse response functions, the linear model is 
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solved following McCandless 2008 who replicated Uhlig‟s (1999) method of undetermined 
coefficients
17
.  The model in section 2.2 has two sets of equations
18
: those with expectations and 
those without.  If the model has only one equation with no expectations and the rest of the 
equations have expectations, it can be solved using the standard quadratic method.  The model 
here has five equations without expectations; therefore, I solve it by using the quadratic matrix 
equation method.   
3.4.1 Solving the Stochastic Model 
To solve the linear version of the model, I reduce the solution of the expectational difference 
equation to the solution of a matrix quadratic equation.  In Uhlig‟s method, all variables are 
written as linear functions of a vector of endogenous variables and a list of exogenous stochastic 
processes.  I define    as a vector of endogenous state variables,    as a vector of other endogenous 
variables (jump variables
19
) that depend on the values of the state variables and    as the vector of 
the stochastic shocks.  The state variables naturally follow the ridge but the values of the other 
variables need to jump to get the system on the stable ridge (see McCandless, 2008; 104).  Let 
           
     
            denote the vector of endogenous state variables, 
                           denote the vector of the jump variables
20
 and                denote 
the vector of the stochastic shocks.  These shocks include world interest rate,     money 
supply,    and world commodity price,      Separating equations that include expectations from 
those that do not, the linear version of the model can be written as: 
                                        (52) 
                                                         (53) 
                                                    (54) 
where C is assumed to be of full rank and has a well-defined inverse and N has only stable 
eigenvalues.  I follow McCandless‟ (2008) method in computing matrices A to N.  I use variables 
                                                 
17
 See appendix C. 
18
 See appendix B. 
19
 The name jump variable comes from the saddle point dynamics of continuous time systems.   
20
 I carried out robustness tests to determine the state variables and the jump variables.  The solution method to the 
model rejects variables that are not really state variables by fixing all of their coefficients to zero in matrices P and R. 
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dated           in deterministic equations and variables dated               in equations 
involving expectations      .  Matrices A to N are presented below.   
3
4
5
3
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
a


 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
A
1 2
1
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0 0
a a
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
B
1 3
1
4 3 1
1
5 6 4
4 5 3
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
a a a
 

  
  
 
 
  
 
  
  
 
   
 
  
C
3
5
0 0
0 1 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 1 0
0 0
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
D
   
3
1
1 4
1
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0


 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
F
   
3
1
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1


 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
G
            
2
1
2
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0


 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
H
 
1
4
1
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0



  
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
J
3
5
4 2
1 3
3
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1


 
 
   
 
 
  
    
  
 
 
 
K
3
0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L
 
3
6 7
5 6
3
0 0
0
0
0 0
0 0 0

 
 

  
 
  
  
   
 
 
 
 
M
 
0 0
0 0
0 0
*r
m
x



 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
N  . 
The solution to this economy is a set of matrices P, Q, R and S, which describes the recursive 
equilibrium, laws of motion so that the equilibrium described by these rules is stable.  The 
equilibrium laws of motion are represented by the following equations: 
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                           (55) 
             .             (56) 
A stationary solution will exist and be unique if, and only if, the number of eigenvalues that are 
outside the unit circle (which have an absolute value greater than zero) is equal to the number of 
expectational variables (see e.g. Blanchard and Kahn, 1980).  When the number of expectational 
equations is equal to the number of eigenvalues that are outside the unit circle, one can impose 
conditions on the equilibrium to guarantee that there is a stable solution to the economy (see 
McCandless, 2008; 128-132 for details).  Uhlig‟s Theorem 2 suggests that the equilibrium 
described by the recursive equilibrium laws of motion is stable if and only if all eigenvalues of P 
are smaller than unity in absolute value.  However, even if some eigenvalues of matrix P are 
greater than zero in absolute value, a stable equilibrium will still be attained as long as all the 
eigenvalues along the principal diagonal of matrix P are smaller than unity in absolute value.  
To calculate the solution, P satisfies the following matrix quadratic equation: 
                                           (57) 
Once the roots of matrix P are determined, R is computed as follows: 
                           (58) 
Q satisfies the equation: 
                           
                                   
                (59) 
where the symbol   denotes the kronecker product and  ec    denotes columnwise 
vectorization
21
.  The identity matrix    has dimension     where k is the number of columns in 
the matrix Q.  The values for matrix N come from estimations of foreign interest rates, money 
supply and exports functions.    
Finally, S is given by: 
                                                 
21
 Given matrices A and B,      
      
      
   
      
      
   
        
        
                              
See McCandless (2008) and Lütkepohl (2007) for details on how to compute the kronecker product and columnwise 
vectorization. 
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                           (60) 
Since variables in vectors    and    are log deviations, the entries in P, Q, R and S are interpreted 
as elasticities.  
3.4.2 Decision Rules and Impulse Response Analysis 
This section describes the multiplier analysis, that is, the response of one variable to an impulse in 
another variable in a system that involves a number of other variables as well.  Thus, I investigate 
the impulse response relationship between variables in a higher dimensional system.  If there is a 
reaction of one variable to an impulse in another variable, the latter is the causal of the former (see 
Lütkepohl, 2007; 51-60 for details).  Following McCandless (2008, 120-121), the economy begins 
in a stationary state, with all shocks to stochastic processes set to zero.  The variables are also set 
to zero because they are log differences from the stationary state.  The time path the economy 
follows is defined by the laws of motion represented by equations 55 and 56 above.  The stochastic 
shocks to this model follow the process:   
              where      is the shock.    
I used Matlab
22
 to compute the values for matrices P, Q, R and S for all the sampled countries and 
the matrices are presented in appendix D.  As noted, for a stable equilibrium, the absolute values 
of the principal diagonal for matrix P must be less than one.  To compute the impulse response 
functions, I use the values in matrices P, Q, R and S, and a 1 percent shock.  I first find the time 
path of the state variables and then I determine the path of the jump variables.  I recursively ran 
simulations for 50 periods for all the sampled countries.  
The matrices P and Q yield a set of decision rules for imported investment and foreign debt.  Note 
that the coefficient of foreign debt on the imported investment function (column 2, row 3 of matrix 
P) is different from zero for most of the sampled countries and it is also negative.  This implies 
that capital accumulation and foreign debt cannot be separated as is the case in the small open 
economy framework.  In view of the fact that these countries mainly import capital, they use 
foreign loans to accumulate fixed capital.   Therefore there is an upward sloping supply function of 
foreign loans.  This finding corresponds to Senhadji (1997).  In countries like Côte d‟Ivoire, 
Ghana, Kenya and Senegal, there is a negative cross effect; the negative coefficient of foreign debt 
                                                 
22
 Mat lab codes for solving the quadratic matrix equation are found in McCandless (2008, 233-235). 
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on imported investments and the negative coefficient of imported investments on foreign debt 
(column 3, row 2 of matrix P).  Senhadji (1997) argues that this cross-effect reflects the 
substitutability between physical capital and the foreign debt.  The negative effect of external debt 
on imported investments also confirms the debt overhang hypothesis.  Another noteworthy point is 
that there is a mixed relationship between foreign debt and output.  Matrix P also shows that in 5 
of the sampled countries, external debt has a negative impact on output whilst it has a positive 
impact in the rest of the countries. 
Another point worth mentioning is that a negative external shock (that is, an increase in world 
interest rates) and a positive external shock (that is, an increase in world commodity price) trigger 
different borrowing responses for different countries.  Matrix Q shows that an increase in world 
interest rate leads to a fall in foreign borrowing for most of the countries (see row 2, column 1 of 
matrix Q) whilst an increase in world commodity prices leads to an increase in foreign borrowing 
in 6 of the sampled countries (see row 2, column 3 of matrix Q).  Another interesting outcome 
from matrix Q is that an expansionary monetary shock also leads to different borrowing responses 
with 7 of the 11 sampled countries reporting an increase in foreign borrowing.  
Another notable observation is that all persistent shocks converge to the steady state equilibrium 
after about 40 years for most of the sampled countries.  On the other hand, the effect of a 
permanent shock converges to the new equilibrium level after about 5 to 9 years for most of the 
sampled countries. The impulse response functions for permanent shocks are presented in 
appendix E. 
 3.4.2.1 Monetary Policy Shock 
In this study, monetary authorities pursue money growth as their monetary policy.  The Figure 
below shows the impulse response functions (IRFs) of a 1 percent persistent shock to an 
expansionary monetary policy.  For most of the countries, the results mimic the basic cash in 
advance model in which a positive money shock drives downwards consumption and output. 
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Figure 3.1: Persistent Shock to Monetary Policy 
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Table 3.2: Summary of IRFs of a Persistent Shock to Monetary Policy 
Target 
Variable 
External 
Debt 
Imported 
Investments 
Inflation Consumption 
Imports 
Interest 
Rates 
Output Exports Consumption Exchange 
Rate 
Money 
Supply 
Expected 
Reaction 
of Target 
Variable 
 
± 
 
 
 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
  
 
± 
 
  
 
± 
 
+ 
 
+ 
Ghana + +   +           + 
Côte 
d’Ivoire 
+       +   +   + + 
Kenya + +   + +         + 
Malawi     + + + +   +   + 
Nigeria     + + +     +   + 
Senegal + +     +   +   + + 
South 
Africa 
  +   + +         + 
Tanzania + +   + +         + 
Uganda + +   + +     +   + 
Zambia   +         +   + + 
Zimbabwe + +   +           + 
The sign + means Increase and   eans Decrease.  Note that an increase/decrease in the exchange rate implies a 
depreciation/appreciation of the exchange rate. 
 
 
Table 3.2 above shows the summary of the responses of economic variables to a persistent 
expansionary monetary policy shock.  An expansionary monetary shock is expected to lead to 
either an increase or decrease in external debt depending on the policies that are pursued by 
respective countries.  External debt falls after a monetary shock when central banks insulate the 
increase in money supply by reducing foreign borrowing.  This is the case reported in Malawi, 
Nigeria, South Africa and Zambia.  The rest of the countries: Côte d‟Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, 
Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe report an increase in external debt after a monetary 
shock.  The increase in external debt can be explained by the fact that imported investments and 
consumption imports increased after a monetary shock due to an appreciation of the exchange rate.    
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The conventional view suggests that an expansionary monetary shock leads to an increase in 
nominal interest rates.  Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) argue that as long as the amount of 
money that households allocate to consumption does not respond to the lump-sum injection of 
cash by monetary authorities, a positive money shock increases the total percentage of the money 
supply available to financial intermediaries.  As long as the gross interest rate exceeds one, 
financial intermediaries lend all of the cash at their disposal to firms.  However this requires that 
firms absorb a disproportionately large share of new cash injections.  For firms to do so 
voluntarily, interest rates must fall.  On the other hand, if the growth rate of money displays 
positive persistence, then the expected inflation effects of a change in the growth rate of money 
exert countervailing pressure on interest rates.  Whether interest rates fall or rise after a money 
shock depends on which effect is stronger.  From the table above, apart from Ghana, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe, an expansionary monetary policy shock leads to an increase in real interest rates in all 
the other sampled countries.  Additionally, Ghana, Zambia and Zimbabwe experience a liquidity 
effect in view of the fact that the countries observe a negative comovement between money supply 
and interest rates.  The liquidity effect is at odds with the predictions of the classical monetary 
model (see Gali, 2008 for details).  However, the negative comovement between money supply 
and interest rate is in line with Friedman (1968).  Friedman argued that an exogenous increase in 
the money supply leads to a drop in the real interest rate, which lasts 1 to 2 years.  
Theoretically, an expansionary monetary policy should lead to an increase in aggregate demand in 
an economy where agents hold money for transaction purposes as opposed to speculative 
purposes.   The increase in aggregate demand leads to an increase in output and consumption.  On 
the other hand, if money is held more for speculative and precautionary reasons than for 
transaction reasons, the opportunity cost of holding money increases in the form of higher interest 
rates.  The increase in the cost of funds discourages investments and thus the economy produces 
less output than potential.  The impulse response functions show that both output and consumption 
fall after an expansionary monetary shock in most countries.  The fall in consumption arises if 
households finance consumption from borrowed funds and/or noncurrent income (i.e., from wealth 
held in interest earning assets).  With increase in interest rate, opportunity cost of wealth increases 
and consequently consumption falls. 
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In most of these economies, imported investments increase after a monetary shock.  The puzzling 
question is: why is it that the increase in imported investments does not translate into an increase 
in output and consumption?  Perhaps, most of the sampled countries invest in projects that have 
low returns.  In fact, Pattillo et al (2001) argue that investments that take place in high uncertainty 
environments as well as high debt environments are likely to be in trading activities that have 
quick returns rather than long-term, high-risk, irreversible investments.  This misallocation of 
investment in turn lowers the efficiency of overall capital accumulation thus negatively affecting 
output.  Another explanation for reduced output and consumption is provided by Ndikumana and 
Boyce (2008) who argue that in African countries, there is high capital flight which has a 
regressive effect on output.  Capital flight also depresses consumption in the domestic economy. 
Another notable feature is the response of exchange rate to a monetary shock.  Theoretically, 
exchange rate is expected to depreciate in response to a monetary shock in a flexible exchange rate 
regime.  This is the case for four of the sampled countries.  In the rest of the countries, the 
exchange rate appreciates after an expansionary monetary shock.  This can be explained by 
Kuttner and Mosser (2002) who argue that in the exchange rate channel, monetary transmission 
mechanism runs from interest rates to the exchange rate via the UIP condition that relates interest 
rates differentials to the expected exchange rate movements.  They point out that an increase in the 
domestic interest rate relative to foreign rates, leads to a stronger currency and a reduction both in 
net exports and in the overall level of aggregate demand.  The appreciation of the exchange rate 
can be explained either by the high real interest rates which attract foreign capital or by increased 
foreign borrowing.  The inflow of foreign capital leads to an appreciation of the exchange rate.  
The appreciation of the exchange rate is accompanied by an increase in consumption imports and a 
reduction in exports since it is cheaper to import goods into the country.  Consequently, a trade 
deficit is created given that imports exceed exports.  
In most of these countries, the design of monetary policy is centered on money growth.  The 
central bank chooses a target rate for money growth corresponding to the lagged inflation rate and 
the lagged output gap.  The assumption is that money growth and inflation rate is positively 
related.  Conventionally, an expansionary monetary policy should therefore lead to an increase in 
inflation since the increase in money supply leads to an increase in aggregate demand in the 
economy.  However, my impulse response functions show that inflation declines in Africa after an 
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expansionary monetary shock.  The question to ask is: why does the model fail to display an 
increase in inflation after an expansionary monetary policy shock? The fall in inflation after an 
expansionary monetary shock has been identified as a “price puzzle” (a temporary drop in the 
price level after an expansionary monetary policy shock).  Ravn, Schmitt-Grohė, Uribe and 
Uuskula (2008) posit that a price puzzle and an “inflation persistent puzzle” arises when first, 
variations in aggregate demand affect the price elasticity of demand facing producers.  An increase 
in current aggregate demand increases the price elasticity and therefore leads producers to set 
lower mark-ups.  Second, when setting prices today, producers need to be forward looking and a 
producer that expects high future demand will have an incentive to lower prices today in order to 
attract more future demand.  In this sense, the model gives rise to a countercyclical mark-up.  
Inflation responses for Kenya and Côte d‟Ivoire replicate the results by Ravn et al (2008) in the 
sense that the response of inflation to an expansionary monetary policy shock is negative during 
the second period after the shock and subsequently increases persistently around the third period 
after the shock.  In Ghana and Zambia, inflation responds sluggishly to monetary shock whilst in 
Tanzania, inflation initially cycles after a monetary shock and then it falls after the fourth period. 
Another explanation for the price puzzle is provided by Barth and Ramey (2001) who refer to the 
cost channel of monetary policy as an alternative explanation for an increase in inflation after a 
monetary tightening.  The cost channel operates alongside the interest rate channel (that is, the 
standard aggregate demand channel) by reflecting that firms depend on credit to finance 
production, which means that their pricing decisions are directly related to credit conditions since 
marginal production costs are affected by interest rates.  On the other hand, Rabanal (2007) argues 
that a shift of inflation in response to a monetary policy shock is not necessarily evidence for 
misspecification but follows from a worsening of credit conditions due to an increase in interest 
rates.  His results suggest that the cost channel fails as an explanation for the price puzzle as he 
finds that the presence of the cost channel is not enough to generate a positive response of inflation 
after a monetary policy contraction.  An initial rise of inflation is stimulated by an increase in 
interest rates that enter marginal production costs, but the shift is completely offset by declines in 
the real wage and the real rental rate of capital, even when wages are set in a staggered way and 
capital utilization is assumed to be highly variable, which makes the rental rate of capital less 
volatile.   
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In a similar vein, CEE (2005) estimate a general equilibrium model and conclude that the 
importance of the cost channel in the US is only minor.  Even though a price puzzle emerges in the 
empirical impulse responses they use for minimizing the distance, the cost channel only 
contributes to explaining inflation inertia, which emerges after a monetary contraction, while 
inflation immediately falls.  However, this should not be the case in inputs-constrained economies 
of Africa.  A more recent study by Henzel, Hülsewig, Mayer and Wollmershäuser (2009) finds 
that the cost channel in the euro area is incapable of producing a price puzzle in an unrestricted 
regression, but its presence helps to generate an initially concave response of inflation to a 
monetary contraction.  Their argument is that the fall in inflation is delayed in the first quarters 
following the shock, before it follows the traditional hump-shaped and convex response, which 
can be attributed to the sluggish reaction of real marginal costs that comes along with the 
simultaneous increase in interest rates. 
With a few exceptions, a permanent shock to monetary policy produces similar results to those of 
a persistent shock in most of the sampled countries (see appendix E for the Figures).  In fact, the 
short-run responses to a permanent shock to an expansionary monetary policy are similar to the 
responses of persistent shocks.  The long-run effects differ from the short-run ones in the sense 
that in the long-run, most countries report depreciated exchange rates and as a consequence, they 
run current account surpluses following an expansionary monetary policy.  Another result worth 
pointing out is that output and consumption increase after a 1 percent permanent increase in 
money in 5 of the sampled countries.  The results imply that in these countries, agents respond to a 
permanent increase in money supply by consuming transaction goods as opposed to investing in 
interest earning investments.   
3.4.2.2 World Commodity Price Shock 
As noted by Cashin, Liang and McDermott (2000), movements in commodity prices are a key 
determinant of the performance of the world economy.  They affect the level of stability of export 
earnings by developing countries, the cost of inputs to production in industrialized countries, the 
allocation of world capital flows and rates of national economic growth.  The impulse response 
functions above show that world commodity prices play an important role in driving business 
cycles in Africa.  The Figure below shows the impulse response functions of a 1 percent persistent 
increase in the world commodity price. 
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Figure 3.2: Persistent Shock to World Commodity Price 
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Table 3.3: Summary of IRFs of a Persistent Shock to World Commodity Price 
Target 
Variable 
External 
Debt 
Imported 
Investments 
Inflation Consumption 
Imports 
Interest 
Rates 
Output Exports Consumption Exchange 
Rate 
Money 
Supply 
Expected 
Reaction 
of Target 
Variable 
 
± 
 
 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
+ 
 
± 
Ghana   +   + +     +   + 
Côte 
d’Ivoire 
+ + + +           + 
Kenya + + + + + +   +   + 
Malawi +           +   + + 
Nigeria + + +     + +   +   
Senegal   +         +   +   
South 
Africa 
+ + + + + +   +   + 
Tanzania + +         +   + + 
Uganda +   +     + +   +   
Zambia   +   + +     +   + 
Zimbabwe       +             
The sign + means Increase and   means Decrease.  Note that an increase/decrease in the exchange rate implies a 
depreciation/appreciation of the exchange rate.  
 
The impulse response functions suggest that a 1 percent positive shock to a commodity price leads 
to an increase in external debt in all sampled countries except for Ghana, Senegal, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe.  The accumulation of external debt can be explained by Bevan, Collier and Gunning 
(1989, 1990 and 1993) who find that even though governments in Africa initially try to save 
windfalls from a commodity price shock, they finally invest far in excess of their savings, so that 
the final consequence of the windfall is an increase in external debt.  Investments are either in poor 
quality irreversible projects which have low-returns or in overambitious projects that are 
abandoned when revenues fall.  In addition, governments raise their current expenditures in a way 
that is difficult to reverse when the boom turns to a slump and therefore, they destabilize the 
economy when sharp and often harmful cuts have to be made.  This leads to more external 
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borrowing to finance the budget deficit; thus, accumulating external debt.  If governments save the 
boom‟s earnings and use the savings to smooth out investments, foreign debt will fall after a 
favourable world commodity price shock. 
Conversely, Deaton and Miller (1995) did not find any connection between commodity price 
booms and external debt but find that commodity price booms mainly affect investments.  In 
support of Deaton and Miller (1995), Kose and Riezman (1999) find that commodity price shocks 
heavily affect investment dynamics in African countries.  From Table 3.3 above, imported 
investments increased after the world commodity price shock in all countries except in Côte 
d‟Ivoire, Malawi and Zambia where imported investments fell after world commodity price shock. 
World commodity price shocks ought to lead to an increase in inflation given that the increase in 
the relative prices of exports causes a substantial increase in ticket prices of imported investments.  
As a consequence, export sectors should contract production and consumption should fall.  This is 
the case that is reported in most of the sampled countries where consumption and output fall after 
a favourable commodity price shock.  On inflation, the impulse response functions show that it 
falls after a commodity price shock in most countries.  This can be explained by the fact that 
African countries pursue stabilization policies that ameliorate the domestic effects of world 
commodity price shocks.  Price stabilization policies typically take the form of either buffer stock 
schemes or buffer fund and are usually implemented in commodity-exporting countries to reduce 
the effects of volatile world commodity prices on domestic prices or export returns.   
Theoretically, the relative value of exports is expected to increase after a favourable world 
commodity price shock where the affected commodity is an export of the country.  This is the case 
for Malawi, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania and Uganda.  However, in the rest of the sampled 
countries, the impulse response functions indicate that exports decline after a commodity price 
shock.  Consumption imports also increase and the commodity price shock leads to a trade deficit 
instead of a trade surplus.  Note that the exchange rate appreciated initially after a commodity 
price boom in these countries and this could have led to increased imports.  The inevitable 
appreciation of the exchange rate leads to contraction of both the export sector and the 
manufacturing sector since output falls after a commodity price shock.  What this means is that 
these countries suffer from the “Dutch disease” in the sense that the boom from a favourable 
commodity price shock has an adverse effect on other sectors of the economy. 
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Real interest rates fall after a favourable commodity price shock because agents defer taking up 
loans from the bank.  When agents realize the boom that comes after the shock is temporary, they 
save the boom and thus push downwards the real interest rates.  This is the scenario reported in 
most African countries.  On the other hand, impulse response functions show that money supply 
responds sluggishly to the world commodity price shock in Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, Senegal, 
South Africa and Tanzania.   
The permanent increase in the world commodity price has similar effects to those of persistent 
shocks in most of the countries.  There are only a few variations in the long-run responses for 
some variables in some countries.  The impulse response functions for a permanent shock to the 
world commodity price are reported in appendix E.   
3.4.2.3 World Interest Rate Shock 
Figure 3.3 shows that world interest rate shocks generate stronger fluctuations in exchange rates, 
import consumption, investment imports and external debt in most of the sampled countries.  The 
response functions substantiate Mendoza‟s (1991) inference that world interest rate disturbances 
might cause significant business cycle fluctuations in highly indebted developing countries.  
Blankenau et al (2001) argue that changes in the world real interest rate can affect behaviour along 
many margins: they affect households by generating intertemporal substitution, wealth, and 
portfolio allocation effects, and they affect firms by altering incentives for domestic investment.  
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Figure 3.3: Persistent Shock to the World Interest Rate 
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Imported 
Investments
Inflation
Consumption 
Imports
Interest Rate
Output
Exports
Consumption
Exchange Rate
-0.02
-0.015
-0.01
-0.005
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
1 4 7 1013161922252831343740434649
Years after Shock
Zimbabwe Money Supply
External Debt
Imported 
Investments
Inflation
Consumption 
Imports
Interest Rate
Output
Exports
Consumption
Exchange Rate
 © Stella Muhanji Page 99 
 
Table 3.4: Summary of IRFs of a persistent Shock to the World Interest Rate 
Target 
Variable 
External 
Debt 
Imported 
Investments 
Inflation Consumption 
Imports 
Interest 
Rates 
Output Exports Consumption Exchange 
Rate 
Money 
Supply 
Expected 
Reaction 
of Target 
Variable 
 
± 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
  
 
± 
 
  
 
+ 
 
± 
Ghana             +   + + 
Côte 
d’Ivoire 
+ +   +           + 
Kenya +   + + + +   +     
Malawi     + + + +   +     
Nigeria       + +     +   + 
Senegal + + + + +     +   + 
South 
Africa 
      +     +   +   
Tanzania + +   +           + 
Uganda     +     + +   +   
Zambia       +     +   +   
Zimbabwe + +   +             
The sign + means Increase and   means Decrease.  Note that an increase/decrease in the exchange rate implies a 
depreciation/appreciation of the exchange rate. 
 
 
In this study, world interest rate is postulated to be an increasing function of external debt.  It 
measures the marginal cost of borrowing foreign debt and thus, foreign debt increases as world 
interest rates increase.  This is the case for Côte d‟Ivoire, Kenya, Senegal, Tanzania and 
Zimbabwe.  The rest of the countries reduce foreign borrowing after a shock to the world interest 
rate.  This is because these countries respond to the higher cost of servicing debt by reducing 
foreign borrowing and, as a result foreign debt falls.  
When marginal cost of borrowing increases, consumption declines because consumers put off 
current consumption to the future.  In fact, consumers delay making a full adjustment to the shock 
and so they gradually cut consumption.  According to the impulse responses, output and imported 
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investments expectedly fall after a shock to the world interest rate in most of the sampled 
countries.  Investments fall because of the flow of capital out of the country.  Another explanation 
for the fall in imported investments is that the increase in the world interest rate results in a 
reversal of capital flows causing a “capital crunch”.  The probability that a country will default 
increases with the increase in interest rates and therefore, rational investors anticipate an increase 
in expropriation risk and hence invest less.  The fall in investments also leads to a decline in 
exports in most of these countries since they mainly rely on imported intermediate goods in the 
production of exportables.  The fall in exports and the attendant increase in consumption imports 
generate a trade deficit in most of the sampled countries.   
Theoretically, with high world interest rates, capital flows out of the country and creates an 
incipient deficit which causes the home currency to depreciate.  The depreciated exchange rate 
should encourage exports and discourage consumption imports.  This is the case that is reported in 
Ghana, South Africa, Uganda and Zambia.  In the rest of the countries, the exchange rate 
appreciates in response to an increase in world interest rates.  The exchange rate appreciation is 
accompanied by an increase in consumption imports and a fall in exports, thus creating a trade 
deficit.  The impact of world interest rates on exports mirrors the findings by Blankenau, et al 
(2001) who document that world interest rates only exert large fluctuations on net exports and net 
foreign assets. 
The short-run effects of a permanent increase in the world interest rate are similar to those of a 
persistent shock (see appendix E for the Figure on responses to a permanent shock).  The long-run 
effects differ from the short run effects in different countries.  In the long-run, a permanent shock 
to the world interest rate leads to an increase in inflation unlike persistent shocks that lead to a fall 
in inflation.  Interest rates also rise after a permanent shock to world interest rate.  Another 
distinguishing feature is the response of consumption and output.  Unlike in the case of the 
persistent shock where output and consumption fall, a permanent shock leads to an increase in 
output and consumption in the long-run.  
 3.5 Business Cycle Properties of the Data and Model 
In line with Senhadji (2003), I summarize the business cycle properties by two statistics: relative 
volatility and comovement with GDP.  Relative volatility is measured as the ratio of the standard 
deviation of the variable to the standard deviation of GDP whilst comovement is measured as the 
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variable‟s correlation with GDP.  The results for volatility and comovement of variables with GDP 
are presented in Tables F1 and F2 in appendix F.  The data shows that external debt, imported 
investments, consumption imports, exchange rate and exports are volatile whilst interest rates are 
less volatile.  Consumption is as variable as GDP.  There are, however, some differences in the 
magnitudes across different countries.  With respect to comovement, consumption is strongly 
procyclical whilst imported investments, consumption imports, exports and money supply are 
somewhat procyclical.  Inflation and interest rates are, on average, weakly countercyclical.  
When the model‟s business cycle properties are compared to those of the data, the relative 
volatility of external debt, consumption imports and exports replicate business cycle properties of 
the data after a persistent expansionary monetary policy shock.  Other variables with high 
volatility include consumption, imported investments, money supply and the exchange rate.  With 
a persistent commodity price shock, volatility declines for external debt and money supply.  The 
volatile variables include imported investments, consumption imports, exports and the exchange 
rate.  When there is a persistent shock to world interest rates, external debt, consumption, imported 
investments, consumption imports and exchange rates are more volatile than GDP.  Another 
notable observation is that inflation is as variable as GDP after both the commodity price shock 
and the world interest rate shock.  In summary, the three shocks increase substantially the relative 
volatility of imported investments (which are used for capital formation) and the exchange rate. 
In terms of comovement with GDP, with a persistent monetary policy shock, inflation and 
consumption are strongly procyclical whilst external debt, imported investments, consumption 
imports and money supply are countercyclical. With a persistent commodity price shock, inflation 
and consumption are strongly procyclical while exports and exchange rates are somewhat 
procyclical.  Imported investments and consumption imports are countercyclical.  If there is a 
persistent shock to world interest rates, inflation and consumption become strongly procyclical 
whilst external debt, imported investments and consumption imports are countercyclical.  
 3.6 Conclusions from the DSGE Model 
From the foregoing discussion of results, it is apparent that the structural model developed in this 
study fits empirical data fairly well and replicates business cycle properties.  Most of the estimated 
parameters are statistically different from zero.  The results show that there is high wage 
indexation in Africa and therefore the Phillips curve is backward-looking.  The backward-looking 
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Phillips curve implies that African markets are inefficient; an outcome that is due largely to 
information asymmetry.  Agents rely on past information to make current periods‟ decisions.  On 
the contrary, imported investments are forward-looking such that if imported investments are 
expected to rise in future, current imported investments increase.  
The empirical results also show that exports reduce foreign debt whilst imports increase foreign 
debt.  This implies that countries must run a trade surplus if they desire to reduce their external 
debt burden.  The results also prove that a depreciation of the exchange rate leads to an increase in 
external debt when debt is denominated in domestic currency (the opposite is true when debt is 
denominated in foreign currency).  Additionally, a depreciation/appreciation of the exchange rate 
leads to an increase/decrease in exports and a fall/rise in consumption imports for most of the 
countries. 
On shock propagation, what clearly comes out is that monetary shock, commodity price shock and 
world interest rate shock drive business cycles in Africa.  The shocks have a high impact on 
external debt, imported investments, consumption imports, exports, fluctuations in exchange rates, 
consumption and output.  Specifically, an expansionary monetary shock leads to an increase in 
investments/consumption imports, external debt and the real interest rates in most of the countries.  
Surprisingly, instead of the exchange rate depreciating after an expansionary monetary shock, it 
appreciates in most of the sampled countries.  World commodity price shock leads to an increase 
in external debt, imported investments, consumption imports and money supply.  World interest 
rates shock lead to a fall in external debt, imported investments, inflation, exports, consumption 
and output.  Apparently consumption imports increase in response to world interest rates shock 
whilst exports decline hence causing a trade deficit.   
From these results, it appears that countries accumulate debt either when the trade deficit increases 
or when there is an adverse macroeconomic shock.  In order to address the pervasive effects of 
external debt on African countries, the next chapter derives possible national strategic guides 
based on national income ratios for better debt sourcing and management.  These strategies are 
geared towards averting the future accumulation of unsustainable debts.  To formulate appropriate 
strategies that will forestall external debt accumulation, insights will be gleaned from the literature 
in chapter two and the results documented in this chapter.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: REASONED PLAN/GUIDE FOR BETTER DEBT SOURCING AND 
MANAGEMENT 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter two presented a review of the sources of the current debt problem among African 
countries and the consequences of the debt crisis on these economies.  As discussed in the review 
of literature, the main sources of debt accumulation are short sighted policy decisions by African 
leaders, uncontrolled fluctuations in export earnings as a result of weak export markets, creditor 
investments in unproductive projects that eventually became white elephants, exchange rate 
fluctuations, and macroeconomic propagated shocks.   
In Chapter three, a macroeconomic model of external debt burden for African countries was 
developed.  The estimation results provide evidence that suggests exports reduce debt 
accumulation whilst imports increase debt accumulation.  Fluctuations in exchange rate also affect 
debt accumulation in these countries.  The dynamic effect of shocks on external debt was also 
analyzed in this chapter.  From the simulations, external debt increases in most of the countries as 
imported investments and consumption imports increase.  The simulations show that an internal 
shock and two external shocks contribute towards fluctuations of external debt in African 
countries.  Specifically, an expansionary monetary policy (internal) shock and a favourable world 
commodity price (external) shock leads to an increase in external debt whereas an adverse world 
interest rate (external) shock leads to a fall in external debt.   
4.2 Recap of Ineffective Patterns of Borrowing Contracts and Repayment Plan 
As highlighted in the review of literature, African countries accumulated external debt 
immediately after the commodity price booms.  The simulations in Figure 3.3 confirm that a 
favourable world commodity price boom contributes towards the indebtedness of these countries.  
Conventionally, the commodity booms should create a trade surplus which can be used to acquire 
capital for investment projects.  Even though countries acquired capital goods after the booms as 
evidenced by the increase in imported investments, they invested the boom in over-ambitious 
projects that either turned out to be white elephants or the boom was not enough to completely 
finance the projects.  Countries therefore resorted to external borrowing to complete the projects 
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thus accumulating more debt.  In order to arrest this kind of expenditure, African countries must 
pursue better practices for evaluating and financing sustainable investment projects. 
Another destructive external debt contracting practice by African countries comes from corrupt 
contracts by private agents.  As highlighted in chapter two, most of the money that was received, 
especially during cold war, was deposited back in western banks under dubious circumstances.  In 
other cases, contracts were completed in western countries and the money never reached the 
debtor country.  In such circumstances, the external debt for these countries is “odious debt ”23.  
Authors like Sack (1927) and Boyce and Ndikumana (2001, 2002) suggest that countries should 
not be compelled to repay odious debts because of the circumstances under which the debts were 
acquired.  What comes out clearly is that when private agents are accumulating debt, it is 
capitalized but when the debt becomes a burden, it becomes a social cost and therefore, it is 
socialized.  Taxpayers are therefore compelled to repay a debt that they never accumulated. 
Poor governance and misuse of funds by debtor countries was widely reported, but creditor 
countries continued to lend money to such debtor countries.  Institutions like the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank also had the audacity to lend funds to countries that had poor 
governance practices amidst evidence that the money was not put into projects that could generate 
foreign exchange.  The loans (especially structural adjustment loans) were more or less like a pain 
reliever to an advanced cancerous disease that cannot be cured.  It is similar to giving an 
incentive/bonus to a manager who has plunged an institution into bankruptcy with the expectation 
that the same manager will revamp it.  In fact, Easterly (2002) argues that official lenders continue 
lending even when the loans do no promote development because multilateral and donor agencies 
are rewarded for volumes of assistance rather than results.  The official lenders lend so that the 
country does not default on earlier obligations to private or official creditors.  For instance, World 
Bank gave loans to finance the same agricultural policy reforms in Kenya five separate times.  
Easterly‟s view is that official lenders should bear some of the blame for financing bad 
governments that pursue policies that are detrimental to their own citizens.  Proper governance, 
good management practices and a good track record of prosperity are essential preconditions for 
allocating debt funds to African countries. 
                                                 
23
 According to Sack (1927), odious debts are those (a) incurred without the consent of the people (by a “despotic” 
regime); (b) from which no benefits accrued to the people; and (c) when the creditors have knowledge of the 
foregoing. 
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Most African countries were forced to devalue their currencies as part of the structural adjustment 
programmes.  What comes out clearly from my empirical findings is that a depreciated currency 
increases foreign debt when debt is denominated in domestic currency.  The depreciated exchange 
rate reduces importation of intermediate goods that are necessary in the production of exports and, 
consequently lead to stagnation of these economies.  With depressed export sectors, these 
countries were forced to reschedule their debts instead of defaulting, since exports are used to 
repay foreign debt.   
African countries mainly import capital for the production sector.  The simulations demonstrate 
that when imported investments increase after a shock, external debt also increases and vice versa.  
Similarly, consumption imports increase foreign debt.  It is therefore prudent that these countries 
mainly import intermediate goods that are used in the production sector as opposed to importing 
consumption imports.  Perhaps these countries should pursue protectionist policies to prevent 
dumping of unnecessary consumption goods into these countries.  They must protect infant 
industries so as to avoid accumulating external debt by importing goods that they can produce 
domestically.   
The countries export primary commodities whose prices are determined in the international 
market.  Why have these countries continued to export primary commodities that can also be 
exported as finished products? For instance, why are countries like Ghana and Kenya still 
exporting cocoa and coffee beans instead of exporting refined and patented cocoa and coffee, 
respectively? Exporting primary products is a disadvantage to these countries since they end up 
running huge trade deficits.  In fact, empirical results in the previous chapter suggest that if 
countries want to reduce foreign debt, they must increase their exportables.  It is therefore wise for 
these countries to change from exporting primary products to exporting finished goods.   
The foregoing suggests that African countries have a flawed external debt sourcing and 
management process.  For these countries to manage and forestall debt accumulation, they must 
adjust their borrowing patterns.  These countries also face serious governance issues that impede 
any attempts to resolve the accumulation of unsustainable debts.  As ways of proffering solutions 
to this bad debt sourcing and management process, the next two sections identify appropriate 
thresholds for sustainable foreign borrowing as well as analyze the impact of governance on 
external debt. 
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4.3 Threshold Levels for Sustainable Debt  
The theoretical literature suggests that foreign borrowing has a positive impact on investment and 
growth up to a certain threshold level; beyond this level, however, its impact is adverse, giving rise 
to a “Laffer curve” type relationship between external debt, on the one hand, and investment and 
per capita income growth on the other (Claessens, 1990).  The threshold level for debt 
sustainability under the HIPC initiative is the debt-export ratio of 150 percent and debt-revenue 
ratio of 250 percent.  In their empirical study, Patillo et al (2002) compute debt threshold levels by 
assuming that the HIPC initiative will halve country‟s debt levels.  They used the year 2000 debt 
ratios as their benchmark values.  They find that debt negatively affects per capita growth when 
debt-exports ratio is 160-170 percent and debt-GDP ratio is 35-40 percent.   
Most recently, Manasse and Roubini (2009) suggest that the sufficient predictor variables for 
external debt include among others the total external debt/GDP ratio, short-term debt reserves 
ratio, real GDP growth, public external debt/fiscal revenue ratio, external financial requirements 
(current account balance plus short-term debt as a ratio of foreign reserves); exchange rate 
overvaluation; and exchange rate volatility.  A relatively “safe” country type is described by a 
handful of economic prerequisites: low total external debt (below 49.7 percent of GDP); low short-
term debt (below 130 percent of reserves); low public external debt (below 214 percent of fiscal 
revenue); and an exchange rate that is not excessively over-appreciated (overvaluation below 48 
percent).  They identify three types of risks which include solvency (or debt un-sustainability), 
illiquidity and macro-exchange rate risks.  The debt un-sustainability risk is characterized by 
external debt in excess of 49.7 percent of GDP, together with monetary or fiscal imbalances, as 
well as by large external financing needs that signal illiquidity as an element of debt un-
sustainability.  Liquidity risks are identified by moderate debt levels, but have short-term debt in 
excess of 130 percent of reserves coupled with political uncertainty and tight international capital 
markets.  The macro-exchange rate risk arises from the combination of low growth and relatively 
fixed exchange rates.  They however suggest that unconditional thresholds, for example debt-
output ratios, are of little value per se in assessing the probability of default.  One country may be 
heavily indebted but have a negligible probability of default, while a second may have only 
moderate values of debt ratios while running a considerable default risk.  The reason is because the 
joint effects of short maturity, political uncertainty, and relatively fixed exchange rates make a 
liquidity crisis in the latter much more likely than a solvency crisis in the former, particularly if the 
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large external debt burden goes together with monetary stability, a large current account surplus, 
and sound public finances.  
In contrast, Caliari (2006) points out that the indicators used to establish the debt thresholds are 
poor proxies of how an economy is faring and, particularly, how well a government is meeting its 
revenue needs to achieve human development goals.  His arguments is that the HIPC Initiative has 
been heavily criticized for relying mainly on debt-to-export and debt-service-to-export ratios as 
indicators to measure sustainability.  He finds that export revenue does not necessarily correlate 
with growth, poverty reduction rates or, more importantly, fiscal revenue.  In addition, the chosen 
thresholds, being fixed numerical thresholds, are unable to capture the possible variations in 
country situations.  Caliari‟s recommendation is that human development imperatives should take 
precedence over debt payments.  In fact, debt sustainability assessments should be geared to 
ensure that debtor countries are able to fulfill the financing requirements to meet both the human 
development and the millennium development goals. 
From the foregoing literature, it is evident that the most commonly used debt indicators are the 
debt ratio, debt service ratio, debt-GDP ratio, international reserves to debt ratio, international 
reserves to debt service ratio, and interest payments to net export earnings.  In view of the fact that 
most African countries are still battling with debt service problems even though they have 
achieved debt sustainability thresholds envisaged by the HIPC initiative, there is need to identify 
threshold levels that will lead to better debt management.  HIPC threshold levels are very high 
given that these countries are grappling with weak macroeconomic and institutional structures. 
From the information in Table 1.5 (in chapter 1), notice that even though under the HIPC initiative 
a debt-GNP level of below 250% is deemed sustainable, the poorest of the poorest countries like 
Zambia and Tanzania had achieved that threshold level in 1995 when these countries were 
grappling with debt service problems and were asked to reschedule their debts.  In fact, most 
countries had debt-GNP ratios of below 100%.   
An interesting observation from Table F3 (appendix F) is that Malawi, which is at the decision 
point and has received 90 percent debt relief, has not achieved HIPC‟s debt-export ratio of 150 
percent.  In fact, Easterly (2002) posits that debt relief does not even bring a reduction in debt, as 
poor country governments borrow anew until they again become heavily indebted.  A related 
argument is provided by Ferrarini (2008) who posits that full debt cancellation falls short of 
 © Stella Muhanji Page 108 
 
representing a long-term solution in the event of a renewed build-up of unsustainable debt 
burdens, as the HIPC Initiative has amply demonstrated.  As pointed out by Manasse and Roubini 
(2009), existing literature suggests several factors that are at the core of attempting to predict 
sovereign default: measures of solvency, such as public and external debt relative to the capacity 
to pay; and liquidity measures such as short-term external debt and external debt service, possibly 
as a ratio of foreign reserves or exports.  These variables will be used in this study‟s empirical 
models. 
Going by Manasse and Roubini‟s thresholds, African countries are battling with both liquidity and 
solvency risks.  It is therefore paramount that workable thresholds are identified that can be used 
as benchmarks for debt borrowing and management.  This paper contributes to the literature by 
computing workable debt sustainability ratios for African countries.   
4.3.1 Empirical Model for External Debt Thresholds 
To identify appropriate threshold levels for external debt, I estimate regression models in which 
the debt ratios are regressed against different threshold levels.  I compare three regions; Latin 
America, East Asia and Africa.  Africa is represented by the countries in my sample study, Latin 
America is represented by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Jamaica, Mexico, Peru, 
Uruguay and Venezuela while East Asia is represented by South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines and Thailand.  These are middle income countries that have managed to sustain their 
external debts.   
In selecting Latin America and East Asia, several factors were put into consideration.  First, East 
Asian countries used their external borrowing to pursue export-promoting policies that are not 
laissez-faire. The Latin American countries, like African countries, did not use the foreign 
borrowing to develop a resource base in tradable goods, especially export industries that are 
adequate for future debt servicing.  Exports grew more rapidly in East Asia than Latin America 
and Africa and indeed export growth in East Asia greatly outstripped GDP growth.  Second, 
Africa and Latin America overvalued their exchange rates and encouraged capital flight.  Sachs 
(1985) argues that foreign borrowing mainly went to the private sector‟s accumulation of foreign 
assets, rather than an increase in export capacity.  East Asia on its part devalued its currency to 
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promote its export sector.  Third, both Africa and Latin America‟s terms of trade deteriorated 
faster than East Asia‟s terms of trade.  
Data for debt indicators for the three regions ranges from 1970 to 2007.  The threshold levels 
range from 0 to above 200 percent.  Each threshold level is coded 1 for the respective threshold 
and 0 otherwise.  Data source is World Bank‟s global development fund and world development 
indicators.  The threshold levels mainly serve as independent variables.  The debt-GDP ratio and 
the debt-exports ratio capture debt sustainability whilst short-term debt to international reserves 
ratio and the debt service to exports of goods and services capture liquidity. 
Generally, let ℕ denote the number of countries and let     be the observation for the debt 
indicators.  Further, let     be the dummies for different threshold levels and    be regression 
coefficients where j represents the number of thresholds.  The empirical model to be estimated is 
given by: 
                               ℕ            (61) 
The signs and significance of the    coefficients permit one to determine the direction of the effect 
of the threshold on the debt indicator.  A negative significant value implies that the debt indicator 
falls when the countries‟ debt is at that particular threshold and vice versa.  To estimate the above 
equation I use the generalised least squares fixed effects method.  This is because the Breusch and 
Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects shows that the individual effects are correlated 
with the other regressors in the model. 
4.3.2 Results and Discussion   
The table below reports the results for the regression of different debt indicators against different 
threshold levels for the three regions: Africa, Latin America and East Asia.  
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Table 7: Threshold Levels for External Debt Indicators 
 Africa Latin America East Asia 
Thresholds 
(Percent) 
Log 
(ETD/GDP)  
Log 
(EDT/XGS)  
Log 
(SETD/RES)  
Log 
(TDS/XGS) 
Log 
(ETD/GDP)  
Log 
(EDT/XGS)  
Log 
(SETD/RES)  
Log 
(TDS/XGS) 
Log 
(ETD/GDP)  
Log 
(EDT/XGS)  
Log 
(SETD/RES)  
Log 
(TDS/XGS) 
Intercept -0.006 
(-0.03) 
 
-0.467 
(-9.13)***    
0.373 
(1.16)    
-0.114 
(-1.05) 
0.203 
(5.20)*** 
-0.239 
(-5.55)*** 
0.050 
(1.07) 
-0.037 
(-1.35) 
0.308 
(2.05)** 
-0.421 
(-2.34)** 
-0.425 
(-2.22)** 
-0.541 
(-2.80)*** 
<20 -1.058 
(-5.29)*** 
 
-0.476 
(-7.49)***    
-1.616 
(-4.88)*** 
-1.004 
(-9.11)*** 
-0.991 
(-24.24)*** 
(dropped) a -1.253 
(-18.72)*** 
-0.824 
(-26.88)*** 
-0.463 
(-2.98)*** 
(dropped) a -0.682 
(-3.22)*** 
-0.821 
(-4.23)*** 
>20 - 40 -0.553 
(-2.77)*** 
 
(dropped)a -0.885 
(-2.65)*** 
-0.421 
(-3.78)*** 
-0.725 
(-18.15)*** 
-0.335 
(-4.35)*** 
-0.609 
(-10.65)*** 
-0.494 
(-17.40)*** 
-0.388 
(-2.56)** 
-0.291 
(-1.54) 
-0.431 
(-2.17)** 
-0.512 
(-2.63)*** 
>40 - 60 -0.357 
(-1.79)* 
 
0.220 
(3.58)*** 
-0.677 
(-2.05)** 
-0.212 
(-1.76)* 
-0.521 
(-13.17)*** 
(dropped) a -0.364 
(-6.61)*** 
-0.299 
(-10.40)*** 
-0.196 
(-1.30) 
-0.255 
(-1.37) 
-0.442 
(-2.31)** 
-0.405 
(-1.93)* 
>60 - 80 -0.202 
(-1.01) 
 
0.371 
(6.08)***    
-0.603 
(-1.82)* 
 -0.376 
(-9.55)*** 
0.112 
(2.21)** 
-0.193 
(-3.41)*** 
-0.134 
(-4.17)*** 
-0.100 
(-0.66) 
-0.319 
(-1.73)* 
-0.378 
(-1.89)* 
-0.120 
(-0.45) 
>80 - 100 -0.084 
(-0.42) 
 
0.403 
(6.67)*** 
-0.413 
(-1.32) 
 -0.269 
(-6.48)*** 
0.236 
(4.47)*** 
-0.083 
(-1.47) 
 -0.039 
(-0.25) 
-0.116 
(-0.63) 
-0.294 
(-1.43) 
 
>100 - 120 0.027 
(0.14)  
   
0.535 
(7.67)*** 
-0.362 
(-1.08) 
 -0.170 
(-4.04)*** 
0.289 
(5.53)*** 
(dropped) a  (dropped) a 0.045 
(0.25) 
-0.275 
(-1.34) 
 
>120 - 150 0.100 
(0.52) 
 
0.611 
(10.05)*** 
-0.260 
(-0.77) 
 -.092 
(-2.03)** 
0.398 
(8.84)*** 
0.075 
(1.33) 
 0.299 
(1.40) 
0.184 
(1.00) 
-0.280 
(-1.39) 
 
>150 - 200 0.174 
(0.87) 
    
0.719 
(12.71)*** 
-0.168 
(-0.51) 
 (dropped) a 0.510 
(11.45)*** 
0.239 
(3.73)*** 
 0.207 
(1.13) 
0.200 
(1.09) 
-0.317 
(-1.57) 
 
>200 0.315 
(1.55) 
 
1.022 
(19.49)*** 
0.540 
(1.69)* 
 (dropped) a 0.713 
(16.30)*** 
0.425 
(7.56)*** 
 0.925 
(5.62)*** 
0.437 
(2.39)** 
0.059 
(0.31) 
 
Observations 415 
 
416 374 393 378 377 374 378 190 189 186 183 
Overall R-Square 0.8434 
 
0.8947 0.754 0.5902 0.9226 0.7902 0.7750 0.8364 0.6246 0.4924 0.4535 0.3916 
F (H0: all 
coefficients = 0) 
13.52*** 14.60*** 2.87*** 7.28*** 4.08*** 16.02*** 3.93*** 5.31*** 53.28*** 14.01*** 1.40 2.94*** 
The table contains fixed effects estimates of different threshold levels. The column headings are logarithms of external debt to GDP ratio (ETD/GDP), external debt 
to exports ratio (ETD/XGS), short term external debt to international reserves (SETD/RES) and total debt service to exports of goods and services (TDS/XGS). The 
asterisk ***, ** and * indicate significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. The t-stats are in parentheses.  
a
These thresholds did not have data and were 
therefore dropped from the regression. 
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The debt-GDP ratio falls if either a country‟s GDP rises faster than debt or if external debt falls 
while GDP remains unchanged.  External debt level of less that 60 percent of GDP is sustainable 
for Africa whilst in Latin America, a debt-to-GDP ratio of less than 150 percent is sustainable.  
For East Asia, the significant debt sustainability threshold is the debt-GDP ratio of below 40%.  
African countries‟ debt sustainability result is within Manasse and Roubini‟s ratio of 49.7 percent.  
What these results imply is that when African countries contract debt; they should ensure that the 
debt does not exceed 60 percent of GDP.  The debt sustainability level for Latin America would be 
insolvent for both African and East Asian countries.  On debt-exports ratio, the sustainable level 
for Africa is a debt ratio of less that 20 percent of export earnings whereas in Latin America, a 
debt ratio that is less than 40 percent of export earnings is sustainable.  Given that exports are used 
to repay the debt, African countries should not exceed a debt-exports ratio of above 20 percent. 
For East Asia, the debt-exports threshold is 60-80 percent.  These thresholds are far much below 
HIPC initiative‟s debt-exports ratio of 150 percent and Patillo et al‟s (2001) threshold of 160-170 
percent.   
On liquidity, short-term debt to reserve ratio should not exceed 80 percent for all the three regions.  
This ratio is low as compared to the ratio suggested by Manasse and Roubini of about 130 percent. 
For Africa and Asia, a liquidity threshold of 130 percent has an insignificant negative effect on 
debt accumulation whilst in Latin America; the same threshold has an insignificant positive effect 
on debt accumulation. 
The dynamics of the optimal debt threshold level for Africa can be presented in the diagram below 
where, x* represents the optimal threshold debt level.  
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Figure 4.1: Threshold Level for Debt-GDP Ratio for Africa 
 
  
 
 
                   
                        
 
 
Beyond the threshold level of 100 percent
24
, external debt rises faster than the gross domestic 
product and therefore external debt becomes unsustainable.  Any additional borrowing beyond the 
threshold level may render the borrower insolvent.  What this means is that countries whose debt 
exceeds this level should readjust their borrowing plans and reduce their debt to levels below 100 
percent of GDP.  The curve                represents the boundary within which a country can 
borrow.  The variables          an       represent foreign debt, export earnings and foreign 
reserves, respectively.  The area below the boundary curve          captures the wealth of the 
country.  This curve illustrates that debt is a function of the resources     an       that are used to 
repay the debt such as foreign reserves and export earnings.  The area below the curve represents 
the feasible area; that is, an area where export earnings and international reserves are rising faster 
than debt.  External debt should therefore not exceed a country‟s resources that are allocated for its 
repayment.  In fact, Semmler and Sieveking (2000) demonstrate that there is for every initial 
resource stock a critical level of debt, below which debt may be steered to zero but above which 
debt tends to infinity, no matter how the rate of consumption and extraction is chosen
25
.  From the 
Figure above, beyond x* the country should reduce foreign borrowing, otherwise external debt 
becomes explosive.  When the country reduces foreign borrowing, external debt returns to the 
optimal point.  The debt function     implies that a country‟s debt should not exceed its wealth. 
                                                 
24
 For debt-exports ratio, the critical threshold is a debt ratio of 40% of exports for Africa.  
25
 In their model they assume the country exploits a renewable resource to service its debt. 
100 % 
Critical curve 
ETD/GDP 
Threshold Levels 60%  
x* 
External 
Debt 
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To determine the impact of the above mentioned thresholds on the countries‟ wealth, I re-estimate 
equation 30 (in chapter three) which shows equilibrium in the goods market.  In this estimation, I 
use a panel data of the sampled 11 African countries.  In this equation I include the debt-GDP 
ratio, terms of trade, relative interest rate, exchange rate and exports-to-imports ratio as the 
explanatory variables in addition to exports, consumption imports and investment imports.  The 
debt-GDP ratio enters into the equation instead of government spending.  The assumption here is 
that countries finance their budget deficits through foreign borrowing and seniorage.  Additionally, 
from estimations in chapter three, government spending is statistically insignificant in determining 
GDP in most of the sampled countries.  The ratio of the price index of exports over price index of 
imports captures the terms of trade.  Terms of trade measures the effect of volatility in commodity 
prices.  Relative interest rate is captured by the ratio of the world interest rate over the domestic 
interest rate.  The USA lending rate is used to capture the world interest rate.  The ratio measures 
the direction of portfolio capital flow from or to the domestic economy and is expected to have a 
negative sign.  The intuition here is that an increase in the relative interest rate implies that capital 
flows out of the domestic economy, hence GDP falls.  In fact, empirical literature in chapter two 
provides evidence that capital outflow depresses GDP.  The model takes the same format as 
equation 61.  The dependent variable in this model is the log of GDP. 
Data for estimation is divided into the two threshold levels: the period before the threshold and the 
period after the threshold.  The results for this estimation are presented in the table below.  The 
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects show that the individual effects 
are correlated with the other regressors in the model.  The random effects model is not therefore 
favoured because it produces biased estimators that violate one of the Gauss-Markov assumptions.  
In fact, random effect method is invalid given that some regressors are correlated with the 
unobserved heterogeneity term.  For this reason, I report the results for the fixed effects model.  
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Table 8: Effect of Threshold-Based External Debt on GDP for African Countries (Dependent 
Variable: GDP) 
 
 
ETD/GDP<60% ETD/GDP>60% 
Variables 1 2 1 2 
Intercept 11.044 
(38.46)*** 
 
10.130 
(34.40)*** 
9.764 
(44.96)*** 
9.257 
(76.56)*** 
Consumption -0.149 
(-0.73) 
 
-0.151 
(-0.84) 
-0.082 
(-0.57) 
-0.137 
(-1.66) 
Exports 0.261 
(0.85) 
 
 -0.202 
(-0.79) 
 
Consumption Imports -0.546 
(-3.47)*** 
 
 0.746 
(2.97)*** 
 
Imported Investments -0.294 
(-2.98)*** 
 
-0.354 
(-3.98)*** 
0.115 
(2.17)** 
-0.030 
(-0.99) 
Terms of Trade -0.792 
(-7.27)*** 
 
-0.956 
(-9.62)*** 
0.007 
(0.16) 
0.017 
(0.66) 
Relative Interest Rate -0.413 
(-3.70)*** 
 
-0.371 
(-3.64)*** 
-0.123 
(-1.85)* 
0.138 
(3.44)*** 
Exports to imports ratio  0.931 
(6.43)*** 
 
 0.264 
(4.73)*** 
Exchange Rate -0.267 
(-7.59)*** 
 
-0.276 
(-7.70)*** 
0.124 
(4.31)*** 
 
0.165 
(9.42)*** 
Lagged Inflation -0.230 
(-2.02)** 
 
-0.262 
(-2.49)** 
0.115 
(1.42) 
-0.037 
(-0.76) 
Debt to GDP Ratio 0.127 
(1.57) 
 
0.024 
(0.33) 
-0.300 
(-1.90)* 
-0.060 
(-0.72) 
Observations 
 
187 183 183 175 
F(H0: u_i = 0 
 
9.86*** 9.05*** 21.05*** 26.99*** 
The asterisk ***, ** and * indicate significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. The t-stats are in parentheses.  
 
Column (1) presents results when exports and consumption imports are included in the model 
whilst column (2) presents results when the ratio of exports to imports is included in the model.  
The results confirm that high levels of external debt negatively affect GDP while low levels of 
external debt increase GDP.  When the debt-GDP ratio is low, the variables have the expected 
signs.  At this level, relative interest rate negatively affects GDP.  This is because foreign interest 
rate is higher than the domestic interest rate and consequently capital flows out of the country.  
Capital outflow has a detrimental effect on GDP.  Terms of trade provide an interesting result, in 
the sense that they negatively affect GDP at low levels of debt.  This can be explained by the fact 
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that these countries mainly export primary commodities and so when the terms of trade improve, 
they suffer from the “Dutch disease” and hence GDP falls.  Another interesting result is that at low 
debt levels, a depreciation of the exchange rate has a negative effect on GDP
26
 in line with 
conventional theory.  Another important finding is that both consumption and investment imports 
negatively and significantly affect GDP at low levels of external debt.  Expectedly, 
macroeconomic instability (inflation rate) has a negative and significant effect on GDP at low 
threshold levels. 
At high levels of external debt (above the threshold level) macroeconomic dynamics are distorted 
in these countries.  The negative and significant value of the debt to GDP ratio on GDP implies 
that at high levels of debt, the countries‟ GDP is below its expected value by 0.30 percent.  This 
result provides evidence that a high external debt retards the economy.  The terms of trade 
improve but this improvement should be carefully interpreted because external debt depresses 
growth.  Literature in chapter two provides evidence that African countries experienced import 
strangulation during high debt periods.  With import strangulation and stagnant exports, the terms 
of trade improve but that does not translate into an improvement in the net GDP.  Another 
puzzling result is that both consumption and investments imports positively and significantly 
contribute towards GDP.  In addition, a depreciation of the exchange rate increases GDP at high 
levels of debt.  It appears that beggars-thy-neighbor policy works in Africa only when the 
countries are caught in high external debt trap. 
Turning to the model with exports to consumption imports ratio (column 2 of Table 4.2), at low 
debt levels, all the variables have the expected signs.  The ratio of exports to consumption imports 
has a positive and significant sign.  Exports to imports ratio increases when either exports increase 
faster than imports or when imports fall.  A 1 percent rise in the ratio of exports to consumption 
imports leads to about 0.90 percent increase in GDP.  At high levels of debt, the ratio of exports to 
consumption imports also has a positive and significant effect on GDP.  However, its impact is 
expectedly smaller in the sense that a 1 percent increase in the ratio leads to about 0.30 percent 
increase in GDP.  In fact, its effect at a high debt level is a third of the effect at a low debt level. 
                                                 
26
 The variables used in this analysis are denominated in US$ (and exchange rate expressed in local currency per unit 
of US$), unlike the analysis in chapter three where variables were denominated in local currency.   
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The literature has identified poor governance as a main impediment to debt sustainability in 
African countries.  These countries cannot sustain the above mentioned ratios if governance issues 
are not addressed.  In fact, Manasse et al (2003) argue that institutional factors affect policy 
credibility as well as a government‟s ability to pursue policies consistent with a sustainable debt 
path. Therefore, the next section analyzes the impact of institutional infrastructure (both legal and 
political) on debt sustainability.           
 4.4 External Debt Sustainability and Governance  
Crucial institutions and governance structures play important roles in debt sustainability.  Chauvin 
and Kraay (2005) show that debt relief in 62 developing countries during 1989–2003 neither 
improved the institutional quality nor raised the levels of FDI or economic growth.  Easterly 
(2002) finds that highly indebted poor countries became highly indebted mainly because of poor 
policies, not because of external shocks or wars.  He concludes that official lenders did not adhere 
to prudential rules and that the IMF and the World Bank provided far more financing to HIPCs 
throughout 1979–1997 than to other developing countries of similar income levels, although the 
policies in many HIPCs have been worse.  
I follow Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2008) in defining governance as the traditions and 
institutions by which authority in a country is exercised.  This includes the process by which 
governments are selected, monitored and replaced; the capacity of the government to effectively 
formulate and implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the state for the 
institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them.  The six dimensions of 
governance include voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, 
government effectiveness, rule of law, regulatory quality and control of corruption.  
Voice and accountability captures perceptions of the extent to which a country‟s citizens are able 
to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of 
association and a free media.  Political stability and absence of violence captures perceptions of 
the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or 
violent means.  Government effectiveness captures the perceptions of the quality of public 
services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political 
pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation and the credibility of the 
government‟s commitment to such policies.  Regulatory quality captures perceptions of the ability 
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of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and 
promote private sector development.  Rule of law captures perceptions of the extent to which 
agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of the society, and in particular the quality of 
contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime 
and violence.  Finally, control of corruption captures the perceptions of the extent to which public 
power is exercised for private gain.  
Instead of using the six governance indices in my analysis, I grouped them into two broad 
variables; political and legal.  The political variable is computed as the average of voice and 
accountability, government effectiveness and, political stability and absence of violence whilst the 
legal variable is computed as the average of the rule of law, control of corruption and regulatory 
quality.  The aim of this section is to identify the role that governance plays in debt management. 
Data on governance was downloaded from the World Bank‟s world governance indicators.  The 
scores lie between 2.5 and -2.5 with higher scores indicating better outcomes (for details on 
computation of the indices see Kaufmann et al, 2008). Data for governance indices ranges from 
1996 to 2007. 
4.4.1 Empirical Analysis 
To capture the effect of governance on debt sustainability, I estimate equation 38 (in chapter three) 
but I exclude the risk premium.  The risk premium is excluded because the estimation results for 
the risk premium (in chapter three) are statistically insignificant and therefore it is not necessary to 
include the variable in the current analysis.  In this analysis, I use the debt-to-GDP and the short-
term debt to international reserves ratio as the dependent variables instead of using the deviation of 
external debt from its steady state.  I also add as part of the explanatory variables institutional 
variables such as political and legal; and macroeconomic variables such as inflation rate, terms of 
trade and the relative interest rate which capture both a country‟s ability to pay and willingness to 
pay.   
I present an empirical equation using the format for equation 61 and in this case,     represent the 
ratio of exports earnings to GDP, ratio of consumption imports to GDP, ratio of imported 
investments to GDP, inflation rate, exchange rate, terms of trade, relative interest rate, growth rate 
in GDP and institutional variables such as political environment and legal environment.  Inflation 
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rate enters as a policy variable and is used to capture macroeconomic instability.  The dependent 
variables are represented by      .  The equation is thus:  
                                ℕ             
 I also compare three regions in this section; East Asia, Latin America and Africa.  The countries 
are the same as the ones in part 4.3.  I run four panel regressions: all the 26 countries, East Asian 
countries, Latin American countries and African countries.  Most of the variables have the 
expected signs.  Summary statistics and the correlation matrix are reported in Tables F2 and F3 
respectively, in Appendix F.  
4.4.2 Results and Discussion 
Table 4.3 below shows the results for the regressions of debt sustainability and liquidity indicators 
against policy and institutional variables.  There is a strong correlation between the legal and 
political variables and so I enter the two variables in different models.  Column (1) reports results 
for the model when the legal variable is entered, Column (2) reports the results when the political 
variable is entered while column (3) reports the results when all variables are entered into the 
model.  To determine the appropriate method to use for this analysis, I carry out the Hausman 
specification test.  Where the null hypothesis is accepted, I report results for the random effects 
variable because the random effects method is favoured to the fixed effects method and vice versa.  
On the other hand, where the null hypothesis is rejected, I report the results for the fixed effects 
model.  In some cases, I carry out the Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random 
effects to determine whether the individual effects are correlated with the other regressors in the 
model. 
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Table 4.9: Random and Fixed Effects Estimation for Debt Sustainability and Liquidity Indicators, with a Focus on Governance 
 Africa Latin America 
Dependent 
Variable 
ETD/GDP ratio SETD/RES ratio ETD/GDP ratio SETD/RES ratio 
 1a 2a 3b 1b 2b 3b 1b 2b 3b 1b 2b 3b 
Intercept -0.589 
(-2.18)** 
 
-0.644 
(-2.63)*** 
-0.679 
(-2.89) *** 
-0.570 
(-1.16) 
-0.773 
(-1.65) 
-0.454 
(-0.93) 
-0.421 
(-2.73)*** 
-0.478 
(-3.17)*** 
-0.466 
(-2.91) *** 
-0.299 
(-1.04) 
-0.378 
(-1.37) 
-0.472 
(-1.62) 
Lag inflation 0.171 
(1.04) 
 
0.119 
(0.74) 
0.252 
(1.78) * 
0.483 
(1.53) 
0.379 
(1.20) 
0.442 
(1.41) 
0.285 
(3.62)*** 
0.285 
(3.65)*** 
0.286 
(3.64) *** 
0.246 
(1.68)* 
0.262 
(1.83)* 
0.252 
(1.76) * 
Exports -0.708 
(-2.15)** 
 
-0.839 
(-2.57)*** 
-1.183 
(-4.44) *** 
-1.667 
(-2.62)*** 
-1.864 
(-2.89)*** 
-1.845 
(-2.90) *** 
0.321 
(0.98) 
0.363 
(1.20) 
0.336 
(1.03) 
-0.364 
(-0.60) 
-0.525 
(-0.95) 
-0.308 
(-0.52) 
Consumption 
Imports 
1.087 
(3.68)*** 
 
1.153 
(3.96)*** 
2.044 
(7.22) *** 
0.810 
(1.45) 
0.874 
(1.55) 
0.878 
(1.58) 
 
1.568 
(2.60)*** 
1.730 
(2.82)*** 
1.717 
(2.77) *** 
1.381 
(1.23) 
1.854 
(1.65) 
1.956 
(1.73) * 
Lag GDP 
growth 
-0.191 
(-1.87)* 
 
-0.191 
(-1.92)* 
-0.284 
(-2.09) ** 
-0.257 
(-1.35) 
-0.291 
(-1.55) 
-0.206 
(-1.08) 
0.007 
(0.10) 
0.002 
(0.02) 
0.004 
(0.05) 
-0.106 
(-0.77) 
-0.098 
(-0.74) 
-0.119 
(-0.88) 
Log 
Investment 
-0.079 
(-0.17) 
 
-0.139 
(-0.30) 
0.619 
(-1.11) 
1.773 
(2.00)** 
1.835 
(2.07)** 
1.410 
(1.56) 
0.003 
(0.27) 
0.001 
(0.11) 
0.001 
(0.12) 
-0.047 
(-2.60)*** 
-0.052 
(-2.91)*** 
-0.053 
(-2.95) *** 
 
Relative 
Interest Rate 
0.179 
(2.20)** 
 
0.161 
(2.02)** 
0.136 
(1.71) * 
0.465 
(2.97)*** 
0.437 
(2.78)*** 
0.447 
(2.88) *** 
-0.165 
(-3.14)*** 
-0.162 
(-3.15)*** 
-0.164 
(-3.12) *** 
0.066 
(0.68) 
0.053 
(0.56) 
0.070 
(0.73) 
Terms of 
Trade 
0.035 
(0.59) 
 
0.027 
(0.48) 
-0.056 
(-1.15) 
0.119 
(1.02) 
0.110 
(0.94) 
0.110 
(0.95) 
-0.057 
(-1.49) 
-0.057 
(-1.51) 
-0.056 
(-1.45) 
-0.021 
(-0.30) 
-0.004 
(-0.06) 
-0.015 
(-0.21) 
Exchange 
Rate 
0.026 
(0.66) 
 
0.161 
(2.02)** 
0.046 
(2.47) ** 
0.095 
(1.17) 
0.091 
(1.12) 
0.092 
(1.15) 
0.013 
(1.76)* 
0.014 
(1.82)* 
0.014 
(1.82) * 
0.018 
(1.29) 
0.020 
(1.46) 
0.020 
(1.44) 
Legal -0.047 
(-0.45) 
 
 0.125 
(0.91) 
0.179 
(0.89) 
 0.590 
(1.93) * 
-0.084 
(-1.08) 
 -0.022 
(-0.22) 
-0.064 
(-0.44) 
 0.178 
(0.99) 
Political   -0.152 
(-1.93)* 
-0.294 
(-3.01) *** 
 -0.075 
(-0.46) 
-0.433 
(-1.77) * 
 -0.122 
(-1.49) 
-0.108 
(-1.04) 
 -0.304 
(-2.02)** 
-0.419 
(-2.21) ** 
Observations 115 115 115 115 115 115 111 111 111 111 111 111 
Overall R-
Square 
0.2808 
 
0.3862 0.4863 0.0185 0.0042 0.0298 0.1066 0.0863 0.0883 0.0090 0.0002 0.0048 
Specification 
Test 
0.20c 0.32 c 65.92 d 12.98 d 17.69 d 5.63 d 85.79 c  185.83 c  118.91 c 39.81 d 202 c 147.93 c 
a 
Is the random effects results. 
b 
Is the fixed effects results. 
c 
Is the Hausman test statistic. 
d 
Is the Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier statistic. 
The column headings are logarithms of external debt to GDP ratio (ETD/GDP) and short-term external debt to international reserves (SETD/RES).  
The asterisk ***, ** and * indicate significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. The t-stats are in parentheses.  
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Continuation of Table 4.3 
 East Asia All 26 Countries 
Dependent 
Variable 
ETD/GDP ratio SETD/RES ratio ETD/GDP ratio SETD/RES ratio 
 1b 2b 3 b 1b 2 b 3b 1b 2b 3b 1 b 2b 3b 
Intercept -0.523 
(-0.82) 
 
-0.177 
(-0.30) 
-0.539 
(-0.82) 
-0.500 
(-0.55) 
0.071 
(0.09) 
-0.549 
(-0.61) 
-0.651 
(-4.19)*** 
-0.653 
(-4.25)*** 
-0.695 
(-4.41) *** 
0.078 
(0.26) 
0.039 
(0.13) 
-0.075 
(-0.24) 
Lag inflation 0.162 
(0.62) 
 
0.078 
(0.30) 
0.165 
(0.62) 
0.354 
(1.01) 
0.279 
(0.81) 
0.430 
(1.24) 
 
-0.047 
(-1.17) 
-0.055 
(-1.35) 
-0.056 
(-1.38) 
0.061 
(0.87) 
0.042 
(0.59) 
0.043 
(0.61) 
Exports 0.112 
(0.19) 
 
0.323 
(0.54) 
0.094 
(0.15) 
-1.470 
(-1.81)* 
-1.357 
(-1.72)* 
-1.763 
(-2.17) ** 
-0.715 
(-2.95)*** 
-0.754 
(-3.09)*** 
-0.755 
(-3.10) *** 
-0.920 
(-2.23)** 
-1.020 
(-2.47)*** 
-1.037 
(-2.51) ***  
Consumption 
Imports 
-1.170 
(-1.97)* 
 
-1.314 
(-2.21)** 
-1.170 
(-1.95) * 
0.707 
(0.89) 
0.389 
(0.50) 
0.656 
(0.84) 
0.858 
(3.71)*** 
0.862 
(3.74)*** 
0.858 
(3.72) *** 
0.384 
(0.95) 
0.396 
(0.98) 
0.419 
(1.04) 
Lag GDP 
growth 
-0.216 
(-1.51) 
 
-0.147 
(-1.07) 
-0.222 
(-1.49) 
0.031 
(0.15) 
0.279 
(0.81) 
-0.004 
(-0.02) 
-0.040 
(-0.69) 
-0.038 
(-0.66) 
-0.041 
(-0.72) 
-0.026 
(-0.25) 
-0.023 
(-0.23) 
-0.037 
(-0.36) 
Log 
Investment 
0.886 
(1.71)* 
 
1.076 
(2.08)** 
0.864 
(1.60) 
-0.697 
(-1.01) 
-0.659 
(-0.96) 
-1.035 
(-1.47) 
0.010 
(0.88) 
0.009 
(0.85) 
0.010 
(0.88) 
-0.029 
(-1.55) 
-0.30 
(-1.60) 
-0.029 
(-1.60) 
Relative 
Interest Rate 
-0.090 
(-1.06) 
 
-0.094 
(-1.08) 
-0.089 
(-1.03) 
-0.117 
(-0.98) 
-0.089 
(-0.73) 
-0.083 
(-0.70) 
0.060 
(1.42) 
0.060 
(1.41) 
0.064 
(1.50) 
0.062 
(0.87) 
0.062 
(0.87) 
0.070 
(0.97) 
Terms of 
Trade 
0.598 
(3.43)*** 
 
0.543 
(3.15)*** 
0.598 
(3.39) *** 
0.664 
(2.86)*** 
0.559 
(2.49)** 
0.654 
(2.88) *** 
0.200 
(3.72)*** 
0.196 
(3.69)*** 
0.207 
(3.84) *** 
0.079 
(0.88) 
0.077 
(0.87) 
0.096 
(1.07) 
Exchange 
Rate 
0.054 
(0.58) 
 
-0.026 
(-0.34) 
0.060 
(0.59) 
0.027 
(0.21) 
-0.049 
(-0.51) 
0.097 
(0.75) 
0.029 
(0.57) 
0.026 
(0.53) 
0.047 
(0.91) 
-0.187 
(-1.70)* 
-0.176 
(-1.67)* 
-0.122 
(-1.07) 
Legal 0.217 
(1.50) 
 
 0.237 
(1.26) 
0.162 
(0.82) 
 0.400 
(1.66) 
0.016 
(0.25) 
 0.104 
(1.18) 
-0.029 
(-0.27) 
 0.190 
(1.27) 
Political   0.080 
(0.79) 
-0.022 
(-0.17) 
 -0.116 
(-0.82) 
-0.286 
(-1.66) 
 -0.054 
(-0.92) 
-0.119 
(-1.48) 
 -0.172 
(-1.75)** 
-0.289 
(-2.15) ** 
Observations 55 55 55 53 53 53 284 284 284 280 280 280 
Overall R-
Square 
0.1984 0.1473 0.2118 0.3969 0.7121 0.4463 0.0955 0.1462 0.1415 0.0892 0.1221 0.1147 
Specification 
Test 
0.53 d 226.61 c 1.11 d 51.52 c 0.28 c 8.59 c 332.94 d 353.61 d 276.32 c 378.67 d 390.12 d 388.04 d 
a 
Is the random effects results. 
b 
Is the fixed effects results. 
c 
Is the Hausman test statistic. 
d 
Is the Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier statistic. 
The column headings are logarithms of external debt to GDP ratio (ETD/GDP) and short-term external debt to international reserves (SETD/RES).  
The asterisk ***, ** and * indicate significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. The t-stats are in parentheses.  
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Given that most of the signs and significance of variables do not change after separating the legal 
and political variable, I report the results in column (3).  The results for Africa have the predicted 
signs for most of the variables.  A rise in export earnings, growth rate in GDP and a stable political 
environment improve both the debt sustainability and liquidity of these countries.  Specifically, 
using debt sustainability indicator, a 1 percent increase in export earnings reduces debt-GDP ratio 
by about 1.18 percent.  Likewise, a 1 percent increase in the growth rate of GDP leads to a fall in 
debt-GDP ratio by about 0.28 percent.  An improvement in the political environment reduces debt-
GDP ratio by 0.29 percent.  Using the liquidity indicator, a 1 percent increase in exports leads to 
about 1.85 percent decrease in short-term debt to international reserves ratio whilst a more stable 
political environment reduces short-term debt to reserve ratio by 0.43 percent.  On the other hand, 
consumption imports, the relative interest rate, the exchange rate, terms of trade and the inflation 
rate worsen both the debt sustainability and the liquidity level.  In particular, a 1 percent increase 
in consumption imports increases debt as a percentage of GDP by about 2 percent.  Investment 
imports significantly worsen the liquidity level and insignificantly affect debt sustainability.  
Liquidity falls because imported investments are financed using foreign reserves.  The positive 
relationship between external debt and the relative interest rate implies that when foreign interest 
rate increases, it increases the cost of borrowing.  Consequently, foreign debt increases.  
Alternatively, the increase in foreign interest rate encourages capital flight and this leads to flight 
driven external debt.  Macroeconomic instability (inflation rate) significantly increases debt un-
sustainability whilst terms of trade insignificantly affects both debt sustainability and liquidity 
ratios in Africa.  
In Latin America, inflation and consumption imports significantly contribute towards debt un-
sustainability and illiquidity.   Specifically, an increase in inflation worsens both liquidity and debt 
sustainability by about 0.3.  Similarly, a 1 percent increase in consumption imports worsens both 
liquidity and debt sustainability by about 2 percent.  In view of the fact that these countries do not 
mainly import capital for investments, an increase in the gross fixed capital formation improves 
the liquidity ratio.  Unlike in Africa where the relative interest rate increases debt to GDP ratio, in 
Latin America, it reduces the debt to GDP ratio.  A stable political environment also improves debt 
sustainability in these countries.  In East Asia, terms of trade play a significant role in increasing 
debt un-sustainability and illiquidity.  Exports only significantly improve liquidity by about 1.76. 
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4.4.3 Further Assessment of Governance on Debt Management 
In analyzing the relative impact of exports and imports vis-à-vis the institutional and policy 
variables on debt sustainability and liquidity, I follow Asiedu (2006).  I selected imports and 
exports because they play a significant role in determining both debt sustainability and liquidity 
levels of African countries.  Note that exports improve debt sustainability and liquidity whilst 
imports worsen both liquidity and debt sustainability.  I use Latin America and Asia (countries that 
have managed to sustain their external debt burdens) as the benchmark regions.  Columns (1) and 
(2) of Table 4.4 report the average values of the institutional and policy variables for Africa and 
Latin America.  Column (3) reports the estimated coefficients for all countries combined (see 
Table 4.3).  Columns (4) and (5) show the equivalent effect of a change in policy and institutional 
environment on exports and imports, respectively.   
Table 10: Estimated Equivalent Effect of a Change in Institutional and Policy Variables vis-à-vis 
Exports and Consumption Imports for Africa and Latin America 
 
Africa 
Latin 
America 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
a
 
Equivalent Effect on 
 Exports 
b
 % Consumption 
Imports 
c
 % 
ETD/GDP      
Political  -0.547 -0.086 0.119 7.27 -6.39 
Legal -0.551 -0.111 0.104 6.06 -5.33 
GDP growth 0.082 0.092 0.041 0.05 -0.05 
Relative Interest Rate 0.544 0.385 0.064 -1.35 1.19 
Exchange Rate 0.830 -0.675 0.047 -9.37 8.24 
SETD/RES      
Political  -0.547 -0.086 0.289 12.85 -31.80 
Legal -0.551 -0.111 0.190 8.06 -19.95 
GDP growth 0.082 0.092 0.037 0.04 -0.09 
Relative Interest Rate 0.544 0.385 0.070 -1.07 1.30 
Exchange Rate 0.830 -0.675 0.122 -17.71 43.82 
a 
These are the absolute values of the estimated coefficients for political and legal variables from columns (5) and (6) 
of Table 4.3. 
b 
The equivalent effect of a change in the political environment from the level of Africa to that of Latin America is 
given by (-0.547+0.086)*0.119/-0.755, where -0.755 is the estimated coefficient for exports for all the 26 countries. 
c 
The equivalent effect of a change in the legal environment from the level of Africa to that of Latin America is given 
by (-0.551+0.111)*0.104/0.858, where 0.858 is the estimated coefficient for consumption imports for all the 26 
countries. 
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On debt sustainability, the results show that an improvement in the political environment of Africa 
to that of Latin America has the same effect as increasing exports by about 7.3 percent and 
reducing consumption imports by about 6.4 percent.  Likewise, an improvement in the legal 
system from that of Africa to that of Latin America is similar to increasing exports by about 6 
percent and reducing consumption imports by about 5.3 percent.  An increase in growth rate of 
GDP from that of Africa to that of Latin America has the same effect as increasing exports by and 
reducing consumption imports by about 0.05 percent.  The increase in exports and fall in 
consumption imports translates into a fall in debt as a percentage GDP and hence, GDP improves.  
An interesting scenario from Table 4.4 is that of the exchange rate.  Latin American countries 
overvalued their exchange rates and therefore an appreciation of the exchange rate from the level 
of Africa to that of Latin America is comparable to reducing exports by about 9.4 percent and 
increasing imports by about 8.2 percent.  An overvaluation of the exchange rate causes an external 
imbalance that leads to debt accumulation especially if debt is denominated in foreign currency.  It 
discourages promotion of the export sector that services external debt. 
On liquidity, the results show that an improvement of the political environment from that of Africa 
to that of Latin America is comparable to an increase in exports of about 12.9 percent and a 
decrease in imports of about 32 percent.  Similarly, an improvement in the reliability of the legal 
system from the one of Africa to that of Latin America has the same effect as an increase in 
exports by about 8 percent and a decrease in imports by about 20 percent.  An improvement of the 
growth rate in GDP from that of Africa to that of Latin America is similar to an increase in exports 
of about 0.04 percent and a decrease in consumption imports of about 0.09 percent.  An 
appreciation of the exchange rate is similar to reducing exports by about 18 percent and increasing 
consumption imports by about 44 percent.  In terms of liquidity, an overvalued exchange rate has a 
far more detrimental effect on the export sector. 
Table 4.5 shows the equivalent effect of a change in policy and institutional variables on exports 
and imports for Africa relative to East Asia.  As in Table 4.4, columns (1) and (2) report the 
average values of the institutional and policy variables for Africa and Asia.  Column (3) reports 
the estimated coefficients for all countries combined (see Table 4.3).  Columns (4) and (5) show 
the equivalent effect of a change in policy and institutional environment on exports and imports, 
respectively.    
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Table 11: Estimated Equivalent Effect of a Change in Policy and Institutional Variables vis-à-vis 
Exports and Consumption Imports for Africa and East Asia 
 
Africa East Asia 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
a
 
Equivalent Effect on 
 Exports 
b
 %
 Consumption 
Imports
 c
 % 
ETD/GDP      
Political  -0.547 -0.021 0.119 8.29 -7.30 
Legal -0.551 0.030 0.104 8.00 -7.04 
GDP growth 0.082 0.117 0.041 0.19 -0.17 
Relative Interest Rate 0.544 0.718 0.064 1.47 -1.30 
Exchange Rate 0.830 4.255 0.047 21.32 -18.76 
SETD/RES      
Political  -0.547 -0.021 0.289 14.66 -36.28 
Legal -0.551 0.030 0.190 10.65 -26.35 
GDP growth 0.082 0.117 0.037 0.12 -0.31 
Relative Interest Rate 0.544 0.718 0.070 1.17 -2.91 
Exchange Rate 0.830 4.255 0.122 40.29 -99.73 
a 
These are the absolute values of the estimated coefficients for institutional and policy variables from regressions of 
all countries combined that are reported in Table 4.3. 
b 
The equivalent effect of a change in political environment from the level of Africa to that of Latin America is given 
by (-0.547+0.021)*0.119/-0.755, where -0.755 is the estimated coefficient for exports for all the 26 countries. 
c 
The equivalent effect of a change in political environment from the level of Africa to that of Latin America is given 
by (-0.551-0.030)*0.104/0.858, where 0.858 is the estimated coefficient for consumption imports for all the 26 
countries. 
 
The results above show that a change in the political environment in Africa to that of East Asia is 
similar to increasing exports by about 8.29 percent and reducing imports by about 7.3 percent. 
Similarly, an improvement in the legal system from that of Africa to that of East Asia is similar to 
increasing exports by about 8 percent and reducing consumption imports by about 7 percent.  One 
of the major reasons as to why Asian countries managed their debt is their export promotion and 
exchange rate management policies.  If African countries depreciate their exchange rate to the 
level of Asia, exports increase by about 21.32 percent and consumption imports reduce by about 
19 percent.   
Using the liquidity model, a stable political environment (similar to that of Asia) is the same as an 
increase in exports by about 15 percent and a fall in imports by about 36.3 percent.  An 
improvement in the reliability of the legal system from the level of Africa to that of East Asia is 
equivalent to increasing exports by about 11 percent and reducing imports by about 26.4 percent.  
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Additionally, a depreciation of the exchange rate from that of Africa to that of East Asia is the 
same as increasing exports by 40.3 percent and reducing consumption imports by about 100 
percent.  Africa‟s depreciation of the currency to East Asia‟s level has a more positive effect in 
terms of promoting exports.   
4.5 Effective Debt Management Strategies 
From the analysis above, African countries should not exceed a debt-GDP ratio of more than 60% 
and short-term debt to international reserves ratio of above 80%.  External debt to GDP ratio is 
explosive beyond the debt-GDP ratio of 100%.  The results imply that beyond this level, African 
countries must reduce foreign borrowing since it exceeds the country‟s wealth. 
Exports and a stable political environment promote both debt sustainability and liquidity for 
African countries.  On the other hand consumption and investment imports worsen liquidity and 
debt sustainability.  Since countries must import capital for investment purposes, they should 
reduce import of consumption goods and boost imports of investment goods.  Investment goods 
are necessary if they export finished goods instead of primary goods. 
For African countries to appropriately manage their debts, they should adopt some of the reasoned 
policies pursued by East Asian countries especially the export promotion policies.  But these 
policies can only be effective if countries adopt better governance and exchange rate management 
strategies.  What clearly comes out of the analysis in Tables 4.4 and 4.5 is that a stable political 
and legal environment plays a key role in determining the level of exports and consumption 
imports in Africa.  Indeed, a stable political environment and an effective legal system play a key 
role in boosting exports which in turn reduces external debt. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
Theoretical literature and empirical evidence suggest that certain level or nature of external debt 
burden tends to be associated with low investment and low economic growth.  Most empirical 
literature on external debt has concentrated on the debt overhang hypothesis, crowding out effect, 
debt sustainability and default, and debt repudiation.  This study contributes to the literature in two 
broad aspects: first, I developed a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of external debt 
burden and second, I identified strategies for better debt sourcing and management.  Before 
developing the model, I reviewed debt crises effects on African countries.  The next section looks 
at some of the identified sources and effects of external debt on African countries.  Section 5.3 
recaps key features of the structural model and how empirical data from African countries fitted 
the model.  Section 5.4 highlights the main thrusts of reasoned guides laid out for sourcing and 
managing external debt in a sustainable manner.  Finally, section 5.5 flags the policy derivations 
from the entire work and areas needing further research attention.  
5.2 Sources and Effects of External Debt Burden in Africa 
In this chapter, I reviewed the sources of external debt and its effects on African countries. African 
countries started amassing external debt after the oil price shocks of the 1970s when members of 
OPEC increased the oil price.  The increase in oil price resulted in a slow-down in growth and 
dampened exports from Africa, thus worsening the terms of trade.  The OPEC members deposited 
their oil earnings in Western banks which in turn loaned the money to African countries along with 
developing countries from other regions of the World.  These loans are the major source of 
Africa‟s debt problems because they were simply consumed and did not generate the returns 
needed to service them.  The loans were also invested in projects that turned out to be helplessly 
unproductive as evidenced by the more than 3000 “white elephants” in Africa.  Another source of 
Africa‟s debt problems is the structural weaknesses of its economies. Most of these countries 
mainly export primary commodities whose returns are too low to repay their external debt.  In the 
post-1989 period, Africa‟s debt burden increased as a result of decline in the terms of trade, 
uncontrolled fluctuations in export earnings, higher international interest rates, realignment of 
exchange rates and lender-favored rescheduling and refinancing of external debt.  
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The build-up of external debt had pervasive effects on African countries.  Its servicing led to debt 
overhang problems, crowding out effect, and exposed countries to risks of default and erosion of 
credit worthiness.  Excessive stock of external debt retarded economic growth and hampered the 
socio-economic development of African countries.  Crowding out of investment and expenditure 
on health care and education has had an adverse effect on physical and social infrastructure of 
these countries.  With reduced growth and increased debt service commitments, countries landed 
into debt management problems because they did not have the capacity to generate income that 
could sustain the debt.  
Policies have been put in place to address Africa‟s debt problems.  Rescheduling and refinancing 
formed part of policies that have been pursued by Bretton Woods institutions to address Africa‟s 
debt problems.  But rescheduling merely postponed debt service payments while at the same time 
they increased debt burden by imposing draconian “market-related” interest rates.  Structural 
adjustment programmes (SAPs) have been pursued as debt management solutions.  They were 
meant to forestall state intervention and patronage which were considered to be the central causes 
of economic downtown.  However, SAPs failed because countries were either not committed to 
reforms or the reforms were structurally ill-advised.  Then highly indebted poor countries (HIPC) 
initiative came into force in 1996 when SAPs failed to address Africa‟s debt problem.  The HIPC 
initiative faces some major challenges that hinder it from effectively addressing Africa‟s debt 
burden.  First, its voluntary nature has contributed to low participation by non-Paris club official 
bilateral creditors.  Second, a number of commercial creditors and distressed debt funds are 
engaging in litigation cases against some HIPCs.  Third, some HIPCs are unable to accomplish the 
reforms required by the initiative for them to qualify for full debt cancellation.  Without a doubt, 
efforts pursued to find solutions to Africa‟s indebtedness can be adjudged as inadequate and for 
this reason, this study sought to identify workable solutions for Africa‟s debt burden.  The process 
of identifying these solutions began with the development of an external debt model for small 
open economies, such as Africa‟s. 
5.3 Macroeconomic Model of External Debt Burden 
The dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model I developed has similar characteristics 
with the basic real business cycle models.  In developing the model, I assume that the economy 
relies on import for capital formation and has imperfect access to international financial markets.  I 
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also assume that the economy is populated by identical consumers who maximize a utility function 
with three augments: domestic goods, imported goods and money balances.  Households are also 
assumed to hold their financial wealth in the form of cash balances, domestic bond, foreign debt 
and capital stock.  Firms on their part produce domestic goods, export some of the goods to the 
foreign market and import intermediate inputs since they do not have the capacity to produce 
investment goods.  In this model, I add the evolution of external debt.  External debt balances into 
an arbitrage condition between exports and imports.  In addition, monetary authorities in this 
model economy control the monetary base following the McCallum (1994) rule but money supply 
is driven by inflation and output gap following the Taylor rule.   
The model is estimated for 11 African countries: Côte d‟Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, 
Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.  In general, most of the 
estimated parameters had the expected signs and were significantly different from zero.  The 
results show that consumption is more sensitive to changes in interest rates in South Africa than all 
the other sampled countries.  Another finding is that African countries have backward looking 
expectations because of incomplete and inefficient markets.  Importantly, the exchange rate and 
consumption imports positively and significantly contribute towards external debt accumulation 
whilst exports reduce foreign debt.  Additionally, lagged inflation gap negatively affects money 
supply whilst lagged output gap positively affects money supply.  Turning to the goods market, 
consumption constitutes the highest percentage of GDP while government spending constitutes a 
small fraction of GDP.  
A number of simulations were performed to determine whether shocks contribute towards business 
cycles in Africa.  The simulations show that all persistent shocks converge to the steady state 
equilibrium after about 40 years for most of the sampled countries.  Monetary policy shock 
increases external debt, imported investments, consumption imports and interest rates.  On the 
other hand, Inflation, output, exports, exchange rate and consumption fall after a monetary policy 
shock.  A favourable commodity price shock leads to indebtedness of most African countries; this 
may be explained by African countries having to borrow more to buy higher priced intermediate 
production inputs whose prices incorporate the higher price of primary products: i.e., the 
seemingly unfavourable terms of trade of African countries.  Imported investments increase after 
commodity price shock in most of the countries but this increase does not translate into an increase 
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in output which implies that countries invested in projects that have low returns.  The shock also 
leads to an appreciation of the exchange rate which in turn hurts exports and creates a current 
account deficit.  The World interest rate shock leads to a fall in external debt, imported 
investments, output, exports and the exchange rate.  
5.4 Strategies for Better Debt Sourcing and Management 
In this chapter, I computed threshold levels for sustainable debt accumulation for African 
countries.  I compared Africa‟s thresholds with those of East Asia and Latin America.  I selected 
the two regions on the basis of the fact that they have successfully managed their external debt 
better than has the African region.  The results reveal that each region has its own debt threshold 
level.  Africa‟s debt sustainability is a debt to GDP ratio of below 60% while Latin America is a 
debt-GDP ratio of below 150%.  This shows that Latin America‟s external debt threshold is 
unsustainable for African countries.  On liquidity, the threshold level for all the regions is a short-
term debt to reserves ratio of below 80%.  These threshold levels are below those suggested by 
IMF and World Bank.  To ascertain the impact of these thresholds on GDP for African countries, I 
ran regressions of GDP against debt for the two threshold levels.  Expectedly, the result shows that 
at low debt levels, external debt positively contributes towards GDP but at high debt levels, debt 
has a negative effect on GDP.  This reinforces simulation results of the previous chapter on the 
structural model, that a high external debt level also distorts macroeconomic dynamics of African 
countries.  
Countries cannot achieve the aforementioned thresholds without pursuing proper governance 
policies.  In order to come up with appropriate strategies for debt management, the impact of 
governance was assessed.  Results show that a stable political environment leads to both debt 
sustainability and liquidity.  Exports and growth rate in GDP also lead to debt sustainability and 
liquidity in Africa.  Conversely, high relative interest rate leads to debt un-sustainability and 
illiquidity whilst high consumption imports and exchange rate increase illiquidity.   
Given that proper governance is essential in determining solvency and liquidity, I analyzed the 
relative effect of a change in institutional variables, from the level of Africa to Latin America and 
East Asia, on exports and consumption imports.  The results show that exports increase in Africa 
when both political and legal environments improve to levels of Latin America and East Asia.  
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Latin America and East Asia have pursued different exchange rate management with Latin 
American countries overvaluing their currencies whilst East Asian countries undervalued their 
currencies.  Results also show that if African countries overvalue their currencies to levels of Latin 
American countries, exports would fall whilst consumption imports would increase.  On the other 
hand, if they devalued their currencies to levels of East Asian countries, exports would increase 
and consumption imports would fall. 
5.5 Main Contributions of the Study 
Most African countries are riddled with unsustainable debts which depress investments and 
growth. To mitigate the effects of unsustainable debts, this study develops a macroeconomic 
model of external debt for African countries.  
The literature does not provide clearly defined thresholds for sustainability of external debt. This 
study adds to the literature by computing appropriate thresholds for external debt for African 
countries.  
5.6 Policy Implications and Areas for Further Research 
A few policy implications can be derived from this study.  First, it is essential that countries pursue 
export promotion strategies so that they are at a comparable level with the successful East Asian 
countries.  They should also emulate East Asian countries and adopt better exchange rate 
management strategies.  Consumption imports that lead to indebtedness of these countries should 
be discouraged.  Instead, countries should import investment goods that can be used in the 
production sector, particularly for adding value to primary products before exportations.  This 
would contribute in reversing the unfavourable terms of trade of African countries.  Further, it will 
not only increase GDP but also boost exports which are necessary for debt repayments.  Second, 
when countries borrow off-shore, they should ensure that the borrowed funds do not exceed the 
threshold levels identified in this work.  In this way, countries will avoid getting into a debt trap.  
Third, countries should cushion themselves against external shocks, especially the shocks that 
affect these economies.  The surplus from a favourable commodity price shock should translate 
into investment in projects that earn foreign exchange as well as improve the growth rate in GDP.  
Fourth, there is need to seriously address governance issues in these countries, particularly 
stability in the political environment.  A stable political environment is essential for improved 
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export earnings and reduced consumption imports which in turn translate into a trade surplus.  In 
turn, the trade surplus would lead to a reduction in the debt burden.    
It is worth pointing out a number of areas that necessitate further research.  In this study, external 
debt is mainly driven by exports, imports and fluctuations in exchange rates. It is a well known 
fact that most of these countries borrow from multilateral institutions to finance their budget 
deficits.  There is need to incorporate budget deficit into the model and analyze the role of fiscal 
policy in debt accumulation.   Another area that has attracted little research is the war torn 
countries of Africa that amassed huge external debts from purchase of military equipment.  The 
war torn African countries spent more than 10 percent of GDP on military imports whilst 
expenditure on education and health only constituted less than 5 percent of GDP.  It will be 
interesting to extend this study in that direction by using the model I developed in chapter three.  
Finally, in this study, financial flows were not incorporated in the model.  A model that 
incorporates both capital inflows and outflows forms another area for further study.  
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APPENDIX A 
Capital Stock Calculations 
Initial capital stocks are estimated by using a combination of both the steady-state method 
following King and Levine (1994) and the perpetual inventory formula by Limam and Miller 
(2004).  The steady state method is used to compute the initial capital stock whilst the perpetual 
inventory method is used to generate the time series of capital stocks.  The steady state method 
assumes that at the steady state the capital-output ratio is constant, which implies that        
         The steady state capital output ratio for country j is given as: 
                         `                   (A1) 
where     is the country‟s capital-output ratio and   is the depreciation rate of physical capital.   
Capital-output ratio dictates the size of the effect of the rate of investment on economic growth.   
The steady state investment rate for country j is     and     is the steady state growth rate of country 
j over the period 1970 to 2006.  The steady state investment rate is the average investment rate for 
the entire period.  The steady state growth rate is the weighted average of the country‟s growth rate 
and the world growth rate.  The formula for the steady state growth rate is given by:  
     لا      لا                        (A2) 
where    is the world growth rate over the period 1970 to 2006 and لا is the mean reversion of 
growth rates.  King and Levine (1994) and Limam and Miller (2004) used لا        and    
    .  In my study, I computed each country‟s mean reversion of growth rates by running a simple 
regression of     لا          The mean reversions of growth rates ranged between 0.74 for 
South Africa and 0.96 for Malawi.  Using لا        gives higher values for initial capital stocks 
for African countries while country specific mean reversions of growth rates give lower initial 
capital stocks.  A higher mean reversion of growth rate implies that the steady state growth rate for 
country j is mainly driven by the domestic growth rate and not the world growth rate.  This may be 
the case for African countries since their growth rates are not necessarily driven by the world 
growth rate.    
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To compute the initial capital stock for country j, I used the real gross domestic product of 1970 as 
an estimate of initial output.  To calculate initial capital stock       , the steady state capital-
output ratio,     is multiplied by the initial output in 1970,        and thus                . To 
generate a time series of capital stocks for the remaining years I use Limam and Miller‟s perpetual 
inventory formula, which is given by: 
         
    
               
  ,                 (A3) 
where        and      is the previous period‟s gross fixed capital formation.  I use a 
depreciation rate of capital of 7% in line with Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) and King and Levine 
(1994). 
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 APPENDIX B 
Simplified Equations 
 
  
 
                                                 (B1) 
                                                    (B2) 
                                                                   (B3) 
   
         
         
                                              (B4) 
                      
 
                                    (B5) 
                           
                                   (B6) 
                                  
               (B7) 
              
                                 (B8) 
   
         
                                   
                                 (B9) 
 
                                                       (B10) 
                                                               (B11) 
where    
 
    
    
  
    
     
 
 
    
   
 
       
The equations above can be separated according to whether or not they have expectations.   
Separating the equations with expectations from the ones with no expectations, we have the 
following: 
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Equations with no expectations:  
                                                           (B12) 
                                                            (B13) 
                             
                      (B14) 
                
                                     (B15) 
                                                                     (B16) 
         
     
                                                             (B17) 
Equations with expectations: 
                                                            (B18) 
         
      
          
                                              (B19) 
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                                                          (B22) 
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 APPENDIX C 
Solving the Matrix Quadratic Equation 
To solve the matrix quadratic equation for P, I follow Uhlig (1999) and McCandless (2008), and 
write: 
                        (C1) 
where            ,                 and                    
Equation (C1) can be solved by turning it into a generalized eigenvalue and eigenvector problem.   
A generalized eigenvalue λ and eigenvector s of a matrix Ξ with respect to a matrix Θ, is defined 
to be a vector and a value satisfying 
λ s   s                   (C2) 
A standard eigenvalue problem is obtained, if Θ is an identity matrix.  The generalized eigenvector 
problem can be reduced to a standard one, if Θ is invertible, by calculating standard eigenvalues 
and eigenvectors for          To solve the quadratic matrix equation (C1), I define the     
matrices Ξ and Θ as 
   
  
    
                  (C3) 
and 
     
  
    
                  (C4) 
where I is an     identity matrix and     is an     matrix of zeros only.  If s is a generalized 
eigenvector and λ is the corresponding generalized eigenvalue of Ξ with respect to Θ, the s can be 
written as     λ        for some         The solution to the matrix quadratic equation is  
                      (C5) 
where Λ is a matrix of eigenvalues on the diagonal and takes the form  
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λ   
   
  λ 
                  (C6) 
and Ψ is the corresponding matrix of eigenvectors.  The solution to P is stable if and only if 
 λ                         
If    , then the solution to P is given by      
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 APPENDIX D 
The following are matrices P, Q, R, and S for all the sampled countries.  I did not simulate price of 
capital when preparing impulse response functions because the price of capital is not a state variable.  
The column for price of capital (column 4 in matrices P and Q) has zero entries for most of the 
countries which confirms that the price of capital is not a state variable.  I included price of capital as 
a state variable so that matrix C can be inverted.  The solution to the matrices has real roots for all the 
countries except Uganda which has both real and complex roots.  In the simulations for Uganda, I 
used the real roots.  In some countries, the eigenvalues for matrix P are greater than zero, but these 
values did not affect the stability of the impulse response functions since the eigenvalues of the 
principal diagonal are all smaller than unity. 
The variables for the columns in matrices P and R are         
     
              respectively whilst the 
variables for the columns in matrices Q and S are               respectively.  Likewise, the variables 
for the rows in matrices P and Q are         
     
              respectively whilst those for the rows in 
matrices R and S are    
 
                      respectively       
Côte d‟Ivoire 
0 5805 0 1268 0 0001 0 2776 0 1997 0 1545 1 024
0 0686 0 4945 0 0011 0 6965 0 2295
0 4636 9 7027 0 1349 12 6269 3 9487
0 0036 0 8127 0 0010 0 8441 0 2745
0 0543 1 4937 0 0002 1 0413 0 3482
. . . . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
   
 
     
    
   
 
 
 
 
P Q
6 0 1388
0 6397 0 1076 0 9020
5 2570 2 0006 7 3897
0 3572 0 1380 0 4666
0 5258 0 0894 1 5762
.
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
 
 
 
 
 
  
   
 
 
 
0 0352 0 1502 0 0003 1 4492 0 4175
0 0414 0 3516 0 0022 0 0647 0 0029
0 0976 0 9327 0 0022 0 8710 0 3797
0 0106 0 4118 0 0011 1 8299 0 5783
0 1919 0 7192 0 0048 0 2796 0 0912
0 0160 0 6240 0 0016 2 7725 0 8762
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
    

   






R
1 1098 0 2340 0 1245
0 1868 0 4182 0 4840
0 6939 0 3666 1 0257
0 9058 0 0737 0 4637
0 3396 0 7919 1 0077
1 3725 0 1116 0 7026
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
  
  
   
    
  
   
     
   
    
   
     
S   
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Ghana 
0 6351 0 0043 0 0007 0 0 2056 0 0051 1 0644 0 0085
0 6707 0 6092 0 0007 0 0 1794 0 8007 0 4938 0 0385
0 2906 1 2279 0 1851 0 0 0359 0 0
0 0567 0 0255 0 0001 0 0 0119
0 2632 0 1901 0 0039 0 0 1040
. . . . . . .
. . . . . . .
. . . . .
. . . .
. . . .
 
 
   
    
    
  
 
 
 
P Q
696 0 1727 0 8751
0 0777 0 1064 0 1558
0 0176 0 4359 0 0319
. .
. . .
. . .
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0 5858 0 4946 0 0007 0 0 1082 0 0079 0 1
0 0937 0 2482 0 0005 0 0 0394
0 2529 0 1134 0 0048 0 0 1023
0 5222 0 4978 0 0015 0 0 0538
0 4085 0 2565 0 0009 0 0 1417
0 7794 0 7429 0 0022 0 0 0804
. . . . . .
. . . .
. . . .
. . . .
. . . .
. . . .
  
 
  
 
 
    
  
 
   
 
  
R S
847 0 1465
0 2081 0 0276 0 0125
0 1298 0 4243 0 0287
0 5215 0 1057 0 1853
0 2143 0 5493 0 0172
0 7784 0 1578 0 2766
.
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
 
 
  
   
 
  
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
Kenya 
0 5651 0 1387 0 0002 0 1194 0 7288 0 0032 1 0846 0 0352
0 0115 0 9754 0 0001 0 6015 0 0818
0 0147 3 1441 0 1917 0 4541 0 2759
0 0052 0 2844 0 0 1853 0 0163
0 0178 0 7182 0 0006 0 7082 0 3995
. . . . . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . .
. . . . .
    
 
    
   
  
 
  
 
 
 
P Q
0 2958 0 1842 0 2204
0 2532 1 0646 5 1194
0 1043 0 0174 0 0582
0 1705 0 2258 0 2573
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
0 0208 1 1405 0 0004 1 6923 0 0980
0 0065 0 4741 0 0003 0 6625 0 0341
0 0222 0 6236 0 0008 0 5748 0 0712
0 0184 0 7970 0 0001 0 7912 0 0773
0 0444 0 9533 0 0007 1 3398 0 1440
0 0633 2 7481 0 0005 2 7281 0 2667
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
     

  
 


 

R
1 2280 0 3107 1 7795
0 0568 0 5755 0 3239
0 0241 0 3807 0 1873
0 4058 0 2876 0 9387
0 1156 0 7557 0 6575
1 3994 0 9918 3 2369
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
  
  
  
  
  
    
   
   
     
   
     
S  
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Malawi 
0 1918 0 1186 0 0002 0 0208 0 0464 0 0253 0 9631 0
0 0412 0 7663 0 0002 0 3875 0 7027
0 0021 3 6837 0 1692 0 8533 1 8299
0 0056 0 5856 0 0002 0 1727 0 3524
0 0581 0 5675 0 0008 0 2443 0 6113
. . . . . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
   
 
  
   
    
  
 
 
 
P Q
0026
0 7692 1 0719 0 6002
2 3870 1 9260 0 5013
0 4029 0 6267 0 3121
0 5550 0 5875 0 3682
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
 
 
  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 1871 0 0152 0 6548 0 0008 0 1576
0 1951 0 0622 0 4114 0 0004 0 2433
0 1700 0 0891 0 4205 0 0012 0 2096
0 0508 0 0311 0 4231 0 0002 0 0282
0 2930 0 1464 0 5208 0 0010 0 3388
0 1954 0 1197 1 6273 0 0010 0 1085
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
   
   
 
 
  
 

R
0 8358 0 5186 0 7416
0 2712 0 6303 0 3199
0 2402 0 3642 0 2504
0 1093 0 1680 0 3030
0 4119 0 6413 0 5211
0 4204 0 6460 1 1654
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
  
   
   
   
   
    
   
   
    
   
     
S  
 
Nigeria 
0 6045 0 0932 0 0016 0 3240 0 5678 0 1918 1 3236 0 4
0 1956 1 0018 0 0012 2 3594 1 9348
0 0766 1 5808 0 2072 0 2693 0 7843
0 0137 0 0690 0 0008 0 0997 0 0254
0 0076 0 1668 0 0052 0 0114 0 5663
. . . . . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
  
 
  
  
     
  
 
 
 
P Q
515
1 2609 2 3476 2 4732
0 1282 0 0116 0 1488
0 1064 0 0019 0 4736
0 0321 0 0137 0 0580
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
 
 
  
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
0 0236 0 0244 0 0051 1 6757 0 6385
0 0688 0 5555 0 0036 1 3717 0 6645
0 0200 0 1417 0 0067 0 1395 0 0413
0 0502 0 1966 0 0021 0 6422 0 2623
0 2183 1 1508 0 0088 3 1791 1 0991
0 1477 0 5782 0 0062 1 8889 0 7714
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
   
   
 
 
  
 

R
1 3520 1 3565 2 1529
0 5203 1 4848 1 5277
0 1145 0 1747 0 2227
0 3842 0 6316 0 9016
1 2479 1 8596 3 5960
1 1300 1 8576 2 6516
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
  
   
   
    
   
    
   
   
    
   
     
S  
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Senegal 
0 3285 0 2337 0 0007 0 1133 0 3852 0 0781 1 0647 0
0 0443 0 6098 0 0019 0 0198 0 0264
0 1701 4 4143 0 1952 2 9492 1 3697
0 0548 1 2191 0 0010 0 7371 0 3563
0 0872 1 1321 0 0016 0 1008 0 0550
. . . . . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
   
 
   
    
   
 
 
 
 
P Q
0009
0 1285 0 1118 0 4451
1 6078 0 0120 0 6430
0 3450 0 3594 0 8363
0 1708 0 2817 0 7645
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
0 0267 0 8859 0 0005 1 3062 0 5135
0 0279 0 3827 0 0019 0 2788 0 1148
0 1081 0 5717 0 0037 0 0339 0 1542
0 0872 1 1980 0 0007 1 3285 0 6139
0 1065 0 3229 0 0024 0 3537 0 0347
0 1503 2 0656 0 0012 2 2905 1 0585
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
    

   


 


R
1 1047 0 4641 1 1248
0 0262 0 1284 0 5612
0 1015 0 4035 0 4140
0 6691 0 2674 0 9795
0 0614 0 5132 0 6163
1 1536 0 4611 1 6888
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
   
  
  
     
   
   
    
   
   
   
     
S  
 
South Africa 
0 2398 0 0330 0 0000 0 0 5231 0 0001 1 1644 0 0271
0 0014 0 1279 0 0002 0 0 0364 0 3879 1 2181 0 0490
0 0006 0 1686 0 1839 0 0 0114 0 19
0 0000 0 0223 0 0000 0 0 0009
0 0018 1 0298 0 0002 0 0 0530
. . . . . . .
. . . . . . .
. . . . .
. . . .
. . . .
  
 
   
    
   
  
 
 
 
P Q
63 0 9966 1 3499
0 0150 0 0712 0 2404
0 1142 1 6711 0 1684
. .
. . .
. . .
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
0 0001 0 2115 0 0001 0 0 0288 0 3779 0 107
0 0011 0 1243 0 0002 0 0 0394
0 0024 0 9852 0 0004 0 0 3431
0 0002 0 1075 0 0000 0 0 0054
0 0027 1 1282 0 0017 0 0 3868
0 0004 0 2987 0 0001 0 0 0150
. . . . . .
. . . .
. . . .
. . . .
. . . .
. . . .
   
 
   
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
  
R S
3 0 2320
0 0393 0 7386 0 0243
0 3097 2 0928 0 1597
0 0738 0 1689 0 1582
0 3575 2 3125 0 2221
0 2049 0 4690 0 4395
.
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
 
 
 
  
 
  
  
 
  
 
  
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Tanzania 
0 8126 0 1036 0 0003 0 0 7109 0 0308 1 0385 0 1183
0 3005 0 1631 0 0016 0 0 1661 0 2604 0 0635 0 6449
2 4644 1 0575 0 1955 0 1 8038 0 6727
0 0076 0 0537 0 0000 0 0 0033
0 2778 1 1996 0 0012 0 0 1691
. . . . . . .
. . . . . . .
. . . . .
. . . .
. . . .
  
 
   
   
   
 
 
 
 
P Q
0 3994 2 3565
0 0032 0 0001 0 1115
0 1259 0 1309 1 3205
. .
. . .
. . .
 
 
 
 
 
  
   
 
 
 
 
0 1144 1 1738 0 0021 0 0 0361 0 4786 0 2145 0
0 1088 0 7184 0 0021 0 0 0410
0 3376 0 9547 0 0025 0 0 4928
0 3534 1 5459 0 0018 0 0 1826
0 2854 1 2929 0 0042 0 0 5066
0 3800 1 6623 0 0019 0 0 1963
. . . . . . .
. . . .
. . . .
. . . .
. . . .
. . . .
   
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
R S
6379
0 1604 0 4818 0 6436
0 2810 0 3451 1 0819
0 1002 0 5719 0 6231
0 2841 0 3507 1 1430
0 1077 0 6149 0 6700
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
 
 
  
   
 
  
   
 
  
 
  
 
 
Uganda 
0 7154 0 3847 0 0080 0 0 2472 0 1961 1 2750 0 2662
0 0051 0 1944 0 0067 0 0 0010 0 2507 0 2900 0 4634
1 4184 6 4041 0 1832 0 0 2047 4 4
0 0124 2 2357 0 0373 0 0 6007
0 2987 1 3858 0 0334 0 0 3258
. . . . . . .
. . . . . . .
. . . . .
. . . .
. . . .
   
 
  
  
    
   
 
 
 
P Q
620 5 2770 4 4632
0 6137 0 2936 1 5200
1 2734 1 6049 0 8641
. .
. . .
. . .
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
0 5952 3 0921 0 0361 0 0 5406 0 4746 1 2
0 1722 1 3337 0 0244 0 0 3443
0 3744 2 5889 0 0558 0 0 0667
0 2184 1 8387 0 0170 0 0 2295
0 7672 1 8900 0 0354 0 0 6041
0 5459 4 5967 0 0425 0 0 5737
. . . . . .
. . . .
. . . .
. . . .
. . . .
. . . .
  
 
 
   
 
    
 
 
   
 
  
R S
224 2 3435
0 4373 0 6481 1 1628
1 3449 1 8920 1 7779
0 5530 0 7821 1 3394
0 6747 0 5829 1 5935
1 3825 1 9552 3 3485
.
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
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Zambia 
0 0040 0 2654 0 0005 0 0 1574 0 2198 0 7144 0 1783
0 0002 0 6689 0 0012 0 0 0655 0 5869 0 6878 0 0400
0 0001 0 2458 0 1865 0 0 0855 0
0 0001 0 1058 0 0004 0 0 0493
0 0007 0 3031 0 0040 0 0 4287
. . . . . . .
. . . . . . .
. . . .
. . . .
. . . .
  
 
     
   
    
  
 
 
 
P Q
0733 2 0011 5 9041
0 0748 0 2246 0 3411
0 0895 0 7102 0 1664
. . .
. . .
. . .
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0 0007 0 5483 0 0007 0 0 0721 0 1017 0 8
0 0002 0 3615 0 0008 0 0 0717
0 0008 0 2764 0 0047 0 0 1405
0 0001 0 2285 0 0007 0 0 0926
0 0019 0 8068 0 0012 0 0 2191
0 0003 0 6529 0 0020 0 0 2647
. . . . . .
. . . .
. . . .
. . . .
. . . .
. . . .
   
 
   
 
 
   
  
 
  
 
  
R S
749 0 2436
0 1993 0 1834 0 0383
0 1534 0 7428 0 1610
0 1854 0 2758 0 1378
0 4862 1 7490 0 1701
0 5291 0 7879 0 3936
.
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
 
 
  
   
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
Zimbabwe 
0 9312 0 0155 0 0007 0 0 2787 0 0211 0 9790 0 0063
0 0506 0 6004 0 0026 0 0 0950 0 5522 2 1905 0 0220
0 3242 3 4093 0 1717 0 0 0363 1 93
0 0255 0 1358 0 0019 0 0 0474
0 0558 0 4357 0 0060 0 0 2534
. . . . . . .
. . . . . . .
. . . . .
. . . .
. . . .
   
 
   
   
   
 
 
 
 
P Q
77 11 8633 0 5878
0 6375 1 3773 0 6995
0 3180 2 7287 0 0348
. .
. . .
. . .
 
 
 
 
 
  
   
 
 
 
 
0 0681 0 6471 0 0009 0 0 0197 1 1491 2 8422 0 1
0 0355 0 2844 0 0005 0 0 0166
0 0519 0 3989 0 0064 0 0 0158
0 0820 0 7262 0 0011 0 0 0267
0 0429 0 2903 0 0005 0 0 0190
0 1782 1 5788 0 0023 0 0 0580
. . . . . . .
. . . .
. . . .
. . . .
. . . .
. . . .
   
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
R S
025
0 2902 1 3262 0 0558
0 3655 2 6288 0 0282
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 APPENDIX E 
The Figures below present the impulse response functions of a permanent shock to monetary policy, 
world commodity price and world interest rate. 
Figure E1: Permanent Shock to Monetary Policy 
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Figure E2: Permanent Shock to World Commodity Price 
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Figure E3: Permanent Shock to World Interest Rate 
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APPENDIX F 
 
Table F1: Relative Volatility  
 
Country GDP Inflation Interest Rate 
External 
Debt 
Consumption 
Imported 
Investments 
Consumptio
n Imports 
Money 
Supply 
Exchange 
Rate 
Exports 
Côte d'Ivoire 0.072189 0.731247 0.164346 1.538572 0.541842 2.490435 1.457937 1.451883 2.117511 2.117511 
Ghana 0.106536 1.646655 0.440424 3.809266 0.906032 2.601618 3.238426 1.747916 3.088261 3.088261 
Kenya 0.082605 0.788197 0.333963 1.072405 1.283966 1.295817 1.094292 1.03702 0.980897 0.980897 
Malawi 0.082797 1.553148 0.626581 2.752612 1.750716 2.910299 2.015435 1.047465 1.873643 1.873643 
Nigeria 0.119839 1.343144 0.213027 3.851184 1.249543 2.406963 2.12677 1.5028 2.496741 2.496741 
Senegal 0.064026 2.187799 0.128651 3.119795 0.984741 1.919439 2.018774 1.162387 2.43498 2.43498 
South Africa 0.032477 0.87816 0.74659 9.604335 0.898174 2.354405 3.049789 1.574222 2.794932 2.794932 
Tanzania 0.123219 0.379105 0.726122 2.167409 1.09432 1.622753 2.029281 0.924362 1.86877 1.86877 
Uganda 0.266722 1.298993 0.162495 1.495467 1.145732 1.693842 1.439536 0.919887 1.374105 1.374105 
Zambia 1.697241 0.955365 0.521522 1.269325 1.005059 0.23739 0.968259 1.152829 1.575521 1.575521 
Zimbabwe 0.972514 0.734592 0.478756 0.97132 1.007017 1.003591 1.372723 1.80039 1.367768 1.367768 
Mean 0.329106 1.136037 0.412952 2.877426 1.078831 1.866959 1.891929 1.301924 1.997557 1.997557 
Median 0.106536 0.955365 0.440424 2.167409 1.007017 1.919439 2.015435 1.162387 1.873643 1.873643 
Standard  
deviation 
0.52641 0.522346 0.228794 2.466292 0.299612 0.797852 0.735597 0.323958 0.656455 0.656455 
Minimum 0.032477 0.379105 0.128651 0.97132 0.541842 0.23739 0.968259 0.919887 0.980897 0.980897 
Maximum 1.697241 2.187799 0.74659 9.604335 1.750716 2.910299 3.238426 1.80039 3.088261 3.088261 
Monetary 
Policy Shock 
0.002354 0.848787 1.31628 2.809377 2.019015 5.654687 1.773335 4.18923 3.317159 1.893262 
World Commodity 
Price Shock 
0.002087 1.092427 0.75673 1.161436 1.259786 8.692964 2.21764 0.816632 4.186273 2.20678 
World Interest 
Rate Shock 
0.001855 1.07565 0.98185 2.814414 1.757304 5.15187 2.874229 0.657485 3.845703 1.358911 
GDP values are the standard deviations of GDP. Relative volatility is calculated as the standard deviation of the variable divided by the standard deviation of GDP. 
The shocks were computed using 50 simulations and only 37 simulations were used to prepare the relative volatility. The 37 simulations tally with the years that  
were used in the data. 
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Table F2: Comovement with GDP 
Country Inflation 
Interest 
Rate 
Consumption 
External 
Debt 
Imported 
Investments 
Consumption 
Imports 
Money 
Supply 
Exports 
Exchange 
Rate 
Côte d'Ivoire 0.048121 -0.3112 0.739651 0.295912 0.700591 0.804439 0.760499 0.855736 0.492541 
Ghana -0.1191 0.205502 0.942384 0.663723 0.754571 0.77181 0.778067 0.788917 0.692167 
Kenya -0.33193 -0.42454 0.92457 -0.13192 0.690899 0.379665 0.678246 -0.071 -0.11156 
Malawi -0.66245 -0.41035 0.396678 -0.04137 -0.07493 0.32186 0.234424 0.42059 -0.24037 
Nigeria 0.117082 0.461994 0.455668 0.232055 0.630127 0.755677 0.604835 0.880819 0.396651 
Senegal -0.27037 -0.02755 0.93673 0.637702 0.564019 0.621684 0.604759 0.715439 0.362443 
South Africa -0.23646 0.092816 0.759308 -0.25272 0.671415 0.712665 0.638412 0.373833 -0.24753 
Tanzania 0.196701 -0.02448 0.900699 0.438875 0.728959 0.810431 0.363683 0.736437 0.80681 
Uganda -0.36066 -0.74419 0.500717 0.551325 0.301782 0.884122 0.720668 0.829201 0.535196 
Zambia 0.1123 -0.07371 0.8998 0.775589 0.819041 0.891971 0.666204 0.927486 0.855564 
Zimbabwe -0.05634 0.173387 0.998335 0.825421 0.985502 0.703547 0.415228 0.699926 0.859392 
Mean -0.1421 -0.09839 0.768595 0.363144 0.615634 0.69617 0.58773 0.650672 0.400118 
Median -0.1191 -0.02755 0.8998 0.438875 0.690899 0.755677 0.638412 0.736437 0.492541 
Standard 
 deviation 
0.258974 0.345533 0.218901 0.37422 0.28365 0.188112 0.174938 0.297823 0.422938 
Minimum -0.66245 -0.74419 0.396678 -0.25272 -0.07493 0.32186 0.234424 -0.071 -0.24753 
Maximum 0.196701 0.461994 0.998335 0.825421 0.985502 0.891971 0.778067 0.927486 0.859392 
Monetary  
Policy Shock 
0.857936 0.078427 0.974336 -0.04458 -0.34888 -0.07027 -0.26466 0.198 0.186964 
World 
Commodity  
Price Shock 
0.912536 0.338455 0.703664 0.421327 -0.48279 -0.43169 0.053218 0.563927 0.564355 
World Interest  
Rate Shock 
0.8783 0.691327 0.774791 -0.31562 -0.62894 -0.11051 0.109745 0.345045 0.379818 
Comovement is calculated as the correlation of the variable to GDP. The shocks were computed using 50 simulations and only 37 
simulations were used to prepare the comovement. The 37 simulations tally with the years that were used in the data.
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Table F3: Debt Indicators for Selected African Countries (1970 - 2006) 
Year TDS/XGS TDS/RES ETD/RES ETD/XGSETD/GDP TDS/XGS TDS/RES ETD/RES ETD/XGSETD/GDP TDS/XGS TDS/RES ETD/RES ETD/XGSETD/GDP TDS/XGS TDS/RES ETD/RES ETD/XGSETD/GDP
1970 1.9738 351.63 314.32 17.318 8.1085 5.3903 421.79 1342 60.239 25.807 3.9966 289.11 217.23 38.158 29.782 2.641 182.74 463.05 55.657 46.54
1971 2.2373 298.4 575.13 24.143 10.201 6.0301 371.21 1266.6 58.098 22.47 4.2522 296.03 291.26 40.369 27.997 3.221 183.38 476.85 61.802 41.657
1972 2.7243 321.19 665.13 25.902 11.032 3.4188 467.35 580.95 63.428 28.442 3.7378 232.72 287.71 44.931 27.579 3.9357 206 484.75 72.957 43.257
1973 3.176 261.86 976.76 36.27 15.503 3.3684 267.38 389.38 78.675 30.643 4.8841 219.98 362.46 63.267 33.759 5.7593 211.24 322.38 91.095 48.355
1974 4.8925 291.67 1623.7 42.11 18.355 3.3039 252.75 748.42 76.252 26.201 7.0503 240.49 596.37 83.276 38.812 6.2447 182.44 296.22 101.11 44.161
1975 9.4632 240.83 1425.2 97.416 23.29 6.3767 302.87 499.46 82.084 26.155 14.936 325.97 744.05 127.6 39.585 6.9563 195.76 439.16 107.04 44.015
1976 11.265 317.22 2392.3 91.466 25.741 5.8088 282.25 629.06 79.721 25.773 14.811 335.42 542 130.66 42.979 6.963 196.46 1179 117.51 46.115
1977 10.927 273.91 1364.9 92.574 33.764 3.7151 246.34 587.4 104.53 33.441 20.451 544.91 315.51 104.08 36.91 10.42 288.73 518.25 215.25 56.918
1978 15.317 249.42 842.08 124.28 45.389 7.4141 311.96 391.43 128.2 34.912 13.975 262.66 589.36 140.82 40.985 19.715 244.97 771.35 281.12 62.564
1979 20.111 257.2 2810.2 144.94 55.146 8.8849 346.67 319.63 110 31.901 18.372 275.46 407 167 43.645 17.471 183.73 879.05 258.67 63.195
1980 38.659 205.45 16245 205.03 96.846 13.105 299.29 425.31 115.5 31.534 21.029 189.28 628.69 164.31 46.616 27.776 165.11 1092.6 263.69 67.056
1981 52.576 185.21 22909 279.24 102.08 14.237 173.69 573.28 184.82 36.444 26.966 201.18 1228.2 179.48 47.096 36.035 168.9 1516.7 258.67 66.366
1982 54.146 171.94 39780 315.12 112.14 15.537 173.26 472.18 207.66 36.775 30.483 210.77 1357.4 206.62 52.364 35.021 189 3031.2 321.37 73.272
1983 49.937 168.27 24139 349.01 115.35 30.386 232.83 571.88 348.52 41.06 33.774 240.03 892.72 237.94 60.682 29.258 176.81 4396 323.24 72.948
1984 37.55 144.12 44775 281.78 114.37 21.561 196.55 448.16 317.98 44.408 34.795 250.26 847.4 211.14 56.716 31.06 234.36 1452.9 257.68 72.835
1985 34.825 147.11 50089 301.9 123.7 23.545 182.56 406.34 331.65 49.803 38.665 260.7 1003.2 260.21 68.143 39.835 244.35 2077 369.66 90.224
1986 35.448 168.11 30987 307.28 142 28.296 205.26 440.18 341.05 47.954 35.606 265.72 1035.5 241.96 63.582 53.685 278.79 3906.8 425.72 97.768
1987 38.399 231.22 44596 381.06 168.98 45.754 355.11 990.34 362.2 64.72 39.765 237.29 1964.3 332.62 72.551 37.424 266.11 2354.6 441.99 115.52
1988 32.387 219.95 46531 402.02 164.19 56.288 433.2 984.85 316.83 58.834 38.988 235.66 1959.5 307.06 69.524 30.883 257.89 900.47 397.68 98.43
1989 33.227 185.37 45142 457.64 177.16 50.193 395.13 755.72 366.05 62.763 36.637 251.31 1859.8 304.39 71.191 30.903 239.78 1335.7 454.65 88.583
1990 35.438 197.01 81678 484.46 208.5 38.132 348.47 1207.3 391.11 63.445 35.409 237.25 2988 315.9 82.126 29.31 284.19 1095.6 344.11 82.775
1991 37.861 193.39 62472 537.76 219.56 27.242 275.59 645.11 385.72 62.981 32.612 224.7 5135.2 337.9 91.426 24.676 277.88 1054.6 319.05 75.496
1992 32.078 205.16 85195 513.05 224.61 27.14 272.95 1029.9 374.23 66.096 31.138 257.37 8671.3 320.47 83.909 24.859 295.9 3861.1 392.82 94.895
1993 33.223 214.76 97085 579.23 231.41 24.339 260.89 885 377.43 76.691 27.129 238.34 1628.3 305.28 123.64 22.378 271.54 2949 522.07 88.144
1994 35.172 272.24 7858.8 491.75 209.38 24.351 309.19 740.08 364.92 93.762 32.943 267.6 1211.3 266.3 99.665 22.396 297.3 4233.4 569.41 170.93
1995 23.112 248.41 3572.4 417.53 212.34 23.958 408.48 683.59 340.72 85.094 30.411 302.15 1902.1 245.77 80.796 24.912 276.48 1946.4 472.3 160.13
1996 26.526 267.06 3222.9 376.73 203.62 25.007 331.66 622.15 325.55 83.571 27.547 306.34 878.13 224.06 56.564 15.89 269.01 1025.8 415.3 101.31
1997 26.188 260.84 2524.2 300.63 153.99 29.547 363.03 924.87 334.55 82.979 21.892 306.45 797.08 215.5 49.293 14.373 280.6 1524.8 375.82 83.531
1998 25.668 193.93 1736.1 275.55 139.87 18.484 314.29 1381.8 243.86 84.438 22.938 337.05 871.46 236.23 48.42 14.844 346.5 940.89 417.97 139.28
1999 26.783 234.65 2089.2 243.41 122.1 16.865 281.78 1200.5 254.86 83.269 25.436 399.12 817.95 237.79 50.208 13.96 369.97 1095.9 523.2 154.36
2000 22.613 189.32 1817.4 269.02 116.43 15.608 289.91 1979.9 245.77 122.87 20.944 416.79 684.4 217.86 48.419 13.35 297.95 1097.3 573.78 155.14
2001 13.32 246.73 1140.1 249.26 111.33 11.361 311.6 1687.2 257.73 119.47 15.572 438.67 518.4 177.61 42.512 9.4477 296.07 1254.2 533.44 150.56
2002 13.854 269.02 632.82 196.48 114.86 6.7737 197.45 1094.5 264.87 113.02 16.024 458.11 573.68 185.23 46.602 7.6483 211.37 1740.4 603.03 108.32
2003 8.6371 403.81 934.66 184.03 120.72 13.852 513.06 515.14 230.96 99.328 15.5 436.04 463.44 183.88 46.087 8.2034 225.16 2432 609.43 127.78
2004 4.9848 689.7 781.09 168.03 128.92 6.8718 283.46 403.9 199.99 79.657 7.5837 418.76 455.32 147.27 42.996 12.186 241.63 2564 694.65 130.56
2005 3.5221 604.61 904.61 137.01 116.86 6.9909 296.47 355.44 166.44 62.898 9.2298 589.06 357.31 110.21 34.249 15.534 323.04 1923.4 653.25 111.49
2006 2.9236 533.02 713.32 139.27 120.46 4.9294 305.19 140.91 60.278 25.144 6.4343 454.11 270.45 98.51 29.068 17.713 395.43 614.64 177.87 27.574
Côte d'Ivoire Ghana Kenya Malawi
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Year TDS/XGS TDS/RES ETD/RES ETD/XGSETD/GDP TDS/XGS TDS/RES ETD/RES ETD/XGSETD/GDP TDS/XGS TDS/RES ETD/RES ETD/XGSETD/GDP TDS/XGS TDS/RES ETD/RES ETD/XGSETD/GDP
1970 0.587 344.16 374.36 79.326 6.669 1.6512 508.55 658.73 20.461 14.24 .. .. 30.208 7.8216 1.7878 2.3036 245.08 326.86 68.948 2.9532
1971 0.57 313.97 222.34 96.54 10.459 2.4324 384.57 619.09 21.289 14.507 .. .. 74.83 12.845 2.9428 2.8867 231.92 1984.4 360.98 13.907
1972 0.5943 302.75 276.87 80.352 8.8131 2.355 285.42 419.89 21.603 12.647 .. .. 36.841 11.942 3.1636 3.3552 213.44 1192.1 370.98 13.709
1973 1.4954 598.53 285.62 73.706 11.732 5.466 491.04 1653.1 26.696 13.546 .. .. 20.103 6.8149 1.8241 4.3457 222.21 1236.7 419.9 14.368
1974 1.2192 460.46 32.943 30.063 7.5693 6.4678 270.12 4193.9 42.998 15.984 .. .. 19.853 7.2868 2.1008 5.3696 219.75 4107.4 433.45 14.559
1975 1.52 594.11 29.779 33.119 6.0736 5.8389 217.79 1121.5 48.379 15.614 .. .. 40.228 11.27 3.2427 8.5474 214.23 3660.4 571.81 15.331
1976 2.2187 903.79 25.449 20.227 3.6845 5.9573 238.69 1624.5 54.71 18.073 .. .. 71.453 14.93 4.2953 6.4222 185.82 2459.4 436.07 13.497
1977 1.038 265.3 72.566 35.105 8.7315 6.4732 263.21 1741.2 69.244 27.064 .. .. 77.223 12.805 3.9579 8.318 188.79 1252.2 537.65 12.203
1978 1.2822 224.87 250.94 71.283 13.938 15.339 357.18 3765.7 120.85 34.539 .. .. 51.66 9.0368 3.0039 16.895 270.25 4435.6 708.41 5.7763
1979 2.1729 152.36 105.85 53.245 13.213 16.587 300.2 3302.1 126.55 34.792 .. .. 19.915 5.4658 1.983 14.354 238.23 6276.9 612.54 4.9347
1980 4.1437 126.65 83.85 47.305 13.896 28.655 273.65 5854.5 162.75 42.054 .. .. 9.815 2.6628 0.9593 21.152 201.15 26221 698.74 4.6695
1981 9.1806 154.91 273.98 84.6 19.06 17.14 192.81 8274.4 156.64 52.592 .. .. 23.37 4.2154 1.1732 22.06 201.03 30919 719.82 3.9723
1982 16.181 167.23 621.44 147.2 24.057 12.779 157.83 7538.5 192.59 59.813 .. .. 31.01 5.952 1.5271 28.646 179.46 128543 1169 3.8555
1983 23.56 181.84 1402.6 369.11 50.245 11.328 154.96 8908.3 201.71 74.724 .. .. 32.216 5.6507 1.4213 33.427 224.96 35354 1397.2 4.4134
1984 32.901 209.78 1061.5 424.59 63.055 16.713 162.2 17398 227.41 81.211 .. .. 62.818 7.8762 1.8519 25.711 218.92 26890 1428 5.0681
1985 32.732 257.12 985.44 407.66 65.627 20.813 210.46 17610 281.17 86.4 .. .. 65.132 6.5028 1.8425 39.853 316.86 56905 2085.2 4.4297
1986 37.998 254 1645.4 642.88 109.9 26.145 222.07 15596 281.89 77.106 .. .. 49.118 5.2363 1.3927 35.086 256.16 8023 1098.7 5.9924
1987 14.126 170.9 1937.6 432.73 123.8 32.377 239.78 17369 337.7 80.083 .. .. 32.153 4.073 1.0704 39.184 229.21 17321 1379.9 8.7221
1988 30.355 145.58 3174.9 560.7 129.65 31.356 243.28 17411 314.21 78.094 .. .. 47.884 3.7666 0.9205 31.924 212.12 7735.2 1185.5 117.86
1989 24.664 140.19 1475.8 386.4 126.33 28.62 201.49 10700 246.2 66.732 .. .. 35.317 2.8937 0.6206 32.953 289.85 10796 1088.4 132.41
1990 22.581 154.75 809.9 270.41 117.44 19.914 253.55 16967 230.62 65.665 .. .. 29.268 2.7177 0.6749 32.894 291.07 3347.5 1185.8 151.55
1991 21.949 141.41 716.7 329.83 122.75 20.885 254.23 15293 241.25 63.899 .. .. 23.855 2.8153 0.6323 39.947 336.93 3217 1278.2 132.35
1992 28.715 200.4 2426.2 210.03 88.714 13.44 309.22 16719 236.49 61.354 .. .. 25.873 2.8794 0.6359 40.124 374.3 2037.7 1141.3 144.96
1993 12.505 163.49 1873.6 305.47 143.94 9.3804 305.16 25807 281.68 67.002 .. .. 53.101 5.0979 1.1724 26.814 196.91 3337.3 862.64 159.39
1994 17.948 166.34 2006.6 334.91 139.85 17.13 290.28 1938.8 270.4 95.373 9.3676 470.01 657.72 69.966 15.961 18.942 273.63 2182 748.11 160.63
1995 13.837 200.36 1994.7 273.86 121.29 16.844 326.53 1440.8 233.16 80.261 9.541 396.53 568.11 71.355 16.781 17.924 269.81 2746.6 572.22 141.22
1996 14.008 229.99 725.43 184.8 88.973 19.126 224.6 1313.3 247.54 74.738 11.584 459.02 1112.8 71.229 18.124 18.92 261.73 1678.5 519.32 113.71
1997 7.7909 245.74 365.69 174.72 78.541 17.484 276.43 985.41 264.97 81.45 17.233 769.6 424.22 66.577 16.983 13.458 354.86 1110.8 550.91 89.929
1998 11.324 238.45 415.08 281.12 94.247 20.731 301.25 950.95 262.57 80.992 12.166 491.79 449.39 68.626 18.432 20.091 231.24 1219.8 619.65 87.186
1999 6.9068 231.95 515.56 227 83.758 14.497 311.21 984.4 240.04 77.023 12.071 526.67 318.91 67.278 17.951 19.096 254.16 987.14 645.06 88.623
2000 8.1725 244.65 310.46 126.33 68.187 14.336 293.11 943.23 231.84 77.197 9.7727 519.88 322.78 62.929 18.71 12.785 269.44 711.43 516.86 76.34
2001 12.187 302.66 291.56 150.42 64.67 12.341 323.58 820.66 213.11 75.253 11.344 506.26 315.33 62.648 20.299 8.3473 320.49 539.93 341.75 66.148
2002 7.6289 436.24 402.76 161.77 51.552 11.689 298.71 644.89 218.1 77.061 12.285 612.67 321.09 64.462 22.637 5.5001 253.34 447.5 346.82 70.111
2003 5.7438 386.69 467.97 120.11 51.289 10.338 312.58 395.07 185.92 63.997 5.7532 422.81 336.31 55.006 16.455 4.0789 228.24 342.96 310.31 67.987
2004 4.2716 305.74 219.53 98.119 43.125 11.827 452.57 284.34 138.91 49.092 3.9832 371.38 182.13 44.318 12.551 4.4419 228.46 339.99 289.95 68.758
2005 15.784 177.38 77.46 42.457 19.758 9.7703 352.81 324.54 186.41 44.491 4.5479 381.69 150.79 43.751 12.832 4.35 262.49 380.53 256.95 55.128
2006 .. 1787.9 18.249 12.3 5.31 8.925 259.45 145.06 88.951 20.862 6.6898 461.75 138.9 43.459 13.826 3.434 233.88 187.66 128.68 29.905
SenegalNigeria South Africa Tanzania
  
Source: World Bank‟s Global Development Fund, 2009. South Africa‟s debt data is extracted from the Reserve Bank of South Africa. RES stands for International 
Reserves. The other acronyms are as defined in the tables 2.3 to 2.5 in chapter two. Africa in this study means countries referred to as Sub-Saharan African countries. 
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Year TDS/XGS TDS/RES ETD/RES ETD/XGSETD/GDP TDS/XGS TDS/RES ETD/RES ETD/XGSETD/GDP TDS/XGS TDS/RES ETD/RES ETD/XGSETD/GDP TDS/XGS TDS/RES ETD/RES ETD/XGS ETD/GDP
1970 2.7335 199.67 267.74 45.868 12.042 5.8789 245.88 158.01 63.287 45.48 0.7789 205.49 390.96 19.196 12.332 4.9579 20.939 224.23 53.093 10.621
1971 2.8835 204.32 640.19 52.331 12.162 7.0305 232.31 299.95 66.477 51.857 0.8463 183.96 571.99 19.357 10.947 5.4761 26.652 322.42 66.247 13.168
1972 2.8945 211.48 494.3 54.028 11.919 9.8271 314.04 550.47 73.319 50.381 0.9561 196.39 225.37 18.294 8.172 5.2005 20.718 257.37 64.603 13.459
1973 7.438 525.7 602.93 53.238 10.314 31.2 408.99 495.49 83.722 42.333 1.3803 289.67 104.1 18.588 6.5717 6.4919 24.904 233.78 60.941 13.679
1974 4.191 343.28 1205.8 60.703 9.6271 10.542 261.47 611.24 93.346 41.094 1.2305 291.21 132.24 18.397 5.46 3.8356 10.702 137.38 49.237 13.14
1975 5.0154 645.39 674.39 62.919 8.8666 12.667 319.5 1013.4 125.34 68.721 0.6248 354.03 144.65 14.688 4.2746 5.1849 14.98 180.39 62.435 14.265
1976 6.3251 1155.3 547.66 75.569 9.9658 13.697 264.91 1638.5 144.16 70.922 0.5514 350.24 128.08 10.737 3.3323 5.298 18.665 228.98 64.995 15.085
1977 4.9051 520.12 637.11 92.029 10.242 20.266 344.47 2477.9 183.18 92.633 0.583 345.54 204.3 19.623 4.5702 5.0981 22.36 332.39 75.783 19.275
1978 6.672 987.97 809.93 127.94 17.636 31.169 339.2 2664.8 270.22 91.511 0.8052 194.74 241.9 42.924 10.251 5.8228 32.206 513.87 92.906 22.649
1979 7.8641 1165.9 2575.7 168.71 27.502 22.071 367.48 1587.9 197.72 90.467 1.173 199.93 129.45 45.049 10.801 6.0871 22.771 309.66 82.778 22.404
1980 17.352 467.51 23017 208.8 55.48 25.228 291.03 1574 199.67 83.533 3.7817 255.47 187.39 45.582 11.763 8.0602 29.085 264.69 73.352 21.956
1981 24.94 381.33 2357 258.19 52.881 35.884 329.88 2530.2 308.16 89.907 6.4245 147.09 355.18 74.977 15.726 10.948 61.699 561.98 99.723 25.033
1982 18.205 222.88 1116.4 251.92 40.156 30.929 243.14 2324.9 339.08 94.494 13.197 129.8 584 118.73 21.915 13.052 82.863 823.85 129.77 29.411
1983 23.401 242.78 947.49 274.42 45.04 29.115 237.77 2729.1 365.72 112.85 36.907 311.42 729.42 160.16 28.226 14.598 93.867 999.94 155.51 35.171
1984 30.337 259.38 1581.9 253.3 29.711 24.981 218.7 6844.9 385.77 138 26.159 195.07 838.51 159.33 34.316 17.152 127.8 1166.3 156.54 38.18
1985 41.676 311.86 4538.8 332.59 35.189 15.724 208.45 2231.4 517.19 199.21 29.044 241.47 698.67 166.13 42.816 18.984 130.85 1273.9 184.83 47.348
1986 40.716 342.05 4872 337.58 36.269 52.077 265.63 7879.1 760.44 338.46 31.137 275.64 828.73 171.54 42.162 16.947 104.71 1302.9 210.86 51.662
1987 47.93 369.84 3545.1 580.22 30.873 18.991 230.71 5850.6 719.32 286.08 32.285 311.52 778.63 174.85 42.787 12.567 76.161 1278.6 210.98 53.444
1988 75.685 464.86 3936.6 728.79 29.817 15.105 244.72 4803.5 535.19 179.52 28.48 299.88 791.15 143.93 34.49 14.002 99.547 1484.1 208.76 51.58
1989 67.632 407.65 15576 790.84 41.622 13.316 312.35 5326.1 459.41 164.06 22.375 250.55 1028.4 143.77 34.031 12.289 79.573 1326.9 204.92 51.862
1990 81.364 402.94 5924.2 1465.6 60.539 14.733 263.04 3431.6 507 209.98 23.145 234.83 1111 161.12 37.328 13.765 70.671 1147.3 223.46 58.529
1991 74.798 327.9 4758.3 1424.2 84.392 46.875 194.71 3616.5 549.86 206.07 23.082 236.46 1177.4 174.25 40.195 13.649 56.461 1018.8 246.28 58.698
1992 59.657 331.9 3125.8 1555 103.29 32.305 208.1 2926 619.31 210.51 32.299 284.21 1019.8 221.92 61.096 12.712 71.385 1292.7 230.2 58.095
1993 51.458 441.09 2085.9 1017.7 94.796 34.043 238.52 3368.2 609.81 197.89 30.999 298.61 676.51 210.77 64.742 9.7876 47.981 1279.1 260.93 65.579
1994 27.499 391.84 1057.2 628.13 85.143 36.048 221.72 2539.3 655.3 203.45 25.204 269.78 766.28 189.13 65.1 14.951 67.974 1283.9 282.41 76.654
1995 19.837 354.6 786.52 529.17 62.701 257.54 478.95 3124.3 685.89 200.07 30.945 267.56 561.91 242.78 70.159 15.933 71.53 1142.5 254.5 72.03
1996 18.202 344.25 702.26 455.99 61.386 24.466 264.7 3170.1 688.98 215.88 30.94 274.69 597.41 242.09 58.28 14.833 65.607 1001.1 226.35 68.077
1997 20.171 367.76 616.89 489.86 62.332 19.372 302.49 2785.5 524.81 170.31 31.937 303.96 1272.6 235.56 57.915 15.542 51.906 725.99 217.38 62.54
1998 20.796 473.09 543.42 534.71 59.863 20.956 289.63 9902.3 712.48 212.23 44.609 457.75 1484.5 217.44 75.804 15.672 49.194 789.95 251.66 68.936
1999 13.811 384.16 458.33 369.26 58.307 16.094 164.75 12898 635.17 187.12 29.356 349.42 899.75 202.5 72.477 14.371 44.751 710.16 228.05 65.003
2000 7.752 282.14 432.76 366.43 56.462 20.799 211.04 2337.4 641.84 176.74 20.159 304.02 1191.2 183.38 51.727 11.705 36.988 578.69 183.13 61.795
2001 4.673 284.94 379.44 347.95 63.886 17.189 323.51 3327.4 567.16 167.83 8.0085 327.93 3005.3 171.48 35.003 12.864 37.707 550.87 187.94 60.475
2002 6.127 279.76 426.1 345.99 64.023 20.667 364.16 1231.7 605.61 177.37 5.167 183.25 2951.7 185.05 17.751 11.783 35.03 564.62 189.92 58.196
2003 7.2144 307.24 420.51 390.82 68.786 42.388 309.68 2744.8 516.65 155.46 2.571 397.95 .. 212.87 60.609 7.9012 27.478 559.56 160.9 51.489
2004 6.9671 277.98 363.32 322.47 65.816 21.702 626.37 2211.3 346.9 134.93 6.1739 571.49 .. 227.5 101.6 6.2686 18.039 379.54 131.89 43.479
2005 9.3002 479.62 329.34 239.95 47.988 10.871 434.31 960.69 209.1 73.178 11.257 889.81 .. 202.77 124.48 9.0446 24.608 262.35 96.427 33.828
2006 4.8183 386.4 69.847 53.148 12.704 3.6576 298.86 307.29 52.346 20.316 4.0533 161.52 .. 221.44 .. 8.1198 19.042 150.17 64.036 23.282
AfricaUganda Zambia Zimbabwe
 
Source: World Bank‟s Global Development Fund, 2009. South Africa‟s debt data is extracted from the Reserve Bank of South Africa. RES stands for International 
Reserves. The other acronyms are as defined in the tables 2.3 to 2.5 in chapter two. Africa in this study means countries referred to as Sub-Saharan African countries. 
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Table F4: Summary Statistics 
Region Statistic 
Relative 
Interest 
Rate Inflation Legal  Political  
Debt to 
GDP 
Ratio 
Short-term 
Debt to 
Reserves 
Ratio 
Exports 
to GDP 
Ratio 
Consumption 
Imports to 
GDP Ratio GDP 
Imported 
Investments 
to GDP 
Ratio 
Terms of 
Trade 
Exports 
to 
Imports 
Ratio 
Log of 
Exchange 
Rate 
Africa 
Mean 0.544 0.207 -0.551 -0.547 -0.408 0.064 0.277 0.374 0.082 -1.77 1.149 0.751 0.830 
Standard 
Error 
0.017 0.014 0.036 0.048 0.029 0.045 0.007 0.010 0.009 0.019 0.029 0.012 0.091 
Skewness 1.288 3.491 -0.189 -0.068 -1.135 -0.260 0.772 2.381 0.872 -0.583 2.546 0.020 -0.763 
Kurtosis 5.040 17.636 2.577 2.544 3.915 6.835 5.263 17.446 7.394 3.920 11.339 3.622 2.951 
Observations 418 366 116 116 366 335 366 365 348 417 418 407 418 
Latin 
America 
Mean 0.385 0.299 -0.111 -0.086 -0.376 -0.158 0.222 0.226 0.092 -2.147 1.115 1.027 -0.675 
Standard 
Error 
0.018 0.020 0.061 0.054 0.128 0.025 0.006 0.007 0.009 0.187 0.020 0.015 0.187 
Skewness 1.792 1.770 0.856 0.366 -0.087 -2.927 0.757 1.333 -0.879 -3.730 1.093 1.563 -1.451 
Kurtosis 7.052 7.797 3.349 2.252 2.982 25.458 3.314 4.792 8.089 17.172 4.744 6.223 4.507 
Observations 380 347 111 111 347 343 347 347 347 347 380 347 380 
East Asia 
Mean 0.718 0.083 0.030 -0.021 0.086 -0.739 0.409 0.397 0.117 0.298 0.833 1.017 4.255 
Standard 
Error 
0.0214 0.006 0.067 0.069 0.026 0.025 0.017 0.015 0.010 0.015 0.012 0.012 0.181 
Skewness 0.839 2.861 -0.324 -0.276 0.935 1.171 1.707 1.425 -0.551 5.857 0.232 0.392 0.259 
Kurtosis 4.136 14.274 1.747 1.900 5.440 6.809 5.523 4.320 7.156 41.091 2.644 3.674 1.836 
Observations 190 185 60 60 190 186 190 190 185 190 190 190 190 
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Table F5: Correlation Matrices 
Africa 
 
Relative 
Interest 
Rate Inflation Legal  Political  
Debt to 
GDP  
Short-term 
Debt to 
Reserves  
Exports 
to GDP  
Consumption 
Imports to 
GDP  GDP 
Imported 
Investments 
to GDP  
Terms of 
Trade 
Exports to 
Imports  
Log of 
Exchange 
Rate 
Relative Interest 
Rate 
1.0000             
Inflation -0.3109 1.0000            
Legal 0.0559 -0.1245 1.0000           
Political 0.1084 -0.1695 0.8855 1.0000          
Debt to GDP  -0.0910 0.1170 -0.2939 -0.3726 1.0000         
Short-Term Debt 
to Reserves  
 
0.0860 0.2639 0.1853 0.0220 0.1585 1.0000        
Exports to GDP  
 
-0.1697 0.0279 -0.3593 -0.3542 0.2439 0.2385 1.0000       
Consumption 
Imports to GDP  
 
-0.2454 0.0272 -0.1283 -0.1383 0.4650 0.1674 0.7407 1.0000      
GDP -0.2247 0.4017 -0.1824 -0.1152 -0.1023 -0.0902 0.0441 0.0070 1.0000     
Imported 
Investments to 
GDP  
 
0.2645 -0.1706 0.5281 0.5662 -0.1953 0.2070 -0.1958 -0.0890 -0.0803 1.0000    
Terms of Trade 0.2031 0.1047 0.0444 0.1194 0.0034 -0.1511 -0.3088 -0.1120 -0.0364 -0.5034 1.0000   
Exports to 
Imports  
 
-0.0719 -0.1501 -0.0465 0.0001 -0.3253 0.1331 0.4458 0.1042 -0.0014 -0.1557 -0.0504 1.0000  
Log of Exchange 
Rate 
-0.2064 0.0325 -0.2302 -0.2133 0.2726 0.1582 0.2645 0.1393 0.1026 -0.1004 -0.2957 0.0099 1.0000 
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Latin America 
 
 Relative 
Interest 
Rate 
Inflation Legal  Political  Debt to 
GDP  
Short-term 
Debt to 
Reserves  
Exports 
to GDP  
Consumption 
Imports to 
GDP  
GDP Imported 
Investments 
to GDP  
Terms of 
Trade 
Exports to 
Imports  
Log of 
Exchange 
Rate 
Relative Interest 
Rate 
1.0000             
Inflation 0.0819 1.0000            
Legal -0.5755 -0.1753 1.0000           
Political -0.3921 -0.1654 0.8857 1.0000          
Debt to GDP  
 
0.2051 0.2073 -0.0260 0.0963 1.0000         
Short-Term Debt 
to Reserves  
 
0.2406 0.0592 -0.0592 0.0946 0.5367 1.0000        
Exports to GDP  
 
0.3307 0.0794 0.0567 0.1905 0.2853 -0.0892 1.0000       
Consumption 
Imports to GDP  
 
0.2784 -0.0320 0.0974 0.2004 0.2754 -0.0100 0.7966 1.0000      
GDP -0.0287 0.2721 -0.0140 -0.0175 0.0497 -0.1618 0.2487 0.0362 1.0000     
Imported 
Investments to 
GDP  
 
0.2057 -0.0456 -0.0816 0.0177 0.2543 -0.0353 0.4853 0.7896 -0.0233 1.0000    
Terms of Trade -0.0547 -0.1291 0.0453 0.2418 0.0508 0.1142 0.0515 0.2129 0.0196 0.4411 1.0000   
Exports to 
Imports  
 
0.1308 0.1993 -0.2220 -0.1081 0.0908 -0.0928 0.2676 -0.3246 0.3498 -0.3508 -0.1321 1.0000  
Log of 
Exchange Rate 
0.3395 0.0565 -0.0122 -0.0888 0.3196 0.0967 0.4136 0.4163 -0.0126 0.1266 -0.4071 -0.0844 1.0000 
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East Asia 
 
 
Relative 
Interest 
Rate Inflation Legal  Political  
Debt to 
GDP  
Short-term 
Debt to 
Reserves  
Exports 
to GDP  
Consumption 
Imports to 
GDP  GDP 
Imported 
Investments 
to GDP  
Terms of 
Trade 
Exports to 
Imports  
Log of 
Exchange 
Rate 
Relative Interest 
Rate 
1.0000             
Inflation -0.4005 1.0000            
Legal 0.7275 -0.4780 1.0000           
Political 0.7055 -0.4924 0.9583 1.0000          
Debt to GDP  -0.7493 0.4354 -0.7801 -0.7144 1.0000         
Short-Term Debt 
to Reserves  
 
-0.6700 0.3702 -0.7518 -0.6885 0.8519 1.0000        
Exports to GDP  0.4797 -0.3166 0.4299 0.3154 -0.7054 -0.6714 1.0000       
Consumption 
Imports to GDP 
  
0.4941 -0.3081 0.4411 0.3277 -0.7078 -0.6735 0.9668 1.0000      
GDP -0.0591 -0.4253 -0.0737 -0.0889 -0.1109 0.0173 0.1334 0.0345 1.0000     
Imported 
Investments to 
GDP  
 
0.2726 0.0229 0.5401 0.4790 -0.2846 -0.3253 -0.0767 -0.0022 -0.4110 1.0000    
Terms of Trade 0.0909 -0.2125 0.1120 0.1265 -0.0834 -0.0411 0.1910 0.0060 0.4752 -0.2434 1.0000   
Exports to 
Imports  
 
-0.0453 -0.1378 -0.0735 -0.0936 -0.0587 -0.0181 0.2820 0.0434 0.4557 -0.3017 0.7649 1.0000  
Log of Exchange 
Rate 
-0.4783 0.3654 -0.4828 -0.4194 0.5943 0.5709 -0.8262 -0.9052 0.1619 -0.0343 0.1382 0.1627 1.0000 
 
 
 
